Elements of Military Art and Science - Henry Wager Halleck (best free ebook reader .TXT) 📗
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Louis XIV. and Frederick II. fought mostly on their own frontiers, and followed the system of regular dépôts and supplies. But the revolutionary armies of France made war without magazines, subsisting, sometimes on the inhabitants, sometimes by requisitions levied on the country passed over, and at others by pillage and marauding. Napoleon found little difficulty in supporting an army of a hundred or a hundred and twenty thousand men in Italy, Suabia, and on the rich borders of the Rhine and the Danube; but in Spain, Poland, and Russia, the subject of subsistence became one of extreme embarrassment.
All dépôts of provisions and other supplies for an army are denominated magazines; these are divided into principal, secondary, and provisional. The first are usually on the base of operations; the second, on the line of operations; and the last in the immediate vicinity of the troops, and contain supplies for a few days only.
The system of magazines is objected to by some, because it fetters the movements of an army, and makes its military operations subordinate to the means of supply. Moreover, as the movements of an army must be so arranged as to cover these magazines, their establishment at given points reveals to the enemy our plan of campaign.
On the other hand, the system of requisitions, either for immediate supplies or for secondary magazines, gives far greater velocity and impetuosity to an active army; and if it be so regulated as to repress pillage, and be levied with uniformity and moderation, it may be relied on with safety in well-cultivated countries; but in more barren and less populous districts, an army without magazines, especially in case of a prolonged stay or a forced retreat, will be exposed to great suffering and loss, if not to total destruction.
Before commencing a campaign the general should make himself acquainted with all the resources of the country to be passed over—determine the amount of supplies which it may be necessary to take with him, and the amount that can be obtained by requisitions; these requisitions being levied in a uniform and legal manner, and through the existing local authorities.
In great wars of invasion it is sometimes impracticable, at least for a time, to provide for the immense forces placed on foot, by any regular system of magazines or of ordinary requisitions: in such cases their subsistence is entirely intrusted to the troops themselves, who levy contributions wherever they pass. The inevitable consequences of this system are universal pillage and a total relaxation of discipline; the loss of private property and the violation of individual rights, are followed by the massacre of all straggling parties, and the ordinary peaceful and non-combatant inhabitants are converted into bitter and implacable enemies.
In this connection the war in the Spanish peninsula is well worthy of study. At the beginning of this war Napoleon had to choose between methodical operations, with provisions carried in the train of his army, or purchased of the inhabitants and regularly paid for; and irregular warfare, with forced requisitions—war being made to support war. The question was thoroughly discussed.
On the one hand, by sacrificing three or four millions of francs from the French treasury, he would have been able to support his troops without requisitions, would have maintained good order and discipline in his armies, and by the distribution of this money among a people poor and interested, he would have made many partisans. He could then have offered them, with a firm and just hand, the olive or the sword. But then the drafts upon the French treasury, had the war been a protracted one, would have been enormous for the support of an army of 200,000 men in Spain. Moreover, the hostile and insurrectionary state of the local authorities rendered regular and legal requisitions almost impossible; and the want of navigable rivers, good roads, and suitable transport, rendered problematical the possibility of moving a sufficient quantity of stores in an insurrectionary country. Besides, no great detachments could have been made to regulate the administration of the provinces, or to pursue the insurgent corps into the fastnesses of the mountains. In fine, by this system, he would have effected a military occupation of Spain without its subjugation.
On the other hand, by marching rapidly against all organized masses, living from day to day upon the local resources of the country, as he had done in Italy, sparing his reserves for the occupation and pacification of the conquered provinces; this mode promised more prompt and decisive results than the other. Napoleon, therefore, determined to adopt it for his active masses, employing the system of magazines and regular requisitions so far as practicable. In favorable parts of the country, Soult and Souchet, with smaller armies, succeeded in obtaining in this way regular supplies for a considerable length of time, but the others lived mainly by forced requisitions levied as necessity required. This sometimes gave place to great excesses, but these were principally the faults of subordinate officers who tolerated them, rather than of Napoleon, who punished such breaches of discipline, when they were known to him, with great severity. He afterwards declared that, "had he succeeded he would have indemnified the great mass of the Spanish people for their losses, by the sale of the hoarded wealth of the clergy, which would have rendered the church less powerful, and caused a more just division of property; thus the evil of the war would have been forgotten in the happy triumph of public and private interest over the interest of an ambitious and exclusive clergy."
The following maxims on subsistence have the sanction of the best military writers:
1st. Regular magazines should be formed, so far as practicable, for the supplies of an army; the levying of requisitions being resorted to only where the nature of the war, and the requisite rapidity of marches, render these absolutely necessary to success.
2d. Dépôts should be formed in places strengthened by nature or art, defended by small corps, or garrisons, and situated in positions least liable to attack.
3d. All great dépôts should be placed on navigable rivers, canals, railways, or practical roads, communicating with the line of operations, so that they may be transported with ease and rapidity, as the army advances on this line.
4th. An army should never be without a supply for ten or fifteen days, otherwise the best chances of war may be lost, and the army exposed to great inconveniences. Templehoff says that the great Frederick, in the campaign of 1757, always carried in the Prussian provision-train bread for six, and flour for nine days, and was therefore never at a loss for means to subsist his forces, in undertaking any sudden and decisive operation. The Roman soldier usually carried with him provisions for fifteen days. Napoleon says, "Experience has proved that an army ought to carry with it a month's provisions, ten days' food being carried by the men and baggage-horses and a supply for twenty days by the train of wagons; so that at least four hundred and eighty wagons would be required for an army of forty thousand men; two hundred and forty being regularly organized, and two hundred and forty being obtained by requisition. For this purpose there would be a battalion of three companies for the military stores of each division, each company having its establishment for forty wagons, twenty being furnished by the commissariat, and twenty obtained by requisition. This gives for each division one hundred and twenty wagons, and for each army, four hundred and eighty. Each battalion for a provision-train should have two hundred and ten men."
5th. An army, while actually in motion, can find temporary resources, unless in a sterile country, or one already ravaged by war, or at the season of the year when the old crops are nearly exhausted and the new ones not ready for harvest; but, even supposing the army may in this way be partially or wholly supplied, while in motion, it nevertheless frequently happens that it may remain for some days in position, (as the French at Austerlitz and Ulm;) a supply of hard bread for some ten days will therefore be important to subsist the army till a regular commissariat can be established.
6th. "Supplies of bread and biscuit," says Napoleon, "are no more essential to modern armies than to the Romans; flour, rice, and pulse, may be substituted in marches without the troops suffering any harm. It is an error to suppose that the generals of antiquity did not pay great attention to their magazines; it may be seen in Cæsar's Commentaries, how much he was occupied with this care in his several campaigns. The ancients knew how to avoid being slaves to any system of supplies, or to being obliged to depend on the purveyors; but all the great captains well understood the art of subsistence."
Forage is a military term applied to food of any kind for horses or cattle,—as grass, hay, corn, oats, &c.; and also to the operation of collecting such food. Forage is of two kinds, green and dry; the former being collected directly from the meadows and harvest-fields, and the latter from the barns and granaries of the farmers, or the storehouses of the dealers.
The animals connected with an army may be subsisted by regular magazines, by forced requisitions, or by authorized foraging [7] As has already been remarked, it is not always politic, or even possible, to provide regular magazines for the entire supplies of an army during the active operations of a campaign. On account of the great expense and difficulty of transporting forage, the general of an army is more frequently under the necessity of resorting to requisitions, or forced contributions as they are called, and to foraging, for the subsistence of his animals, than to provide food for his men. Nor are requisitions and foragings for this object so objectionable as in the other case, being far less likely to produce general want and distress among the non-combatant inhabitants.
[7]
This term is sometimes, though improperly, applied to the operation of forcibly collecting food for the troops.
The commanding officer of troops should always use his best endeavors to obtain his forage by purchase of the inhabitants, or by requisitions on the local authorities; and even where these means are impracticable, the foraging parties should be strictly directed to make their levies with uniformity and due moderation. Accurate accounts should be kept of the kinds and quantities of all produce and other property taken, so that it may be regularly distributed and accounted for. Under no circumstances should individuals be permitted to appropriate to themselves more than their pro rata allowance. Foraging parties may sometimes attain their object in a peaceful manner, by representing to the inhabitants the nature of their instructions and the necessity of obtaining immediate supplies. Even where no recompense is proposed, it may be well to offer certificates to the effect that such articles have been taken for the use of the army. These certificates, even when of no value in themselves, frequently tend to appease excited passions and allay insurrections. In defensive war, carried on in one's own country, it is often necessary to seize upon private property and appropriate it to the public service: in all such cases the certificates of the foraging officers become proofs of individual claims against the government.
No foraging party should ever be sent out till after the country has been properly reconnoitred. A good military escort and vanguard should always accompany and precede the foragers, for protection against the enemy's light cavalry and an insurgent militia. Trustworthy troops must be placed in the villages and hamlets of the country to be foraged, in order to prevent the foragers from engaging in irregular and unauthorized pillage. Officers of the staff and administrative corps are sent with the party to see to the proper execution of the orders,
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