The Ethics - Benedictus de Spinoza (ebook reader online free TXT) 📗

understanding.

 

PROP. XXXII. Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a

necessary cause.

Proof.-Will is only a particular mode of thinking, like

intellect ; therefore (by Prop. xxviii.) no volition can exist,

nor be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned by some cause

other than itself, which cause is conditioned by a third cause,

and so on to infinity. But if will be supposed infinite, it must

also be conditioned to exist and act by God, not by virtue of his

being substance absolutely infinite, but by virtue of his

possessing an attribute which expresses the infinite and eternal

essence of thought (by Prop. xxiii.). Thus, however it be

conceived, whether as finite or infinite, it requires a cause by

which it should be conditioned to exist and act. Thus (Def.

vii.) it cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary or

constrained cause. Q.E.D.

Coroll. I.-Hence it follows, first, that God does not act

according to freedom of the will.

Coroll. II.-It follows, secondly, that will and intellect

stand in the same relation to the nature of God as do motion, and

rest, and absolutely all natural phenomena, which must be

conditioned by God (Prop. xxix.) to exist and act in a particular

manner. For will, like the rest, stands in need of a cause, by

which it is conditioned to exist and act in a particular manner.

And although, when will or intellect be granted, an infinite

number of results may follow, yet God cannot on that account be

said to act from freedom of the will, any more than the infinite

number of results from motion and rest would justify us in saying

that motion and rest act by free will. Wherefore will no more

appertains to God than does anything else in nature, but stands

in the same relation to him as motion, rest, and the like, which

we have shown to follow from the necessity of the divine nature,

and to be conditioned by it to exist and act in a particular

manner.

 

PROP. XXXIII. Things could not have been brought into being by

God in any manner or in any order different from that which has

in fact obtained.

Proof-All things necessarily follow from the nature of God

(Prop. xvi.), and by the nature of God are conditioned to exist

and act in a particular way (Prop. xxix.). If things, therefore,

could have been of a different nature, or have been conditioned

to act in a different way, so that the order of nature would have

been different, God’s nature would also have been able to be

different from what it now is ; and therefore (by Prop. xi.) that

different nature also would have perforce existed, and

consequently there would have been able to be two or more Gods.

This (by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) is absurd. Therefore things

could not have been brought into being by God in any other

manner, &c. Q.E.D.

Note I.-As I have thus shown, more clearly than the sun at

noonday, that there is nothing to justify us in calling things

contingent, I wish to explain briefly what meaning we shall

attach to the word contingent ; but I will first explain the

words necessary and impossible.

A thing is called necessary either in respect to its essence

or in respect to its cause ; for the existence of a thing

necessarily follows, either from its essence and definition, or

from a given efficient cause. For similar reasons a thing is

said to be impossible ; namely, inasmuch as its essence or

definition involves a contradiction, or because no external cause

is granted, which is conditioned to produce such an effect ; but

a thing can in no respect be called contingent, save in relation

to the imperfection of our knowledge.

A thing of which we do not know whether the essence does or

does not involve a contradiction, or of which, knowing that it

does not involve a contradiction, we are still in doubt

concerning the existence, because the order of causes escapes

us,-such a thing, I say, cannot appear to us either necessary or

impossible. Wherefore we call it contingent or possible.

Note II.-It clearly follows from what we have said, that

things have been brought into being by God in the highest

perfection, inasmuch as they have necessarily followed from a

most perfect nature. Nor does this prove any imperfection in

God, for it has compelled us to affirm his perfection. From its

contrary proposition, we should clearly gather (as I have just

shown), that God is not supremely perfect, for if things had been

brought into being in any other way, we should have to assign to

God a nature different from that, which we are bound to attribute

to him from the consideration of an absolutely perfect being.

I do not doubt, that many will scout this idea as absurd, and

will refuse to give their minds up to contemplating it, simply

because they are accustomed to assign to God a freedom very

different from that which we (Def. vii.) have deduced. They

assign to him, in short, absolute free will. However, I am also

convinced that if such persons reflect on the matter, and duly

weigh in their minds our series of propositions, they will reject

such freedom as they now attribute to God, not only as nugatory,

but also as a great impediment to organized knowledge. There is

no need for me to repeat what I have said in the note to Prop.

xvii. But, for the sake of my opponents, I will show further,

that although it be granted that will pertains to the essence of

God, it nevertheless follows from his perfection, that things

could not have been by him created other than they are, or in a

different order ; this is easily proved, if we reflect on what

our opponents themselves concede, namely, that it depends solely

on the decree and will of God, that each thing is what it is. If

it were otherwise, God would not be the cause of all things.

Further, that all the decrees of God have been ratified from all

eternity by God himself. If it were otherwise, God would be

convicted of imperfection or change. But in eternity there is no

such thing as when, before, or after ; hence it follows solely

from the perfection of God, that God never can decree, or never

could have decreed anything but what is ; that God did not exist

before his decrees, and would not exist without them. But, it is

said, supposing that God had made a different universe, or had

ordained other decrees from all eternity concerning nature and

her order, we could not therefore conclude any imperfection in

God. But persons who say this must admit that God can change his

decrees. For if God had ordained any decrees concerning nature

and her order, different from those which he has ordained-in

other words, if he had willed and conceived something different

concerning nature-he would perforce have had a different

intellect from that which he has, and also a different will. But

if it were allowable to assign to God a different intellect and a

different will, without any change in his essence or his

perfection, what would there be to prevent him changing the

decrees which he has made concerning created things, and

nevertheless remaining perfect? For his intellect and will

concerning things created and their order are the same, in

respect to his essence and perfection, however they be conceived.

Further, all the philosophers whom I have read admit that

God’s intellect is entirely actual, and not at all potential ; as

they also admit that God’s intellect, and God’s will, and God’s

essence are identical, it follows that, if God had had a

different actual intellect and a different will, his essence

would also have been different ; and thus, as I concluded at

first, if things had been brought into being by God in a

different way from that which has obtained, God’s intellect and

will, that is (as is admitted) his essence would perforce have

been different, which is absurd.

As these things could not have been brought into being by God

in any but the actual way and order which has obtained ; and as

the truth of this proposition follows from the supreme perfection

of God ; we can have no sound reason for persuading ourselves to

believe that God did not wish to create all the things which were

in his intellect, and to create them in the same perfection as he

had understood them.

But, it will be said, there is in things no perfection nor

imperfection ; that which is in them, and which causes them to be

called perfect or imperfect, good or bad, depends solely on the

will of God. If God had so willed, he might have brought it

about that what is now perfection should be extreme imperfection,

and vice vers�. What is such an assertion, but an open

declaration that God, who necessarily understands that which he

wishes, might bring it about by his will, that he should

understand things differently from the way in which he does

understand them? This (as we have just shown) is the height of

absurdity. Wherefore, I may turn the argument against its

employers, as follows :-All things depend on the power of God.

In order that things should be different from what they are,

God’s will would necessarily have to be different. But God’s

will cannot be different (as we have just most clearly

demonstrated) from God’s perfection. Therefore neither can

things be different. I confess, that the theory which subjects

all things to the will of an indifferent deity, and asserts that

they are all dependent on his fiat, is less far from the truth

than the theory of those, who maintain that God acts in all

things with a view of promoting what is good. For these latter

persons seem to set up something beyond God, which does not

depend on God, but which God in acting looks to as an exemplar,

or which he aims at as a definite goal. This is only another

name for subjecting God to the dominion of destiny, an utter

absurdity in respect to God, whom we have shown to be the first

and only free cause of the essence of all things and also of

their existence. I need, therefore, spend no time in refuting

such wild theories.

 

PROP. XXXIV. God’s power is identical with his essence.

Proof.-From the sole necessity of the essence of God it

follows that God is the cause of himself (Prop. xi.) and of all

things (Prop. xvi. and Coroll.). Wherefore the power of God, by

which he and all things are and act, is identical with his

essence. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XXXV. Whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of God,

necessarily exists.

Proof.-Whatsoever is in God’s power, must (by the last Prop.)

be comprehended in his essence in such a manner, that it

necessarily follows therefrom, and therefore necessarily exists.

Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XXXVI. There is no cause from whose nature some effect

does not follow.

Proof.-Whatsoever exists expresses God’s nature or essence in

a given conditioned manner (by Prop. xxv., Coroll.) ; that is,

(by Prop. xxxiv.), whatsoever exists, expresses in a given

conditioned manner God’s power, which is the cause of all things,

therefore an effect must (by Prop. xvi.) necessarily follow.

Q.E.D.

 

APPENDIX :

In the foregoing I have explained the nature and properties

of God. I have shown that he necessarily exists, that he is one

: that he is, and acts solely by the necessity of his own nature

; that he is the free cause of all things, and how he is so ;

that all things are in God, and so depend on