Elements of Military Art and Science - Henry Wager Halleck (best free ebook reader .TXT) 📗

States, will take a similar course? All territorial invasion
being out of the question, it is against our great seaports and
strategic points of coast defence—such as New York, New Orleans, and
San Francisco—pre-eminently New York,—that an enemy will concentrate
his efforts. Against these he will prepare such immense armaments,
—against these he will call into existence special agencies of attack,
which (unless met by an inexpugnable defensive system) shall insure
success."

"The mere defense of the city against ordinary fleets, is no longer
the question; but through the defensive works to be here erected, the
nation is to measure its strength against the most lavish use of the
resources of a great maritime power, aided by all that modern science
and mechanical ingenuity in creating or inventing means of attack, can
bring against them; in short, in fortifying New York, we are really
preparing the battle-field on which the issue of future momentous
contests is to be decided."

A few, however, object to the system at present adopted, on the ground that casemated works do not offer sufficient resistance to ships and floating-batteries, and that earthen works, covering a greater area, will accomplish that object much more effectually, while their longer land fronts will be more difficult of reduction by siege.

It cannot be doubted that earthen batteries, with guns in barbette, can, as a general rule, be more easily taken by assault, that they are more exposed to vertical and ricochet firing, and more expose their gunners to be picked off by sharpshooters. Moreover, they give but a very limited fire upon the most desirable point, as the entrance to a harbor. On the other hand, it has not been proved that masonry-casemated works, when properly constructed and properly armed, will not effectually resist a naval cannonade, whether from ships or floating-batteries. The results of recent wars, and of the West Point experiments by General Totten, would seem to prove them abundantly capable of doing this. Against such proofs the mere ad captandum assertion of their incapacity can have but little weight—certainly not enough to justify the abandonment of a system approved by the best military authorities of this country and Europe, and sanctioned by long experience.

Major Barnard, in speaking of the capacity of masonry casemated forts to resist the fire of a hostile armament, and of the propriety of abandoning them for earthen batteries in our system of Coast Defences, uses the following forcible language:—"When we bear in mind that the hostile 'floating batteries,' of whatever description, will themselves be exposed to the most formidable projectiles that can be thrown from shore batteries,—that when they choose to come to 'close quarters,' to attempt to breach, their 'embrasures' present openings through which deluges of grape, canister, and musket balls can be poured upon the gunners; and consider what experience has so far shown, and reason has taught us, with regard to the casemate,—we need not be under apprehension that our casemated works will be battered down; nor doubt that they will, as they did in Russia, answer the important purposes for which they were designed."

"It only remains to show the necessity of such works. It, in general, costs much less to place a gun behind an earthen parapet, than to build a masonry structure covered with bomb-proof arches, in which to mount it. All authorities agree that an open barbette battery (Grivel's very forcible admission has been quoted), on a low site, and to which vessels can approach within 300 or 400 yards, is utterly inadmissible. It may safely be said, that in nine cases out of ten, the sites which furnish the efficient raking and cross fires upon the channels, are exactly of this character; and indeed it very often happens that there are no others."

"When such sites are found, it rarely happens that they afford room for sufficient number of guns in open batteries. Hence the necessity of putting them tier above tier, which involves, of course, the casemated structure. Such works, furnishing from their lower tier a low, raking fire, and (if of several tiers) a plunging fire from their barbettes, offer as favorable emplacements for guns as can be contrived, and afford to their gunners a degree of security quite as great as can be given to men thus engaged."

"On subjects which have a mere speculative importance, there is no danger in giving rein to speculation; but on those of such real and intense practical importance as the security against hostile aggression of the great city and port of New York, it is not admissible to set aside the experience of the past, or the opinions of the best minds who have devoted themselves to such subjects. A means of defence, sanctioned by its being confided in to protect the great ports of Europe—which has protected the great ports of Russia against the most formidable naval armament that ever floated on the ocean, has a claim upon our confidence which mere criticism cannot diminish; and a claim to be adhered to in place of all new 'systems,' until time and trial shall have necessitated (not merely justified) the change."

"If, then, we refer to the practice of other nations, to find what has been judged necessary for the defence of important ports,—to experience, to find how such defensive systems have stood the test of actual trial,—we may draw useful conclusions with regard to what is now required to defend New York. We shall find at Sebastopol—a narrow harbor, which owed its importance to its being the great naval dépôt of Russia on the Black Sea—an array of 700 guns, about 500 of which were placed in five 'masonry-casemated' works (several of them of great size), and the remainder in open batteries. These defensive works fulfilled their object, and sustained the attack of the allied fleet, on the 17th of October, 1854, without sensible damage."

"The facility with which seaports are attacked by fleets—the enormous preparations required—the great risks encountered in landing a besieging army on the coast of a formidable enemy (while, for protection against the former species of attack, costly works are necessary, and against the latter, field works and men can, in emergency, afford protection), naturally caused the Russians to make these water defences their first object. Yet, though almost unprotected on the land side, Sebastopol resisted, for a whole year, an attack on that quarter; and illustrated how, with plenty of men and material, an energetic and effectual land defence may be improvised, where the sea defence is provided for, as thoroughly as it was at that place."

"Let Cronstadt be another example. Great as was the importance of its defence to Russia, it was not greater,—it was by no means as great, as that of New York to our own country. This port, and military and naval dépôt, was defended (in its main approach) by upwards of 600 guns, 500 of which were mounted in five 'masonry-casemated' works; the remainder in an open barbette battery, which enfiladed the main channel. This number is formidable in itself; yet the same number mounted in New York harbor would not afford anything like such a formidable defence as was found at Cronstadt, owing to its great area, and long line of approach, compared with the latter."

"These works fulfilled their object. They protected the great port and dépôt of Cronstadt and the capital of the empire from invasion. For two successive years did the mighty armaments of France and England threaten; but they were overawed by the frowning array of 'casemated castles' which presented itself, and declined the contest."

"Let us turn our eyes now to the great naval dépôt of France. After the almost incredible expenditure lavished here, in creating a harbor facing the shores of her great rival, England, and an equally profuse expenditure in providing all that constitutes a great naval dépôt, we may suppose that the best means, without regard to cost, which the science of man could devise, would be employed here to make this great seat of naval power secure against the formidable means of attack possessed by the great maritime power most likely to be the assailant. The means there employed are (so far as regards mere harbor defence) precisely the same (viz., casemated works in several tiers, combined with open batteries where the locations are favorable); and the application of means is the same as we have found so successful in Russia,—the same which constitute the system of harbor defence of New York."

Captain McClelland, in his official report to the War Department, on the siege of Sebastopol, uses language equally strong and pertinent:—

"The permanent defences of Sebastopol against an attack by water,
although inferior in material and the details of construction to our own
most recent works, proved fully equal to the purpose for which they
were intended. Indeed, the occurrences on the Pacific, the Baltic, and
the Black Sea, all seem to establish beyond controversy, the soundness
of the view so long entertained by all intelligent military men, that
well constructed fortifications must always prove more than a match for
the strongest fleet."

"It is deemed that a calm consideration of the events so hastily and
imperfectly narrated in the preceding pages must lead all unprejudiced
persons among our countrymen to a firm conviction on two vital points:"

"1st. That our system of permanent coast defences is a wise and
proper one, which ought to be completed and armed with the least
possible delay."

"2d. That mere individual courage cannot suffice to overcome the
forces that would be brought against us, were we involved in an European
war, but that it must be rendered manageable by discipline, and
directed by that consummate and mechanical skill which can only be
acquired by a course of education, instituted for the special purpose,
and by long habit."

"In the day of sailing-vessels the successful siege of Sebastopol
would have been impossible. It is evident that the Russians did not
appreciate the advantages afforded by steamers, and were unprepared
to sustain a siege."

"This same power of steam would enable European nations to disembark
upon our shores even a larger force than that which finally encamped
around Sebastopol. To resist such an attack, should it ever be
made, our cities and harbors must be fortified, and those fortifications
must be provided with guns, ammunition, and instructed artillerists.
To repel the advance of such an army into the interior, it is not enough
to trust to the number of brave but undisciplined men that we can
bring to bear against it. An invading army of 15,000 or 20,000 men
could easily be crushed by the unremitting attacks of superior numbers;
but when it comes to the case of more than 100,000 disciplined
veterans, the very multitude brought to bear against them works its
own destruction; because, if without discipline and instruction, they
cannot be handled, and are in their own way. We cannot afford a Moscow
campaign."

"Our regular army never can, and, perhaps, never ought to be, large
enough to provide for all the contingencies that may arise, but it
should be as large as its ordinary avocations in the defence of the
frontier will justify; the number of officers and non-commissioned
officers should be unusually large, to provide for a sudden increase;
and the greatest possible care should be bestowed upon the instruction
of the special arms of the artillery and engineer troops. The militia
and volunteer system should be placed upon some tangible and effective
basis; instructors furnished them from the regular army, and all
possible means taken to spread sound military information among them.
In the vicinity of our sea-coast fortifications, it would be well to
provide a sufficient number of volunteer companies with the means of
instruction in heavy artillery, detailing officers of the regular
artillery for instructors."

On this subject of instructing our volunteers and militia in the use of sea-coast batteries, we add the following quotation from Major Barnard's pamphlet:—

"One of the main causes of inefficiency in coast