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happiness and of the happiness of others, subordinating, on proper occasions, the first to the second. This theory is definite in its opposition to all the others, but admits of considerable latitude of view within itself. Stoicism and Epicureanism, are both included in its compass.

The two last-named theories--Self-Interest, and Utility or the Common Well-Being, have exclusive regard to the consequences of actions; the others assign to consequences a subordinate position. The terms External and Dependent are also used to express the reference to Happiness as the end: Internal and Independent are the contrasting epithets.

II. Ethical Theory embraces certain questions of pure PSYCHOLOGY.

1. The Psychological nature of Conscience, the Moral Sense, or by whatever name we designate the faculty of distinguishing right and wrong, together with the motive power to follow the one and eschew the other. That such a faculty exists is admitted. The question is, what is its place and origin in the mind?

On the one side, Conscience is held to be a _unique_ and ultimate power of the mind, like the feeling of Resistance, the sense of Taste, or the consciousness of Agreement. On the other side, Conscience is viewed as a growth or derivation from other recognized properties of the mind. The Theory of the Standard (4) called the doctrine of the Moral Sense, proceeds upon the first view; on that theory, the Standard and the Faculty make properly but one question. All other theories are more or less compatible with the composite or derivative nature of Conscience; the supporters of Utility, in particular, adopt this alternative.

2. A second Psychological question, regarded by many (notably by Kant) as vitally implicated in Moral Obligation, is the Freedom of the Will. The history of opinion on this subject has been in great part already given.

3. Thirdly, It has been debated, on Psychological grounds, whether our Benevolent actions (which all admit) are ultimately modes of self-regard, or whether there be, in the human mind, a source of purely Disinterested conduct. The first view, or the reference of benevolence to Self, admits of degrees and varieties of statement.

(1) It may be held that in performing good actions, we expect and obtain an immediate reward fully equivalent to the sacrifice made. Occasionally we are rewarded in kind; but the reward most usually forthcoming (according to Mandeville), is praise or flattery, to which the human mind is acutely sensitive.

(2) Our constitution may be such that we are pained by the sight of an object in distress, and give assistance, to relieve ourselves of the pain. This was the view of Hobbes; and it is also admitted by Mandeville as a secondary motive.

(3) We may be so formed as to derive enjoyment from the performance of acts of kindness, in the same immediate way that we are gratified by warmth, flowers, or music; we should thus be moved to benevolence by an intrinsic pleasure, and not by extraneous consequences.

Bentham speaks of the pleasures and the pains of Benevolence, meaning that we derive pleasure from causing pleasure to others, and pain from the sight of pain in others.

(4) It may be affirmed that, although we have not by nature any purely disinterested impulses, these are generated in us by associations and habits, in a manner similar to the conversion of means into final ends, as in the case of money. This is the view propounded by James Mill, and by Mackintosh.

Allowance being made for a certain amount of fact in these various modes of connecting Benevolence with self, it is still maintained in the present work, as by Butler, Hume, Adam Smith, and others, that human beings are (although very unequally) endowed with a prompting to relieve the pains and add to the pleasures of others, irrespective of all self-regarding considerations; and that such prompting is not a product of associations with self.

In the ancient world, purely disinterested conduct was abundantly manifested in practice, although not made prominent in Ethical Theory. The enumeration of the Cardinal Virtues does not expressly contain Benevolence; but under Courage, Self-sacrifice was implied. Patriotic Self-devotion, Love, and Friendship were virtues highly cultivated. In Cicero, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius, there is a recognition of general Benevolence.

The two heads now sketched--The Standard and the Psychology of our Moral nature--almost entirely exhaust modern Ethics. Smith, Stewart, and Mackintosh agree in laying down as the points in dispute these two:--First, What does virtue consist in? Secondly, What is the power or faculty of the mind that discovers and enforces it?

These two positions, however, are inadequate as regards Ancient Ethics. For remedying the deficiency, and for bringing to light matters necessary to the completeness of an Ethical survey, we add the following heads:--

III. The Theory of what constitutes the Supreme END of Life, the BONUM or the SUMMUM BONUM. The question as to the highest End has divided the Ethical Schools, both ancient and modern. It was the point at issue between the Stoics and the Epicureans. That Happiness is not the highest end has been averred, in modern times, by Butler and others: the opposite position is held by the supporters of Utility. What may be called the severe and ascetic systems (theoretically) refuse to sanction any pursuit of happiness or pleasure, except through virtue, or duty to others. The view practically proceeded upon, now and in most ages, is that virtue discharges a man's obligations to his fellows, which being accomplished, he is then at liberty to seek what pleases himself. (For the application of the laws of mind to the theory of HAPPINESS, see Appendix C.)

IV.-The CLASSIFICATION OF DUTIES is characteristic of different systems and different authors. The oldest scheme is the Four Cardinal Virtues--Prudence, Courage, Temperance, Justice. The modern Christian moralists usually adopt the division--Duties to God, to Others, to Self.

Moreover, there are differences in the substance of Morality itself, or the things actually imposed. The code under Christianity has varied both from Judaism and from Paganism.

V.-The relationship of Ethics to POLITICS is close, while the points of difference of the two are also of great importance. In Plato the two subjects were inseparable; and in Aristotle, they were blended to excess. Hobbes also joined Ethics and Politics in one system. (See Chap, ii., Sec. 3.)

VI.-The relation of Ethics to THEOLOGY is variously represented in modern systems. The Fathers and the Schoolmen accepted the authority of the Bible chiefly on tradition, and did not venture to sit in judgment on the substance of the revelation. They, therefore, rested their Ethics exclusively on the Bible; or, at most, ventured upon giving some mere supplement of its precepts.

Others, in more modern times, have considered that the moral character of a revelation enters into the evidence in its favour; whence, morality must be considered as independent, and exclusively human, in its origin. It would be reasoning in a circle to derive the moral law from the bible, and then to prove the bible from the moral law.

Religion superadds its own sanction to the moral duties, so far as adopted by it; laying especial stress upon select precepts. It likewise calls into being a distinct code of duties, the religious duties strictly so called; which have no force except with believers. The 'duties to God,' in the modern classification, are religious, as distinguished from moral duties.


CHAPTER II.

THE ETHICAL STANDARD.

1. ETHICS, or Morality, is a department of Practice; and, as with other practical departments, is defined by its End.

Ethics is not mere knowledge or speculation, like the sciences of Astronomy, Physiology, or Psychology; it is knowledge applied to practice, or useful ends, like Navigation, Medicine, or Politics. Every practical subject has some end to be served, the statement of which is its definition in the first instance. Navigation is the applying of different kinds of knowledge, and of a variety of devices, to the end of sailing the seas.

2. The Ethical End is a certain portion of the welfare of human beings living together in society, realized through rules of conduct duly enforced.

The obvious intention of morality is the good of mankind. The precepts--do not steal, do not kill, fulfil agreements, speak truth--whatever other reasons may be assigned for them, have a direct tendency to prevent great evils that might otherwise arise in the intercourse of human beings.

Farther, the good aimed at by Ethics is attained by _rules of acting_, on the part of one human being to another; and, inasmuch as these rules often run counter to the tendencies of the individual mind, it is requisite to provide _adequate inducements_ to comply with them.

The Ethical End is what is otherwise called the STANDARD, test, or criterion, of Right and Wrong. The leading controversy of Morals is centered in this point.

3. The Rules of Ethics, termed also Law, Laws, the Moral Law, are of two kinds:--

The first are rules imposed under a Penalty for neglect, or violation. The penalty is termed _Punishment_; the imposing party is named Government, or Authority; and the rules so imposed and enforced, are called Laws proper, Morality proper, Obligatory Morality, Duty.

4. The second are rules whose only external support is _Rewards_; constituting Optional Morality, Merit, Virtue, or Nobleness.

Moral duties are a set of rules, precepts, or prescriptions, for the direction of human conduct in a certain sphere or province. These rules are enforced by two kinds of motives, requiring to be kept distinct.

I.--One class of rules are made compulsory by the infliction of pain, in the case of violation or neglect. The pain so inflicted is termed a Penalty, or Punishment; it is one of the most familiar experiences of all human beings living in society.

The Institution that issues Rules of this class, and inflicts punishment when they are not complied with, is termed Government, or Authority; all its rules are authoritative, or obligatory; they are Laws strictly so called, Laws proper. Punishment, Government, Authority, Superiority, Obligation, Law, Duty,--define each other; they are all different modes of regarding the same fact.

Morality is thus in every respect analagous to Civil Government, or the Law of the Land. Nay, farther, it squares, to a very great extent, with Political Authority. The points where the two coincide, and those where they do not coincide, may be briefly stated:--

(1) All the most essential parts of Morality are adopted and carried out by the Law of the Land. The rules for protecting person and property, for fulfilling contracts, for performing reciprocal duties, are rules or laws of the State; and are enforced by the State, through its own machinery. The penalties inflicted by public authority constitute what is called the Political Sanction; they are the most severe, and the most strictly and dispassionately administered, of all penalties.

(2) There are certain Moral duties enforced, not by public and official authority, but by the members of the community in their private capacity. These are sometimes called the Laws of Honour, because they are punished by withdrawing from the violator the honour or esteem of his fellow-citizens. Courage, Prudence as regards self, Chastity, Orthodoxy of opinion, a certain conformity in Tastes and Usages,--are all prescribed by the mass of each community, to a greater or less extent, and are insisted on under penalty of social disgrace and excommunication. This is the Social or the Popular Sanction. The department so marked out, being distinct from the Political sphere, is called, by Austin, Positive Morality, or Morality proper.

Public opinion also chimes in with the Law, and adds its own sanction to the legal penalties for offences: unless the law happens to be in conflict with the popular sentiment. Criminals, condemned
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