The Ethics - Benedictus de Spinoza (ebook reader online free TXT) 📗

be

about not to exist.

Now thought being an attribute of God, must necessarily exist

unchanged (by Prop. xi., and Prop. xx., Coroll. ii.) ; and beyond

the limits of the duration of the idea of God (supposing the

latter at some time not to have existed, or not to be going to

exist) thought would perforce have existed without the idea of

God, which is contrary to our hypothesis, for we supposed that,

thought being given, the idea of God necessarily flowed

therefrom. Therefore the idea of God expressed in thought, or

anything which necessarily follows from the absolute nature of

some attribute of God, cannot have a limited duration, but

through the said attribute is eternal, which is our second point.

Bear in mind that the same proposition may be affirmed of

anything, which in any attribute necessarily follows from God’s

absolute nature.

 

PROP. XXII. Whatsoever follows from any attribute of God, in so

far as it is modified by a modification, which exists necessarily

and as infinite, through the said attribute, must also exist

necessarily and as infinite.

Proof.-The proof of this proposition is similar to that of

the preceding one.

 

PROP. XXIII. Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as

infinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature

of some attribute of God, or from an attribute modified by a

modification which exists necessarily, and as infinite.

Proof.-A mode exists in something else, through which it must

be conceived (Def. v.), that is (Prop. xv.), it exists solely in

God, and solely through God can be conceived. If therefore a mode

is conceived as necessarily existing and infinite, it must

necessarily be inferred or perceived through some attribute of

God, in so far as such attribute is conceived as expressing the

infinity and necessity of existence, in other words (Def. viii.)

eternity ; that is, in so far as it is considered absolutely. A

mode, therefore, which necessarily exists as infinite, must

follow from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, either

immediately (Prop. xxi.) or through the means of some

modification, which follows from the absolute nature of the said

attribute ; that is (by Prop. xxii.), which exists necessarily

and as infinite.

 

PROP. XXIV. The essence of things produced by God does not

involve existence.

Proof.-This proposition is evident from Def. i. For that of

which the nature (considered in itself) involves existence is

self-caused, and exists by the sole necessity of its own nature.

Corollary.-Hence it follows that God is not only the cause of

things coming into existence, but also of their continuing in

existence, that is, in scholastic phraseology, God is cause of

the being of things (essendi rerum). For whether things exist,

or do not exist, whenever we contemplate their essence, we see

that it involves neither existence nor duration ; consequently,

it cannot be the cause of either the one or the other. God must

be the sole cause, inasmuch as to him alone does existence

appertain. (Prop. xiv. Coroll. i.) Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XXV. God is the efficient cause not only of the existence

of things, but also of their essence.

Proof.-If this be denied, then God is not the cause of the

essence of things ; and therefore the essence of things can (by

Ax. iv.) be conceived without God. This (by Prop. xv.) is

absurd. Therefore, God is the cause of the essence of things.

Q.E.D.

Note.-This proposition follows more clearly from Prop. xvi.

For it is evident thereby that, given the divine nature, the

essence of things must be inferred from it, no less than their

existence-in a word, God must be called the cause of all things,

in the same sense as he is called the cause of himself. This

will be made still clearer by the following corollary.

Corollary.-Individual things are nothing but modifications of

the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God

are expressed in a fixed and definite manner. The proof appears

from Prop. xv. and Def. v.

 

PROP. XXVI. A thing which is conditioned to act in a particular

manner, has necessarily been thus conditioned by God ; and that

which has not been conditioned by God cannot condition itself to

act.

Proof.-That by which things are said to be conditioned to act

in a particular manner is necessarily something positive (this is

obvious) ; therefore both of its essence and of its existence God

by the necessity of his nature is the efficient cause (Props.

xxv. and xvi.) ; this is our first point. Our second point is

plainly to be inferred therefrom. For if a thing, which has not

been conditioned by God, could condition itself, the first part

of our proof would be false, and this, as we have shown is

absurd.

 

PROP. XXVII. A thing, which has been conditioned by God to act

in a particular way, cannot render itself unconditioned.

Proof.-This proposition is evident from the third axiom.

 

PROP. XXVIII. Every individual thing, or everything which is

finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be

conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and

action by a cause other than itself, which also is finite, and

has a conditioned existence ; and likewise this cause cannot in

its turn exist, or be conditioned to act, unless it be

conditioned for existence and action by another cause, which also

is finite, and has a conditioned existence, and so on to

infinity.

Proof.-Whatsoever is conditioned to exist and act, has been

thus conditioned by God (by Prop. xxvi. and Prop. xxiv.,

Coroll.).

But that which is finite, and has a conditioned existence,

cannot be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God

; for whatsoever follows from the absolute nature of any

attribute of God is infinite and eternal (by Prop. xxi.). It

must, therefore, follow from some attribute of God, in so far as

the said attribute is considered as in some way modified ; for

substance and modes make up the sum total of existence (by Ax. i.

and Def. iii., v.), while modes are merely modifications of the

attributes of God. But from God, or from any of his attributes,

in so far as the latter is modified by a modification infinite

and eternal, a conditioned thing cannot follow. Wherefore it

must follow from, or be conditioned for, existence and action by

God or one of his attributes, in so far as the latter are

modified by some modification which is finite, and has a

conditioned existence. This is our first point. Again, this

cause or this modification (for the reason by which we

established the first part of this proof) must in its turn be

conditioned by another cause, which also is finite, and has a

conditioned existence, and, again, this last by another (for the

same reason) ; and so on (for the same reason) to infinity.

Q.E.D.

Note.-As certain things must be produced immediately by God,

namely those things which necessarily follow from his absolute

nature, through the means of these primary attributes, which,

nevertheless, can neither exist nor be conceived without God, it

follows :-1. That God is absolutely the proximate cause of those

things immediately produced by him. I say absolutely, not after

his kind, as is usually stated. For the effects of God cannot

either exist or be conceived without a cause (Prop. xv. and Prop.

xxiv. Coroll.). 2. That God cannot properly be styled the remote

cause of individual things, except for the sake of distinguishing

these from what he immediately produces, or rather from what

follows from his absolute nature. For, by a remote cause, we

understand a cause which is in no way conjoined to the effect.

But all things which are, are in God, and so depend on God, that

without him they can neither be nor be conceived.

 

PROP. XXIX. Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all

things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular

manner by the necessity of the divine nature.

Proof.-Whatsoever is, is in God (Prop. xv.). But God cannot

be called a thing contingent. For (by Prop. xi.) he exists

necessarily, and not contingently. Further, the modes of the

divine nature follow therefrom necessarily, and not contingently

(Prop. xvi.) ; and they thus follow, whether we consider the

divine nature absolutely, or whether we consider it as in any way

conditioned to act (Prop. xxvii.). Further, God is not only the

cause of these modes, in so far as they simply exist (by Prop.

xxiv, Coroll.), but also in so far as they are considered as

conditioned for operating in a particular manner (Prop. xxvi.).

If they be not conditioned by God (Prop. xxvi.), it is

impossible, and not contingent, that they should condition

themselves ; contrariwise, if they be conditioned by God, it is

impossible, and not contingent, that they should render

themselves unconditioned. Wherefore all things are conditioned by

the necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist, but also

to exist and operate in a particular manner, and there is nothing

that is contingent. Q.E.D.

Note.-Before going any further, I wish here to explain, what

we should understand by nature viewed as active (natura

naturans), and nature viewed as passive (natura naturata). I say

to explain, or rather call attention to it, for I think that,

from what has been said, it is sufficiently clear, that by nature

viewed as active we should understand that which is in itself,

and is conceived through itself, or those attributes of

substance, which express eternal and infinite essence, in other

words (Prop. xiv., Coroll. i., and Prop. xvii., Coroll. ii) God,

in so far as he is considered as a free cause.

By nature viewed as passive I understand all that which

follows from the necessity of the nature of God, or of any of the

attributes of God, that is, all the modes of the attributes of

God, in so far as they are considered as things which are in God,

and which without God cannot exist or be conceived.

 

PROP. XXX. Intellect, in function (actu) finite, or in function

infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the

modifications of God, and nothing else.

Proof.-A true idea must agree with its object (Ax. vi.) ; in

other words (obviously), that which is contained in the intellect

in representation must necessarily be granted in nature. But in

nature (by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) there is no substance save

God, nor any modifications save those (Prop. xv.) which are in

God, and cannot without God either be or be conceived. Therefore

the intellect, in function finite, or in function infinite, must

comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God,

and nothing else. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XXXI. The intellect in function, whether finite or

infinite, as will, desire, love, &c., should be referred to

passive nature and not to active nature.

Proof.-By the intellect we do not (obviously) mean absolute

thought, but only a certain mode of thinking, differing from

other modes, such as love, desire, &c., and therefore (Def. v.)

requiring to be conceived through absolute thought. It must (by

Prop. xv. and Def. vi.), through some attribute of God which

expresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought, be so

conceived, that without such attribute it could neither be nor be

conceived. It must therefore be referred to nature passive

rather than to nature active, as must also the other modes of

thinking. Q.E.D.

Note.-I do not here, by speaking of intellect in function,

admit that there is such a thing as intellect in potentiality :

but, wishing to avoid all confusion, I desire to speak only of

what is most clearly perceived by us, namely, of the very act of

understanding, than which nothing is more clearly perceived. For

we cannot perceive anything without adding to our knowledge of

the act of