The Federalist Papers - Alexander Hamilton (ebook pc reader txt) 📗

The Federalist Papers

By Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison.

Table of Contents Titlepage Imprint Introduction The Text of the Federalist The Federalist Papers I: General Introduction II: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence III: The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence) IV: The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence) V: The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence) VI: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States VII: The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States) VIII: The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States IX: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection X: The Same Subject Continued (The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection) XI: The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy XII: The Utility of the Union in Respect to Revenue XIII: Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government XIV: Objections to the Proposed Constitution from Extent of Territory Answered XV: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union XVI: The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) XVII: The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) XVIII: The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) XIX: The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) XX: The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) XXI: Other Defects of the Present Confederation XXII: The Same Subject Continued (Other Defects of the Present Confederation) XXIII: The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union XXIV: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered XXV: The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered) XXVI: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered XXVII: The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered) XXVIII: The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered) XXIX: Concerning the Militia XXX: Concerning the General Power of Taxation XXXI: The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) XXXII: The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) XXXIII: The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) XXXIV: The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) XXXV: The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) XXXVI: The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) XXXVII: Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government XXXVIII: The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed XXXIX: The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles XL: On the Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained XLI: General View of the Powers Conferred by the Constitution XLII: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered XLIII: The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered) XLIV: Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States XLV: The Alleged Danger from the Powers of the Union to the State Governments XLVI: The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared XLVII: The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts XLVIII: These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other XLIX: Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention L: Periodical Appeals to the People Considered LI: The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments LII: The House of Representatives LIII: The Same Subject Continued (The House of Representatives) LIV: The Apportionment of Members Among the States LV: The Total Number of the House of Representatives LVI: The Same Subject Continued (The Total Number of the House of Representatives) LVII: The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation LVIII: Objection That the Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands LIX: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members LX: The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members) LXI: The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members) LXII: The Senate LXIII: The Senate Continued LXIV: The Powers of the Senate LXV: The Powers of the Senate Continued LXVI: Objections to the Power of the Senate to Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered LXVII: The Executive Department LXVIII: The Mode of Electing the President LXIX: The Real Character of the Executive LXX: The Executive Department Further Considered LXXI: The Duration in Office of the Executive LXXII: The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered LXXIII: The Provision for the Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power LXXIV: The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive LXXV: The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive LXXVI: The Appointing Power of the Executive LXXVII: The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered