The Evolution of Man, vol 1 - Ernst Haeckel (funny books to read .TXT) 📗

of the Philosophie Zoologique, I will briefly explain Lamarck’s leading thought. He held that there was no essential difference between living and lifeless beings. Nature is one united and connected system of phenomena; and the forces which fashion the lifeless bodies are the only ones at work in the kingdom of living things. We have, therefore, to use the same method of investigation and explanation in both provinces. Life is only a physical phenomenon. All the plants and animals, with man at their head, are to be explained, in structure and life, by mechanical or efficient causes, without any appeal to final causes, just as in the case of minerals and other inorganic bodies. This applies equally to the origin of the various species. We must not assume any original creation, or repeated creations (as in Cuvier’s theory), to explain this, but a natural, continuous, and necessary evolution. The whole evolutionary process has been uninterrupted. All the different kinds of animals and plants which we see to-day, or that have ever lived, have descended in a natural way from earlier and different species; all come from one common stock, or from a few common ancestors. These remote ancestors must have been quite simple organisms of the lowest type, arising by spontaneous generation from inorganic matter. The succeeding species have been constantly modified by adaptation to their varying environment (especially by use and habit), and have transmitted their modifications to their successors by heredity.

Lamarck was the first to formulate as a scientific theory the natural origin of living things, including man, and to push the theory to its extreme conclusions—the rise of the earliest organisms by spontaneous generation (or abiogenesis) and the descent of man from the nearest related mammal, the ape. He sought to explain this last point, which is of especial interest to us here, by the same agencies which he found at work in the natural origin of the plant and animal species.

He considered use and habit (adaptation) on the one hand, and heredity on the other, to be the chief of these agencies. The most important modifications of the organs of plants and animals are due, in his opinion, to the function of these very organs, or to the use or disuse of them. To give a few examples, the woodpecker and the humming-bird have got their peculiarly long tongues from the habit of extracting their food with their tongues from deep and narrow folds or canals; the frog has developed the web between his toes by his own swimming; the giraffe has lengthened his neck by stretching up to the higher branches of trees, and so on. It is quite certain that this use or disuse of organs is a most important factor in organic development, but it is not sufficient to explain the origin of species.

To adaptation we must add heredity as the second and not less important agency, as Lamarck perfectly recognised. He said that the modification of the organs in any one individual by use or disuse was slight, but that it was increased by accumulation in passing by heredity from generation to generation. But he missed altogether the principle which Darwin afterwards found to be the chief factor in the theory of transformation—namely, the principle of natural selection in the struggle for existence. It was partly owing to his failure to detect this supremely important element, and partly to the poor condition of all biological science at the time, that Lamarck did not succeed in establishing more firmly his theory of the common descent of man and the other animals.

Independently of Lamarck, the older German school of natural philosophy, especially Reinhold Treviranus, in his Biologie (1802), and Lorentz Oken, in his Naturphilosophie (1809), turned its attention to the problem of evolution about the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century. I have described its work in my History of Creation (chapter 4). Here I can only deal with the brilliant genius whose evolutionary ideas are of special interest—the greatest of German poets, Wolfgang Goethe. With his keen eye for the beauties of nature, and his profound insight into its life, Goethe was early attracted to the study of various natural sciences. It was the favourite occupation of his leisure hours throughout life. He gave particular and protracted attention to the theory of colours. But the most valuable of his scientific studies are those which relate to that “living, glorious, precious thing,” the organism. He made profound research into the science of structures or morphology (morphae =

forms). Here, with the aid of comparative anatomy, he obtained the most brilliant results, and went far in advance of his time. I may mention, in particular, his vertebral theory of the skull, his discovery of the pineal gland in man, his system of the metamorphosis of plants, etc. These morphological studies led Goethe on to research into the formation and modification of organic structures which we must count as the first germ of the science of evolution. He approaches so near to the theory of descent that we must regard him, after Lamarck, as one of its earliest founders. It is true that he never formulated a complete scientific theory of evolution, but we find a number of remarkable suggestions of it in his splendid miscellaneous essays on morphology. Some of them are really among the very basic ideas of the science of evolution. He says, for instance (1807): “When we compare plants and animals in their most rudimentary forms, it is almost impossible to distinguish between them. But we may say that the plants and animals, beginning with an almost inseparable closeness, gradually advance along two divergent lines, until the plant at last grows in the solid, enduring tree and the animal attains in man to the highest degree of mobility and freedom.” That Goethe was not merely speaking in a poetical, but in a literal genealogical, sense of this close affinity of organic forms is clear from other remarkable passages in which he treats of their variety in outward form and unity in internal structure. He believes that every living thing has arisen by the interaction of two opposing formative forces or impulses. The internal or “centripetal” force, the type or “impulse to specification,” seeks to maintain the constancy of the specific forms in the succession of generations: this is heredity. The external or “centrifugal” force, the element of variation or “impulse to metamorphosis,” is continually modifying the species by changing their environment: this is adaptation. In these significant conceptions Goethe approaches very close to a recognition of the two great mechanical factors which we now assign as the chief causes of the formation of species.

However, in order to appreciate Goethe’s views on morphology, one must associate his decidedly monistic conception of nature with his pantheistic philosophy. The warm and keen interest with which he followed, in his last years, the controversies of contemporary French scientists, and especially the struggle between Cuvier and Geoffroy St. Hilaire (see chapter 4 of The History of Creation), is very characteristic. It is also necessary to be familiar with his style and general tenour of thought in order to appreciate rightly the many allusions to evolution found in his writings. Otherwise, one is apt to make serious errors.

He approached so close, at the end of the eighteenth century, to the principles of the science of evolution that he may well be described as the first forerunner of Darwin, although he did not go so far as to formulate evolution as a scientific system, as Lamarck did.

CHAPTER 1.5. THE MODERN SCIENCE OF EVOLUTION.

We owe so much of the progress of scientific knowledge to Darwin’s Origin of Species that its influence is almost without parallel in the history of science. The literature of Darwinism grows from day to day, not only on the side of academic zoology and botany, the sciences which were chiefly affected by Darwin’s theory, but in a far wider circle, so that we find Darwinism discussed in popular literature with a vigour and zest that are given to no other scientific conception.

This remarkable success is due chiefly to two circumstances. In the first place, all the sciences, and especially biology, have made astounding progress in the last half-century, and have furnished a very vast quantity of proofs of the theory of evolution. In striking contrast to the failure of Lamarck and the older scientists to attract attention to their effort to explain the origin of living things and of man, we have this second and successful effort of Darwin, which was able to gather to its support a large number of established facts.

Availing himself of the progress already made, he had very different scientific proofs to allege than Lamarck, or St. Hilaire, or Goethe, or Treviranus had had. But, in the second place, we must acknowledge that Darwin had the special distinction of approaching the subject from an entirely new side, and of basing the theory of descent on a consistent system, which now goes by the name of Darwinism.

Lamarck had unsuccessfully attempted to explain the modification of organisms that descend from a common form chiefly by the action of habit and the use of organs, though with the aid of heredity. But Darwin’s success was complete when he independently sought to give a mechanical explanation, on a quite new ground, of this modification of plant and animal structures by adaptation and heredity. He was impelled to his theory of selection on the following grounds. He compared the origin of the various kinds of animals and plants which we modify artificially—by the action of artificial selection in horticulture and among domestic animals—with the origin of the species of animals and plants in their natural state. He then found that the agencies which we employ in the modification of forms by artificial selection are also at work in Nature. The chief of these agencies he held to be “the struggle for life.” The gist of this peculiarly Darwinian idea is given in this formula: The struggle for existence produces new species without premeditated design in the life of Nature, in the same way that the will of man consciously selects new races in artificial conditions. The gardener or the farmer selects new forms as he wills for his own profit, by ingeniously using the agency of heredity and adaptation for the modification of structures; so, in the natural state, the struggle for life is always unconsciously modifying the various species of living things. This struggle for life, or competition of organisms in securing the means of subsistence, acts without any conscious design, but it is none the less effective in modifying structures. As heredity and adaptation enter into the closest reciprocal action under its influence, new structures, or alterations of structure, are produced; and these are purposive in the sense that they serve the organism when formed, but they were produced without any preconceived aim.

This simple idea is the central thought of Darwinism, or the theory of selection. Darwin conceived this idea at an early date, and then, for more than twenty years, worked at the collection of empirical evidence in support of it before he published his theory. His grandfather, Erasmus Darwin, was an able scientist of the older school of natural philosophy, who published a number of natural-philosophic works about the end of the eighteenth century. The most important of them is his Zoonomia, published in 1794, in which he expounds views similar to those of Goethe and Lamarck, without really knowing anything of the work of these contemporaries. However, in the writings of the grandfather the plastic imagination rather outran the judgment, while in Charles Darwin the two were better balanced.

Darwin did not publish any account of his theory until 1858, when Alfred Russel Wallace, who had independently reached the same theory of selection, published his own work. In the following year appeared the Origin of