Elements of Military Art and Science - Henry Wager Halleck (best free ebook reader .TXT) 📗

batteries, which
has given color to the idea that they may be passed, or even attacked
with impunity, I conceive to be the want of skill and care in the use of
the guns. The result is a prodigious smoke, and a prodigious throwing
away of balls, and very little damage done. This has been, however,
by no means a peculiarity of coast defences. The same system of random
firing has hitherto prevailed, both in the use of small arms in land
and of heavy ordnance in sea battles; nor has it occurred apparently to
even the greatest masters of the art of war, to ask why, for one man
wounded, or for one effective shot in a vessel's hull, so many thousands
of shot should be thrown uselessly into the air."

"But this question is now asked, both in the use of the soldier's
rifled musket, and in the management of ships' guns, as well as of
artillery of all kinds."

"It is at last discovered that it is of more importance to teach the
soldier to direct his piece with accuracy of aim, than to perform
certain motions on parade with the precision of an automaton. The same
idea is now infused into all the departments of military and naval
science, and is a necessary result of the recent great
improvements in the construction of arms. In short, the truth has at
last become apparent that the old-fashioned system of random firing,
though perhaps like the 'charge of the six hundred' at Balaklava, 'bien
magnifique, n'est pas la guerre.'"

"It is of the utmost importance that we should apply this principle
to the management of our sea-coast batteries, and give it a practical
effect. The volunteers of our cities will constitute mainly, in time of
war, the gunners of our forts and manipulators of our sea-coast guns.
In time of war, they will probably be exercised in these duties. But it
is most desirable that we should have at all times a body of gunners,
practised in these exercises. The result would be, not only to give to
our citizens, as well as citizen-soldiers, confidence in the defences
provided for their security, but it would disseminate military
knowledge, and an intelligent idea of the bearing and objects of the
different defensive works. To carry out this idea, it would be
desirable that there should be at each considerable seaport town, a
sufficient garrison of artillery troops to aid in the instruction
of the volunteers. In the present condition of the army this cannot
be hoped; but perhaps it might, at least, be found practicable to detail
an artillery officer or two for the purpose."

NOTE TO CHAPTER VIII.—OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES.

The author has seen nothing since this chapter was written to induce him to change the views therein expressed with respect to the superior strategic importance of the line of Lake Champlain, both as a line of military operations, and as a line of defence. The mutual commercial interests of the United States and the Canadas render a war between the two countries less probable than formerly; nevertheless, such an event is by no means impossible, and common prudence should induce us to prepare in the best possible manner for such a contingency.

NOTE TO CHAPTERS IX., X., XI. AND XII.—ARMY ORGANIZATION.

Since these chapters were written, several important changes have been made in our army organization. The rank of Lieutenant-General (at least, by brevet) has been revived, the staff, administrative corps, infantry and cavalry have been increased, and a company of engineer troops organized. But this company is mainly employed at West Point for instruction of the cadets in the several branches of military engineering, and thus serves to supply a deficiency long felt in the system of education at the Military Academy. The want, however, of troops of this arm for the construction, care, and preservation of our permanent fortifications, and for the general duties of field engineering, still remains to be supplied. Of all the arms of military organization, this one most requires instruction in time of peace; it cannot be supplied at the moment a war is declared.

In speaking of our present army organization, as compared with those of the different European powers which he was sent to examine and report upon, Captain McClelland says:—

"Our force of artillery is large in proportion to the other arms of
service, while the number of our engineer troops is ridiculously and
shamefully small; it is, therefore, more than probable that in any
future siege it will be easy for the artillery to construct their own
batteries, while the engineers will be sufficiently burdened by the
construction of the other works of attack; we have now, at last, the
germ of an artillery school of practice; I would then suggest, for the
consideration of the Secretary, the propriety of causing the artillery
to construct their own batteries. The position and armament of siege
batteries should be determined by consultation between the engineers and
the artillery, the former having the preponderating voice, in order to
secure the necessary harmony and connection between all parts of the
works of attack. This change," he says, "will require to be introduced
into the artillery manual and course of instruction everything in
relation to the preparation of the fascines, gabions, platforms, and
magazines, the dimensions of batteries, manner of arranging, working
parties, etc."

With regard to the suggestion of Captain McClellan, it is sufficient to remark, that it seeks to remedy one evil by introducing another equally as great and equally as objectionable. The defect in our present army organization is that one of its arms is too small for the duties which, from the very nature of military service, naturally and properly belong to it; and it surely is no remedy for this defect to permanently transfer a part of these duties to another arm. As well might it be said, if our artillery force were "ridiculously and shamefully small" in proportion to the infantry and cavalry, that the field batteries should be permanently transferred to those arms, and that light artillery tactics should be comprised in our infantry and cavalry manuals.

There are certain duties which the military experience of ages has shown to properly and almost necessarily belong to each particular arm of an army organization, and every attempt to make one branch perform the appropriate duties of another has invariably destroyed its efficiency for either service. Suppose our medical corps were "ridiculously and shamefully small" in proportion to our pay department, shall our paymasters perform the duties of surgery, and be instructed in the use of the scalpel and amputating instruments! This is, perhaps, an extreme case, but it serves to illustrate the principle.

The defect referred to by Captain McClelland, and which has so often been pointed out by our best military men, cannot be obviated by any transfer or assignment, whether temporary or permanent, of the appropriate duties of one corps to another. Indeed, such a measure would only tend to make this defect permanent, and to convert a temporary into a lasting evil. It can readily be remedied by legislative action, but in no other way. The executive action suggested would be deprecated by all. Moreover, the evil is now so obvious and so generally admitted, that there can be little doubt that Congress will soon perceive the importance of applying the only proper and effective remedy.

NOTE TO CHAPTER XIII.—PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS.

Although the general principles of the plan and arrangement of a permanent fortification, as established by the great masters of this branch of military science, remain the same; nevertheless, the vast improvements which have, within the last few years, been made in projectiles, require some changes in the details of defensive works of this character. These changes consist mainly in an increased thickness of stone and earthen parapets and of the covering of magazines, in the arrangement of embrasures, and in protecting the garrison from an enemy's sharpshooters. The introduction of heavier siege guns, and of heavier ordnance on ships of war, and especially on those propelled by steam, require much larger ordnance in forts designed for the defence of harbors. In the Russian war, Sweaborg was made to suffer from a distant bombardment which left her fortifications intact. These modifications in the arrangements and armaments of forts are absolutely necessary in order to restore the relative power of defence against the improvements made in the means of attack. They can very easily be introduced without changing the form or general character of the works, and they are really so very essential that, without them, a fort constructed 25 or 30 years ago, and well suited to the then existing state of the military art, will be likely to offer no very considerable resistance to modern siege batteries or well organized maritime attacks.

Some have gone much further in their estimate of the effect produced by the increased size and force of military projectiles, and boldly assert that masonry works of strong relief can no longer be used, and that the increased range of small arms requires an entire change of the bastioned front, with lines more extended.

With respect to the effect of the increased range of small arms, it is very natural that a superficial observer should adopt the opinion that this improvement must be followed by an extension of the lines of a defensive military work; but a close study of the subject will probably lead to a different conclusion. Such at least is the opinion of the ablest military engineers of Europe. The lines of the bastioned front now generally in use, were really too long for a good defence with the arms in use at the time it was adopted; and, in theory, the "rampart gun" was to be relied upon for the defence of certain exposed points. But this weapon is no longer in use; its place, however, is better supplied by the increased range of the musket and rifle. The latter weapon is almost invaluable for defending the approaches to a permanent work.

With respect to the breaching of stone masonry by siege batteries, it has long been an established principle that all masonry exposed to the fire of land batteries should be masked by earthen works. The neglect of this rule caused the fall of Bomarsund. Those who so readily draw, from the results of that siege, the inference that the present mode of fortifying land fronts must be abandoned, exhibit their ignorance of military engineering. The facts do not justify their conclusions.

With respect to sea fronts, which can be reached only by guns afloat, the case is very different. They are usually casemates of masonry, not masked by earthen works. Whether the increased efficiency of projectiles thrown by ships and floating batteries now require a resort to this mode of protecting masonry on the water fronts of fortifications, is a question well worthy of discussion. This subject has already been alluded to in the Note on Sea-coast Defences, and it is there shown that no facts have yet been developed which require or authorize any change in our present system.

NOTE TO CHAPTER XIV.—FIELD ENGINEERING.

As Mexico had no permanent fortifications to be besieged, the war in that country afforded very little practice in that branch of engineering which is connected with the attack and defence of permanent works, particularly sapping and mining. The only operation resembling a siege was the investment and bombardment of Vera Cruz, and it is worthy of remark that if General Scott had stormed that place, weak as it was, he must have lost a large number of his men, while from his trenches and batteries he reduced it with scarcely the sacrifice of a single life.

Nor did either party in this war make much use of field works in the attack and defence of positions. Nevertheless, no one can read the history of the war without appreciating the important influence which Fort Brown had upon General Taylor's defence of the left