Elements of Military Art and Science - Henry Wager Halleck (best free ebook reader .TXT) 📗

useless. In the open field militia cannot in general be manœuvred to advantage; whereas, in the defence of fortified places their superior intelligence and activity not unfrequently render them even more valuable than regulars. And in reading the severe strictures of Washington, Greene, Morgan, and others, upon our militia, it must be remembered that they were at that time entirely destitute of important works of defence; and the experience of all other nations, as well as our own, has abundantly shown that a newly-raised force cannot cope, in the open field, with one subordinate and disciplined. Here science must determine the contest. Habits of strict obedience, and of simultaneous and united action, are indispensable to carry out what the higher principles of the military profession require. New and undisciplined forces are often confounded at the evolutions, and strategic and tactical combinations of a regular army, and lose all confidence in their leaders and in themselves. But, when placed behind a breastwork, they even overrate their security. They can then coolly look upon the approaching columns, and, unmoved by glittering armor and bristling bayonets, will exert all their skill in the use of their weapons. The superior accuracy of aim which the American has obtained by practice from his early youth, has enabled our militia to gain, under the protection of military works, victories as brilliant as the most veteran troops. The moral courage necessary to await an attack behind a parapet, is at least equal to that exerted in the open field, where movements generally determine the victory. To watch the approach of an enemy, to see him move up and display his massive columns, his long array of military equipments, his fascines and scaling-ladders, his instruments of attack, and the professional skill with which he wields them, to hear the thunder of his batteries, spreading death all around, and to repel, hand to hand, those tremendous assaults, which stand out in all their horrible relief upon the canvass of modern warfare, requires a heart at least as brave as the professional warrior exhibits in the pitched battle.

But we must not forget that to call this force into the open field,—to take the mechanic from his shop, the merchant from his counter, the farmer from his plough,—will necessarily be attended with an immense sacrifice of human life. The lives lost on the battle-field are not the only ones; militia, being unaccustomed to exposure, and unable to supply their own wants with certainty and regularity, contract diseases which occasion in every campaign a most frightful mortality.

There is also a vast difference in the cost of supporting regulars and militia forces. The cost of a regular army of twenty thousand men for a campaign of six months, in this country, has been estimated, from data in the War-office, at a hundred and fifty dollars per man; while the cost of a militia force, under the same circumstances, making allowance for the difference in the expenses from sickness, waste of camp-furniture, equipments, &c., will be two hundred and fifty dollars per man. But in short campaigns, and in irregular warfare, like the expedition against Black Hawk and his Indians in the Northwest, and during the hostilities in Florida, "the expenses of the militia," says Mr. Secretary Spencer, in a report to congress in 1842, "invariably exceed those of regulars by at least three hundred per cent." It is further stated that "fifty-five thousand militia were called into service during the Black Hawk and Florida wars, and that thirty millions of dollars have been expended in these conflicts!" When it is remembered that during these border wars our whole regular army did not exceed twelve or thirteen thousand men, it will not be difficult to perceive why our military establishment was so enormously expensive. Large sums were paid to sedentary militia who never rendered the slightest service. Again, during our late war with Great Britain, of less than three years' duration, two hundred and eighty thousand muskets were lost,—the average cost of which is stated at twelve dollars,—making an aggregate loss, in muskets alone, of three millions and three hundred and sixty thousand dollars, during a service of about two years and a half;—resulting mainly from that neglect and waste of public property which almost invariably attends the movements of newly-raised and inexperienced forces. Facts like these should awaken us to the necessity of reorganizing and disciplining our militia. General Knox, when Secretary of War, General Harrison while in the senate, and Mr. Poinsett in 1841, each furnished plans for effecting this purpose, but the whole subject has been passed by with neglect.

Permanent fortifications differ in many of their features from either of the two preceding elements of national defence. They are passive in their nature, yet possess all the conservative properties of an army or navy, and through these two contribute largely to the active operations of a campaign. When once constructed they require but very little expenditure for their support. In time of peace they withdraw no valuable citizens from the useful occupations of life. Of themselves they can never exert an influence corrupting to public morals, or dangerous to public liberty; but as the means of preserving peace, and as obstacles to an invader, their influence and power are immense. While contributing to the economical support of a peace establishment, by furnishing drill-grounds, parades, quarters, &c.; and to its efficiency still more, by affording facilities both to the regulars and militia for that species of artillery practice so necessary in the defence of water frontiers; they also serve as safe dépôts of arms and the immense quantity of materials and military munitions so indispensable in modern warfare. These munitions usually require much time, skill, and expense in their construction, and it is of vast importance that they should be preserved with the utmost care.

Maritime arsenals and dépôts of naval and military stores on the sea-coast are more particularly exposed to capture and destruction. Here an enemy can approach by stealth, striking some sudden and fatal blow before any effectual resistance can be organized. But in addition to the security afforded by harbor fortifications to public property of the highest military value, they also serve to protect the merchant shipping, and the vast amount of private wealth which a commercial people always collect at these points. They furnish safe retreats, and the means of repair for public vessels injured in battle, or by storms, and to merchantmen a refuge from the dangers of sea, or the threats of hostile fleets. Moreover, they greatly facilitate our naval attacks upon the enemy's shipping; and if he attempt a descent, their well-directed fire will repel his squadrons from our harbors, and force his troops to land at some distant and unfavorable position.

The three means of permanent defence which have been mentioned, are, of course, intended to accomplish the same general object; but each has its distinct and proper sphere of action, and neither can be regarded as antagonistical to the others. Any undue increase of one, at the expense of the other two, must necessarily be followed by a corresponding diminution of national strength. We must not infer, however, that all must be maintained upon the same footing. The position of the country and the character of the people must determine this.

England, from her insular position and the extent of her commerce, must maintain a large navy; a large army is also necessary for the defence of her own coasts and the protection of her colonial possessions. Her men-of-war secure a safe passage for her merchant-vessels, and transport her troops in safety through all seas, and thus contribute much to the acquisition and security of colonial territory. The military forces of the British empire amount to about one hundred and fifty thousand men, and the naval forces to about seven hundred vessels of war,[13] carrying in all some fifteen thousand guns and forty thousand men. France has less commerce, and but few colonial possessions. She has a great extent of sea-coast, but her fortifications secure it from maritime descents; her only accessible points are on the land frontiers. Her army and navy, therefore, constitute her principal means of defence. Her army numbers some three hundred and fifty thousand men, and her navy about three hundred and fifty vessels,[13] carrying about nine thousand guns and thirty thousand men. Russia, Austria, Prussia, Sweden, and other continental powers, have but little commerce to be protected, while their extensive frontiers are greatly exposed to land attacks: their fortifications and armies, therefore, constitute their principal means of defence. But for the protection of their own seas from the inroads of their powerful maritime neighbor, Russia and Austria support naval establishments of a limited extent. Russia has, in all, some one hundred and eighty vessels of war, and Austria not quite half that number.[13]

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