Afghanistan and the Anglo-Russian Dispute - Theo F. Rodenbough (early readers TXT) 📗

It consists (see illustration) of two pads entirely detached, each 4 feet long, 15 inches wide, and 6 inches thick, made of blanket covered with tarpaulin, and encased in stout sacking. One is placed on each side of the elephant’s spine, and retained there by two iron arches. There is no saddle-cloth, the load rests on the ribs; the breast-strap and crupper hook into rings on the saddle; there are rings to fasten the load to; it weighs 140 pounds. With foot-boards it is convenient for riding; a cradle can also be attached for carrying field guns. Recent experiments have shown the practicability of conveying elephants by rail in ordinary open cattle-trucks; they were indifferent to the motion, noises, or bridges; it is said that 32 elephants could be thus carried on one train.

 

[Illustration: Detail of Elephant Saddle.]

 

The excellent railway facilities for moving troops and supplies to the Indo-Afghan frontier were described in 1880, by Traffic Manager Ross, of the Scinde, Punjab, and Delhi Railway, before the United Service Institution of India.

He stated that experiments had been made by the military and railway authorities in loading and disembarking troops and war materiel, and that much experience had been afforded by the Afghan operations of 1878-9.

The movement of troops to and from the frontier commenced in October, 1878, and ended June, 1879. During that period were conveyed over his road 190,000 men, 33,000 animals, 500 guns, 112,000,000 pounds of military stores. The maximum number carried in any one month was in November—40,000 men, 8,000 animals, and 20,800,000 pounds of stores. The greatest number of special trains run in one day was eight, carrying 4,100 men, 300 animals, and 800,000 pounds of stores. As an instance of rapid loading, when the both Bengal Cavalry left for Malta, 80 horses were loaded on a train in 10 minutes appears to have been clean forgotten. The Politicals were by no means silent, and the amount of knowledge they possessed of border statistics was something marvellous. Did any step appear to the military sense advisable, there was a much better, though less comprehensible, political reason why it should not be undertaken. The oracle has spoken and the behest must be obeyed. An enemy in sight who became afterwards hostile, must not be kept at a distance; through political glasses they appear as ‘children of nature,’ while the country out of sight must not be explored, the susceptibilities of the sensitive ‘Tammizais’ having to be respected. That much valuable service was performed by political officers there can be no doubt, but that they caused great exasperation among soldiers cannot be denied, and the example of the War of 1839-40 causes them to be looked upon as a very possible source of danger.

Anglo-Afghan Operations.—The observations of a participant [Footnote: Lieut. Martin, R. E. (_Journal U. S. I. of India_).] in the last British campaign in Afghanistan will be found of value in the study of future operations in that country. Of the Afghan tactics he says: “The enemy (generally speaking, a race of Highlanders) vastly preferred the attack, and usually obtained the advantage of superior numbers before risking an attack; … being able to dispense (for the time) with lines of communication and baggage and commissariat columns, the Afghan tribes were often able to raise large gatherings on chosen ground. They could always attack us; we were rarely able (except when they chose) to find them at home.” This observer says the regular troops of the Ameer were not so formidable as the tribal gatherings. The presence of a tactically immovable artillery hinders the action of an Asiatic army. The mounted men are usually the first to leave when the fight is going against their side in a general engagement. One of the best specimens of their tactics was at Ahmed-Kheyl, on the Ghazni-Kandahar road, when the British division was one hundred miles from any support. The Afghans assembled a force outnumbering the British ten to one. The attack was made in a series of rushes, twice dispersing the British cavalry, and once driving back the infantry. Exposed to a constant fire of field guns, the Afghans stood their ground, although poorly armed with a variety of obsolete weapons—from an Enfield to a handjar or a stick. Trouble may always be expected from the night attacks of certain tribes like the Alizais and Waziris.

The English infantry formation was an objectionably close one, and Lieut. Martin says that the bayonets and rifle-barrels of the front rank were sometimes struck and jammed by bullets from the rear rank. The action of the English cavalry, as at Ahmed-Kheyl, was suicidal in receiving the enemy’s charge—practically at a halt. Occasionally shelter trenches were used, but disapproved.

In the Kuram valley column, under General Roberts, the cavalry (principally native, with one regular squadron and a battery of horse artillery) formed a brigade, but was never used independently, nor was it instructed (although well equipped) for modern cavalry work. The opposition to dismounted cavalry duty is still so great, in the British army, that the mounted arm is paralyzed for effective service.

Very little was done by the horse artillery with the Kuram column. In the case of the field artillery it was found necessary on two occasions to transfer the ammunition boxes from the bullock-carts to the backs of elephants, on account of the steepness of the hills. The mountain artillery (native) was the most serviceable; a Gatling battery, packed on ponies, and in charge of a detachment of Highlanders, was never used however.

The armament of the infantry included both Martini and Snider rifles, requiring two kinds of ammunition, but, as the service by pack-mules was ample, no confusion ensued, although Lieut. Martin says: “In one case I heard a whisper that a regimental reserve of ammunition was found to be blank cartridges, but this must be a heavy joke.” Intrenching tools were carried on camels. A mixture of military and civil-engineer administration and operation is mentioned as unsatisfactory in results. There was great difficulty in getting tools and materials at the opening of the campaign—particularly those required for road and bridge work, although a railroad within two hundred miles had a large stock on hand.

 

[Illustration: Noah’s Valley, Kunar River.]

 

The art of camping and rough fortification was well practised. The best defended camp was surrounded by bush abatis and flanked by half-moon sungas of boulder-stone work, which held the sentries. The most approved permanent camps or “posts” were mud serais flanked by bastions at the alternate angles and overlooking a yard or “kraal.” These were established about ten miles apart, to protect communications, and furnished frequent patrols. During the latter part of the campaign these outposts were manned by the native contingents of the Punjab who volunteered.

The rapid march of General Roberts from Kabul to Kandahar in August, 1880, and the final dispersion of the forces of Ayoub Khan, illustrated British operations in Afghanistan under the most favorable circumstances. The forces included 2,800 European and 7,000 Indian troops; no wheeled artillery was taken; one regiment of native infantry, trained to practical engineering work, did the work of sappers and miners; for the transportation of sick and wounded 2,000 doolie-bearers, 286 ponies, and 43 donkeys; for transport of supplies a pack-train of 1,589 yabus, 4,510 mules, 1,224 Indian ponies, 912 donkeys—a total of 10,148 troops, 8,143 native followers, and 11,224 animals, including cavalry horses; 30 days’ rations, of certain things, and dependence on the country for fresh meat and forage. The absence of timber on this route rendered it difficult to obtain fuel except by burning the roofs of the villages and digging up the roots of “Southern-wood” for this purpose. The manner of covering the movement rested with the cavalry commander. Usually the front was covered by two regiments, one regiment on each flank, at a mile from the column, detaching one or more troops as rear-guard; once movement had commenced, the animals, moving at different gaits were checked as little as possible. With such a number of non-combatants the column was strung out for six or seven miles, and the rear-guard leaving one camp at 7 A.M. rarely reached the next—fifteen to twenty miles distant—before sundown.

 

[Illustration: Watch-Tower in the Khaiber Pass.]

 

Routes.—For operations in Afghanistan the general British base is the frontier from Kurrachee to Peshawur. These points are connected by a railway running east of the Indus, which forms a natural boundary to the Indian frontier, supplemented by a line of posts which are from north to south as follows: Jumrud, Baru, Mackeson, Michni, Shub Kadar, Abazai, and Kohut; also by fortified posts connected by military roads,—Thull, Bunnoo, and Doaba.

From the Indus valley into the interior of Afghanistan there are only four lines of communication which can be called military roads: first, from Peshawur through the Khaiber Pass to Kabul; second, from Thull, over the Peiwar and Shuturgurdan passes to Kabul; third, from Dera Ismail Khan through the Guleir Surwandi and Sargo passes to Ghazni; fourth, by Quetta to Kandahar and thence to Herat, or by Ghazni to Kabul. Besides these there are many steep, difficult, mule tracks over the bleak, barren, Sulimani range, which on its eastern side is very precipitous and impassable for any large body of troops.

 

[Illustration: Fort of Ali Musjid, from the Heights above Lala Cheena in the Khaiber Pass.]

 

The Peshawur-Kabul road, 170 miles long, was in 1880 improved and put in good order. From Peshawur the road gradually rises, and after 7 miles reaches Jumrud (1,650 feet elevation), and 44 miles further west passes through the great Khaiber Pass. This pass, 31 miles long, can, however, be turned by going to the north through the Absuna and Tartara passes; they are not practicable for wheels, and the first part of the road along the Kabul River is very difficult and narrow, being closed in by precipitous cliffs.

As far as Fort Ali Musjid the Khaiber is a narrow defile between perpendicular slate rocks 1,460 feet high; beyond that fort the road becomes still more difficult, and in some of the narrowest parts, along the rocky beds of torrents, it is not more than 56 feet wide. Five miles further it passes through the valley of Lalabeg 1-1/2 miles wide by 6 miles long, and then after rising for four miles it reaches the top of the Pass, which from both sides offers very strong strategical positions. From thence it descends for 2-1/2 miles to the village of Landi Khana (2,463 feet), which lies in a gorge about a quarter of a mile wide; then on to Dakka (altitude 1,979 feet). This pass, 100 to 225 feet wide and 60 feet long, is shut in by steep but not high slopes, overgrown with bushes.

 

[Illustration: Fort of Dakka, on the Kabul River.]

 

On the eleven miles’ march from Dakka to Hazarnao, the Khurd Khaiber is passed, a deep ravine about one mile long, and in many places so narrow that two horsemen cannot pass each other. Hazarnao is well cultivated, and rich in fodder; 15 miles farther is Chardeh (1,800 feet altitude), from which the road passes through a well-cultivated country, and on through the desert of Surkh Denkor (1,892 feet altitude), which is over 8-1/2 miles from Jelalabad. From this city (elsewhere described) onward as far as Gundamuck the route presents no great difficulties; it passes through orchards, vineyards, and cornfields to the Surkhab River; but beyond this three spurs of the Safed Koh range, running in a northeastern direction, have to be surmounted.

 

[Illustration: The Ishbola Tepe, Khaiber Pass.]

 

Between Jelalabad [Footnote: The heat at Jelalabad from the end of April is tremendous—105 degrees to 110 degrees in the shade.] and Kabul two roads can be followed: the first crosses the