The Ethics - Benedictus de Spinoza (ebook reader online free TXT) 📗

the mind, as I have shown above, is defined by the

understanding only, we shall determine solely by the knowledge of

the mind the remedies against the emotions, which I believe all

have had experience of, but do not accurately observe or

distinctly see, and from the same basis we shall deduce all those

conclusions, which have regard to the mind’s blessedness.

 

AXIOMS.

 

I. If two contrary actions be started in the same subject, a

change must necessarily take place, either in both, or in one of

the two, and continue until they cease to be contrary.

 

II. The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause,

in so far as its essence is explained or defined by the essence

of its cause.

(This axiom is evident from III. vii.)

 

PROPOSITIONS.

 

PROP. I. Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged

and associated in the mind, so are the modifications of body or

the images of things precisely in the same way arranged and

associated in the body.

Proof.-The order and connection of ideas is the same (II.

vii.) as the order and connection of things, and vice vers� the

order and connection of things is the same (II. vi. Coroll. and

vii.) as the order and connection of ideas. Wherefore, even as

the order and connection of ideas in the mind takes place

according to the order and association of modifications of the

body (II. xviii.), so vice vers� (III. ii.) the order and

connection of modifications of the body takes place in accordance

with the manner, in which thoughts and the ideas of things are

arranged and associated in the mind. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. II. If we remove a disturbance of the spirit, or emotion,

from the thought of an external cause, and unite it to other

thoughts, then will the love or hatred towards that external

cause, and also the vacillations of spirit which arise from these

emotions, be destroyed.

Proof.-That, which constitutes the reality of love or hatred,

is pleasure or pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause

(Def. of the Emotions, vi. vii.) ; wherefore, when this cause is

removed, the reality of love or hatred is removed with it ;

therefore these emotions and those which arise therefrom are

destroyed. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. III. An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a

passion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof.

Proof.-An emotion, which is a passion, is a confused idea (by

the general Def. of the Emotions). If, therefore, we form a

clear and distinct idea of a given emotion, that idea will only

be distinguished from the emotion, in so far as it is referred to

the mind only, by reason (II. xxi., and note) ; therefore (III.

iii.), the emotion will cease to be a passion. Q.E.D.

Corollary-An emotion therefore becomes more under our

control, and the mind is less passive in respect to it, in

proportion as it is more known to us.

 

PROP. IV. There is no modification of the body, whereof we

cannot form some clear and distinct conception.

Proof.-Properties which are common to all things can only be

conceived adequately (II. xxxviii.) ; therefore (II. xii. and

Lemma ii. after II. xiii.) there is no modification of the body,

whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception.

Q.E.D.

Corollary.-Hence it follows that there is no emotion, whereof

we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. For an

emotion is the idea of a modification of the body (by the general

Def. of the Emotions), and must therefore (by the preceding

Prop.) involve some clear and distinct conception.

Note.-Seeing that there is nothing which is not followed by

an effect (I. xxxvi.), and that we clearly and distinctly

understand whatever follows from an idea, which in us is adequate

(II. xl.), it follows that everyone has the power of clearly and

distinctly understanding himself and his emotions, if not

absolutely, at any rate in part, and consequently of bringing it

about, that he should become less subject to them. To attain

this result, therefore, we must chiefly direct our efforts to

acquiring, as far as possible, a clear and distinct knowledge of

every emotion, in order that the mind may thus, through emotion,

be determined to think of those things which it clearly and

distinctly perceives, and wherein it fully acquiesces : and thus

that the emotion itself may be separated from the thought of an

external cause, and may be associated with true thoughts ; whence

it will come to pass, not only that love, hatred, &c. will be

destroyed (V. ii.), but also that the appetites or desires, which

are wont to arise from such emotion, will become incapable of

being excessive (IV. lxi.). For it must be especially remarked,

that the appetite through which a man is said to be active, and

that through which he is said to be passive is one and the same.

For instance, we have shown that human nature is so constituted,

that everyone desires his fellow-men to live after his own

fashion (III. xxxi. note) ; in a man, who is not guided by

reason, this appetite is a passion which is called ambition, and

does not greatly differ from pride ; whereas in a man, who lives

by the dictates of reason, it is an activity or virtue which is

called piety (IV. xxxvii. note. i. and second proof). In like

manner all appetites or desires are only passions, in so far as

they spring from inadequate ideas ; the same results are

accredited to virtue, when they are aroused or generated by

adequate ideas. For all desires, whereby we are determined to

any given action, may arise as much from adequate as from

inadequate ideas (IV. lix.). Than this remedy for the emotions

(to return to the point from which I started), which consists in

a true knowledge thereof, nothing more excellent, being within

our power, can be devised. For the mind has no other power save

that of thinking and of forming adequate ideas, as we have shown

above (III. iii.).

 

PROP. V. An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive simply,

and not as necessary, or as contingent, or as possible, is, other

conditions being equal, greater than any other emotion.

Proof.-An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to be

free, is greater than one towards what we conceive to be

necessary (III. xlix.), and, consequently, still greater than one

towards what we conceive as possible, or contingent (IV. xi.).

But to conceive a thing as free can be nothing else than to

conceive it simply, while we are in ignorance of the causes

whereby it has been determined to action (II. xxxv. note) ;

therefore, an emotion towards a thing which we conceive simply

is, other conditions being equal, greater than one, which we feel

towards what is necessary, possible, or contingent, and,

consequently, it is the greatest of all. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. VI. The mind has greater power over the emotions and is

less subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things as

necessary.

Proof.-The mind understands all things to be necessary (I.

xxix.) and to be determined to existence and operation by an

infinite chain of causes ; therefore (by the foregoing

Proposition), it thus far brings it about, that it is less

subject to the emotions arising therefrom, and (III. xlviii.)

feels less emotion towards the things themselves. Q.E.D.

Note.-The more this knowledge, that things are necessary, is

applied to particular things, which we conceive more distinctly

and vividly, the greater is the power of the mind over the

emotions, as experience also testifies. For we see, that the

pain arising from the loss of any good is mitigated, as soon as

the man who has lost it perceives, that it could not by any means

have been preserved. So also we see that no one pities an

infant, because it cannot speak, walk, or reason, or lastly,

because it passes so many years, as it were, in unconsciousness.

Whereas, if most people were born full-grown and only one here

and there as an infant, everyone would pity the infants ; because

infancy would not then be looked on as a state natural and

necessary, but as a fault or delinquency in Nature ; and we may

note several other instances of the same sort.

 

PROP. VII. Emotions which are aroused or spring from reason, if

we take account of time, are stronger than those, which are

attributable to particular objects that we regard as absent.

Proof.-We do not regard a thing as absent, by reason of the

emotion wherewith we conceive it, but by reason of the body,

being affected by another emotion excluding the existence of the

said thing (II. xvii.). Wherefore, the emotion, which is

referred to the thing which we regard as absent, is not of a

nature to overcome the rest of a man’s activities and power (IV.

vi.), but is, on the contrary, of a nature to be in some sort

controlled by the emotions, which exclude the existence of its

external cause (IV. ix.). But an emotion which springs from

reason is necessarily referred to the common properties of things

(see the def. of reason in II. xl. note. ii.), which we always

regard as present (for there can be nothing to exclude their

present existence), and which we always conceive in the same

manner (II. xxxviii.). Wherefore an emotion of this kind always

remains the same ; and consequently (V. Ax. i.) emotions, which

are contrary thereto and are not kept going by their external

causes, will be obliged to adapt themselves to it more and more,

until they are no longer contrary to it ; to this extent the

emotion which springs from reason is more powerful. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. VIII. An emotion is stronger in proportion to the number

of simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused.

Proof.-Many simultaneous causes are more powerful than a few

(III. vii.) : therefore (IV. v.), in proportion to the increased

number of simultaneous causes whereby it is aroused, an emotion

becomes stronger. Q.E.D.

Note-This proposition is also evident from V. Ax. ii.

 

PROP. IX. An emotion, which is attributable to many and diverse

causes which the mind regards as simultaneous with the emotion

itself, is less hurtful, and we are less subject thereto and less

affected towards each of its causes, than if it were a different

and equally powerful emotion attributable to fewer causes or to a

single cause.

Proof.-An emotion is only bad or hurtful, in so far as it

hinders the mind from being able to think (IV. xxvi. xxvii.) ;

therefore, an emotion, whereby the mind is determined to the

contemplation of several things at once, is less hurtful than

another equally powerful emotion, which so engrosses the mind in

the single contemplation of a few objects or of one, that it is

unable to think of anything else ; this was our first point.

Again, as the mind’s essence, in other words, its power (III.

vii.), consists solely in thought (II. xi.), the mind is less

passive in respect to an emotion, which causes it to think of

several things at once, than in regard to an equally strong

emotion, which keeps it engrossed in the contemplation of a few

or of a single object : this was our second point. Lastly, this

emotion (III. xlviii.), in so far as it is attributable to

several causes, is less powerful in regard to each of them.

Q.E.D.

 

PROP. X. So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to

our nature, we have the power of arranging and associating the

modifications of our body according to the intellectual order.

Proof.-The emotions, which are contrary to our nature, that

is (IV. xxx.), which