Elements of Military Art and Science - Henry Wager Halleck (best free ebook reader .TXT) 📗

defended, were sufficient to have held in check the French, even after the great victory of Jena, till the newly-organized forces, acting in concert with the Russian army, could re-establish the Prussian monarchy in its ancient greatness. Profiting by the neglect of the Prussians, Napoleon seized upon the great defensive works of the country, which, to his great joy, were readily surrendered into his hands by the old and inefficient generals who commanded them; and French garrisons were almost immediately established in the fortresses of Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, Magdeburg, Spandau, Hameln, Nieubourg, &c. "Spandau," said he in the 19th Bulletin, "is an inestimable acquisition. In our hands it could sustain two months of operations. But such was the general confusion, that the Prussians had not even armed its batteries." The possession of these fortifications inclined the scale at Eylau. All the historians of the war notice their influence on the campaigns of Friedland and Tilsit.

These Prussian fortresses were retained by Napoleon at the treaty of Tilsit. The campaign of 1809 proved the wisdom of this policy, as they effectually prevented Prussia from joining Austria in rekindling the flames of war. And again in 1813, these works might have produced a decided influence on the campaign, had not the political perfidy of Austria, and the treason of the French generals, prevented Napoleon from profiting by the advantages of his position.

The influence of the fortifications of Spain upon the Peninsular campaigns has often been alluded to by historians. Those works which had been given up to Napoleon previous to the opening of hostilities, contributed very much to the success of his arms; while those which had been retained by Spain and her allies contributed in an equal degree to fetter and embarrass his operations. Some of these, like Saragossa, Tarragona, Gerona, Tortosa, &c. &c., with their broken walls and defective armaments, kept the enemy in check for months; and, by compelling the French to resort to the tedious operations of sieges, did much to weaken the French power in the Peninsula.

The influence of the fortifications of the French frontiers in furnishing a secure basis for the successful operations of Napoleon into the enemy's territory, has already been noticed. If these fortresses of France, after the disasters of 1812 and '13, failed to save the nation, the cause must be sought for in the peculiar features of the invasion itself, rather than any lack of military influence in the French defences. As has been already remarked, a million of disciplined men, under consummate leaders, were here assailing a single state, impoverished by the fatal war in Russia,—torn in pieces by political factions,—deserted by its sworn allies,—its fortresses basely betrayed into the enemy's hands, and its military power paralyzed by the treason of generals with their entire armies. Its only hope was in the fortresses which had remained faithful; and Napoleon said at St. Helena, that if he had collected together the garrisons of these few fortresses and retired to the Rhine, he could have crushed the allies even after their entrance into Paris. But political considerations prevented the operation.

Again in 1815, Napoleon, even after the defeat of Waterloo, possessed lines of defence sufficiently strong to resist all attempts at invasion. But again the want of co-operation on the part of the government at Paris, and the treason of his own generals, forced his second abdication. If he had retained the command of the army, and the nation had seconded his efforts, the allies would never have reached Paris. But the new government presented the disgraceful spectacle of opening the way for the enemies of their country. "France," said Napoleon, "will eternally reproach the ministry with having forced her whole people to pass under the Caudine-forks, by ordering the disbanding of an army that had for twenty-five years been its country's glory, and by giving up to our astonished enemies our still invincible fortresses."

History fully supports Napoleon's opinion of the great danger of penetrating far into a hostile country to attack the capital, even when that capital is without fortifications. The fatal effects of such an advance, without properly securing the means of retreat, is exemplified by his own campaign of 1812, in Russia. If, after the fall of Smolensk, he had fortified that place and Vitepsk, which by their position closed the narrow passage comprised between the Dnieper and the Dwina, he might in all probability, on the following spring, have been able to seize upon Moscow and St. Petersburg. But leaving the hostile army of Tschkokoff in his rear, he pushed on to Moscow, and when the conflagration of that city cut off his hopes of winter quarters there, and the premature rigor of the season destroyed the horses of his artillery and provision-trains, retreat became impossible, and the awful fate of his immense army was closed by scenes of horror to which there is scarcely a parallel in history. This point might be still further illustrated by the Russian campaign of Charles XII., in 1708-9, the fatal advance of the French army on Lisbon, in the Peninsular war, and other examples of the same character.

Even single works sometimes effect the object of lines of fortifications, and frustrate the operations of an entire army. Thus, Lille suspended for a whole year the operations of Prince Eugene and Marlborough; the siege of Landrecies gave Villars an opportunity of changing the fortunes of the war; Pavia, in 1525, lost France her monarch, the flower of her nobility, and her Italian conquests; Metz, in 1552, arrested the entire power of Charles V., and saved France from destruction; Prague, in 1757, brought the greatest warrior of his age to the brink of ruin; St. Jean d'Acre, in 1799, stopped the successful career of Napoleon; Burgos, in 1812, saved the beaten army of Portugal, enabled them to collect their scattered forces, and regain the ascendancy; Strasburg has often been, the bulwark of the French against Germany, saving France from invasion, and perhaps subjugation.

In nearly the language of Napoleon, (Memoirs, vol. IX.,) If Vienna had been fortified in 1805, the battle of Ulm would not have decided the fate of the war. Again, in 1809, if this capital had been fortified, it would have enabled the Archduke Charles, after the disaster of Eckmuhl, by a forced retreat on the left of the Danube, to form a junction with the forces of General Hiller and the Archduke John.

If Berlin had been fortified in 1806, the army routed at Jena would have rallied there and been joined by the Russians. If Madrid had been strongly fortified in 1808, the French army, after the victories of Espinosa, Tudela, Burgos, and Sommo-Sierra, would not have marched towards that capital, leaving in rear of Salamanca and Valladolid, both the English army of General Moore and the Spanish army of Romana. If Moscow had been fortified in 1812, its conflagration would have been avoided, for, with strong defensive works, and the army of Kutusoff encamped on its ramparts, its capture would have been impossible.

Had not Constantinople been well fortified, the empire of Constantine must have terminated in the year 700, whereas the standard of the Prophet was not planted there until 1440. This capital was therefore indebted to its walls for eight hundred years of existence. During this period it was besieged fifty-three times, but only one of these sieges was successful. The French and Venetians took it, but not without a very severe contest.

Paris has often owed its safety to its walls. In 885 the Normans besieged it for two years without effect. In 1358 the Dauphin besieged it in vain. In 1359 Edward, king of England, encamped at Montrouge, devastated the country to its walls, but recoiled from before it, and retired to Chartres. In 1429 it repulsed the attack of Charles VII. In 1464 the Count of Charlerois surrounded the city, but was unsuccessful in his attacks. In 1472 it repulsed the army of the Duke of Bourgone, who had already ravaged its precincts. In 1536, when attacked by Charles V., it again owed its safety to its walls. In 1588 and 1589 it repulsed the armies of Henry III. and Henry IV. In 1636 and several succeeding years the inhabitants of Paris owed their safety to its walls. If this capital had been strongly fortified in 1814 and 1815, the allied armies would not have dared to attempt its investment.

But it is deemed unnecessary to further specify examples; the whole history of modern warfare is one continued proof of the importance of fortifications as a means of national defence, and as an auxiliary in offensive military operations. Our illustrations have been mostly drawn from European wars, but our own brief history, as will be shown hereafter, is not without its proofs.

The use and importance of field-fortifications, intrenched camps, &c., as well as the class of military works called coast-defences, will be discussed hereafter.[6]

[6]