The Ethics - Benedictus de Spinoza (ebook reader online free TXT) 📗

like compassion, though not a virtue,

is yet good, in so far as it shows, that the feeler of shame is

really imbued with the desire to live honourably ; in the same

way as suffering is good, as showing that the injured part is not

mortified. Therefore, though a man who feels shame is sorrowful,

he is yet more perfect than he, who is shameless, and has no

desire to live honourably.

Such are the points which I undertook to remark upon

concerning the emotions of pleasure and pain ; as for the

desires, they are good or bad according as they spring from good

or evil emotions. But all, in so far as they are engendered in

us by emotions wherein the mind is passive, are blind (as is

evident from what was said in IV. xliv. note), and would be

useless, if men could easily, be induced to live by the guidance

of reason only, as I will now briefly, show.

 

PROP. LIX. To all the actions, whereto we are determined by

emotion wherein the mind is passive ; we can be determined

without emotion by reason.

Proof.-To act rationally, is nothing else (III. iii. and Def.

ii.) but to perform those actions, which follow from the

necessity, of our nature considered in itself alone. But pain is

bad, in so far as it diminishes or checks the power of action

(IV. xli.) ; wherefore we cannot by pain be determined to any

action, which we should be unable to perform under the guidance

of reason. Again, pleasure is bad only in so far as it hinders a

man’s capability for action (IV. xli. xliii.) ; therefore to this

extent we could not be determined by it to any action, which we

could not perform under the guidance of reason. Lastly,

pleasure, in so far as it is good, is in harmony with reason (for

it consists in the fact that a man’s capability for action is

increased or aided) ; nor is the mind passive therein, except in

so far as a man’s power of action is not increased to the extent

of affording him an adequate conception of himself and his

actions (III. iii., and note).

Wherefore, if a man who is pleasurably affected be brought to

such a state of perfection, that he gains an adequate conception

of himself and his own actions, he will be equally, nay more,

capable of those actions, to which he is determined by emotion

wherein the mind is passive. But all emotions are attributable

to pleasure, to pain, or to desire (Def. of the Emotions, iv.

explanation) ; and desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) is nothing

else but the attempt to act ; therefore, to all actions, &c.

Q.E.D.

Another Proof.-A given action is called bad, in so far as it

arises from one being affected by hatred or any evil emotion.

But no action, considered in itself alone, is either good or bad

(as we pointed out in the preface to Pt. IV.), one and the same

action being sometimes good, sometimes bad ; wherefore to the

action which is sometimes bad, or arises from some evil emotion,

we may be led by reason (IV. xix.). Q.E.D.

Note.-An example will put this point in a clearer light. The

action of striking, in so far as it is considered physically, and

in so far as we merely look to the fact that a man raises his

arm, clenches his fist, and moves his whole arm violently

downwards, is a virtue or excellence which is conceived as proper

to the structure of the human body. If, then, a man, moved by

anger or hatred, is led to clench his fist or to move his arm,

this result takes place (as we showed in Pt. II.), because one

and the same action can be associated with various mental images

of things ; therefore we may be determined to the performance of

one and the same action by confused ideas, or by clear and

distinct ideas. Hence it is evident that every desire which

springs from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, would become

useless, if men could be guided by reason. Let us now see why

desire which arises from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, is

called by us blind.

 

PROP. LX. Desire arising from a pleasure or pain, that is not

attributable to the whole body, but only to one or certain parts

thereof, is without utility in respect to a man as a whole.

Proof.-Let it be assumed, for instance, that A, a part of a

body, is so strengthened by some external cause, that it prevails

over the remaining parts (IV. vi.). This part will not endeavour

to do away with its own powers, in order that the other parts of

the body may perform its office ; for this it would be necessary

for it to have a force or power of doing away with its own

powers, which (III. vi.) is absurd. The said part, and,

consequently, the mind also, will endeavour to preserve its

condition. Wherefore desire arising from a pleasure of the kind

aforesaid has no utility in reference to a man as a whole. If it

be assumed, on the other hand, that the part, A, be checked so

that the remaining parts prevail, it may be proved in the same

manner that desire arising from pain has no utility in respect to

a man as a whole. Q.E.D.

Note.-As pleasure is generally (IV. xliv. note) attributed to

one part of the body, we generally desire to preserve our being

with out taking into consideration our health as a whole : to

which it may be added, that the desires which have most hold over

us (IV. ix.) take account of the present and not of the future.

 

PROP. LXI. Desire which springs from reason cannot be excessive.

Proof.-Desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) considered

absolutely is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is

conceived as in any way determined to a particular activity by

some given modification of itself. Hence desire, which arises

from reason, that is (III. iii.), which is engendered in us in so

far as we act, is the actual essence or nature of man, in so far

as it is conceived as determined to such activities as are

adequately conceived through man’s essence only (III. Def. ii.).

Now, if such desire could be excessive, human nature considered

in itself alone would be able to exceed itself, or would be able

to do more than it can, a manifest contradiction. Therefore,

such desire cannot be excessive. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. LXII. In so far as the mind conceives a thing under the

dictates of reason, it is affected equally, whether the idea be

of a thing future, past, or present.

Proof.-Whatsoever the mind conceives under the guidance of

reason, it conceives under the form of eternity or necessity (II.

xliv. Coroll. ii.), and is therefore affected with the same

certitude (II. xliii. and note). Wherefore, whether the thing be

present, past, or future, the mind conceives it under the same

necessity and is affected with the same certitude ; and whether

the idea be of something present, past, or future, it will in all

cases be equally true (II. xli.) ; that is, it will always

possess the same properties of an adequate idea (II. Def. iv.) ;

therefore, in so far as the mind conceives things under the

dictates of reason, it is affected in the same manner, whether

the idea be of a thing future, past, or present. Q.E.D.

Note.-If we could possess an adequate knowledge of the

duration of things, and could determine by reason their periods

of existence, we should contemplate things future with the same

emotion as things present ; and the mind would desire as though

it were present the good which it conceived as future ;

consequently it would necessarily neglect a lesser good in the

present for the sake of a greater good in the future, and would

in no wise desire that which is good in the present but a source

of evil in the future, as we shall presently show. However, we

can have but a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of

things (II. xxxi.) ; and the periods of their existence (II.

xliv. note.) we can only determine by imagination, which is not

so powerfully affected by the future as by the present. Hence

such true knowledge of good and evil as we possess is merely

abstract or general, and the judgment which we pass on the order

of things and the connection of causes, with a view to

determining what is good or bad for us in the present, is rather

imaginary than real. Therefore it is nothing wonderful, if the

desire arising from such knowledge of good and evil, in so far as

it looks on into the future, be more readily checked than the

desire of things which are agreeable at the present time. (Cf.

IV. xvi.)

 

PROP. LXIII. He who is led by fear, and does good in order to

escape evil, is not led by reason.

Proof.-All the emotions which are attributable to the mind as

active, or in other words to reason, are emotions of pleasure and

desire (III. lix.) ; therefore, he who is led by fear, and does

good in order to escape evil, is not led by reason.

Note.-Superstitions persons, who know better how to rail at

vice than how to teach virtue, and who strive not to guide men by

reason, but so to restrain them that they would rather escape

evil than love virtue, have no other aim but to make others as

wretched as themselves ; wherefore it is nothing wonderful, if

they be generally troublesome and odious to their fellow-men.

Corollary.-Under desire which springs from reason, we seek

good directly, and shun evil indirectly.

Proof.-Desire which springs from reason can only spring from

a pleasurable emotion, wherein the mind is not passive (III.

lix.), in other words, from a pleasure which cannot be excessive

(IV. lxi.), and not from pain ; wherefore this desire springs

from the knowledge of good, not of evil (IV. viii.) ; hence under

the guidance of reason we seek good directly and only by

implication shun evil. Q.E.D.

Note.-This Corollary may be illustrated by the example of a

sick and a healthy man. The sick man through fear of death eats

what he naturally shrinks from, but the healthy man takes

pleasure in his food, and thus gets a better enjoyment out of

life, than if he were in fear of death, and desired directly to

avoid it. So a judge, who condemns a criminal to death, not from

hatred or anger but from love of the public well-being, is guided

solely by reason.

 

PROP. LXIV. The knowledge of evil is an inadequate knowledge.

Proof.-The knowledge of evil (IV. viii.) is pain, in so far

as we are conscious thereof. Now pain is the transition to a

lesser perfection (Def. of the Emotions, iii.) and therefore

cannot be understood through man’s nature (III. vi., and vii.) ;

therefore it is a passive state (III. Def. ii.) which (III. iii.)

depends on inadequate ideas ; consequently the knowledge thereof

(II. xxix.), namely, the knowledge of evil, is inadequate.

Q.E.D.

Corollary.-Hence it follows that, if the human mind possessed

only adequate ideas, it would form no conception of evil.

 

PROP. LXV. Under the guidance of reason we should pursue the

greater of two goods and the lesser of two evils.

Proof.-A good which prevents our enjoyment of a greater good

is in reality an evil ; for we apply the terms good and bad to

things, in so far as we compare them one with another (see

preface to this Part) ; therefore, evil is in reality a lesser