Unconscious Memory(Fiscle Part-3) - Samuel Butler (digital e reader TXT) 📗

Showing,  As It

Does,  That Many Different Purposes,  Which In The Case Of The Higher

Animals Require A Complicated System Of Organs Of Motion,  Can Be

Attained With Incredibly Simple Means.

 

Arcella Vulgaris Is A Minute Morsel Of Protoplasm,  Which Lives In A

Concave-Convex,  Brown,  Finely Reticulated Shell,  Through A Circular

Opening In The Concave Side Of Which It Can Project Itself By

Throwing Out Pseudopodia.  If We Look Through The Microscope At A

Drop Of Water Containing Living Arcellae,  We May Happen To See One Of

Them Lying On Its Back At The Bottom Of The Drop,  And Making

Fruitless Efforts For Two Or Three Minutes To Lay Hold Of Some Fixed

Point By Means Of A Pseudopodium.  After This There Will Appear

Suddenly From Two To Five,  But Sometimes More,  Dark Points In The

Protoplasm At A Small Distance From The Circumference,  And,  As A

Rule,  At Regular Distances From One Another.  These Rapidly Develop

Themselves Into Well-Defined Spherical Air Vesicles,  And Come

Presently To Fill A Considerable Part Of The Hollow Of The Shell,

Thereby Driving Part Of The Protoplasm Outside It.  After From Five

To Twenty Minutes,  The Specific Gravity Of The Arcella Is So Much

Lessened That It Is Lifted By The Water With Its Pseudopodia,  And

Brought Up Against The Upper Surface Of The Water-Drop,  On Which It

Is Able To Travel.  In From Five To Ten Minutes The Vesicles Will Now

Disappear,  The Last Small Point Vanishing With A Jerk.  If,  However,

Chapter 8 Pg 96

The Creature Has Been Accidentally Turned Over During Its Journey,

And Reaches The Top Of The Water-Drop With Its Back Uppermost,  The

Vesicles Will Continue Growing Only On One Side,  While They Diminish

On The Other; By This Means The Shell Is Brought First Into An

Oblique And Then Into A Vertical Position,  Until One Of The

Pseudopodia Obtains A Footing And The Whole Turns Over.  From The

Moment The Animal Has Obtained Foothold,  The Bladders Become

Immediately Smaller,  And After They Have Disappeared The Experiment

May Be Repeated At Pleasure.

 

The Positions Of The Protoplasm Which The Vesicles Fashion Change

Continually; Only The Grainless Protoplasm Of The Pseudopodia

Develops No Air.  After Long And Fruitless Efforts A Manifest Fatigue

Sets In; The Animal Gives Up The Attempt For A Time,  And Resumes It

After An Interval Of Repose.

 

Engelmann,  The Discoverer Of These Phenomena,  Says (Pfluger's Archiv

Fur Physologie,  Bd. Ii.):  "The Changes In Volume In All The Vesicles

Of The Same Animal Are For The Most Part Synchronous,  Effected In The

Same Manner,  And Of Like Size.  There Are,  However,  Not A Few

Exceptions; It Often Happens That Some Of Them Increase Or Diminish

In Volume Much Faster Than Others; Sometimes One May Increase While

Another Diminishes; All The Changes,  However,  Are Throughout

Unquestionably Intentional.  The Object Of The Air-Vesicles Is To

Bring The Animal Into Such A Position That It Can Take Fast Hold Of

Something With Its Pseudopodia.  When This Has Been Obtained,  The Air

Disappears Without Our Being Able To Discover Any Other Reason For

Its Disappearance Than The Fact That It Is No Longer Needed. . . .

If We Bear These Circumstances In Mind,  We Can Almost Always Tell

Whether An Arcella Will Develop Air-Vesicles Or No; And If It Has

Already Developed Them,  We Can Tell Whether They Will Increase Or

Diminish . . . The Arcellae,  In Fact,  In This Power Of Altering Their

Specific Gravity Possess A Mechanism For Raising Themselves To The

Top Of The Water,  Or Lowering Themselves To The Bottom At Will.  They

Use This Not Only In The Abnormal Circumstances Of Their Being Under

Microscopical Observation,  But At All Times,  As May Be Known By Our

Being Always Able To Find Some Specimens With Air-Bladders At The Top

Of The Water In Which They Live."

 

If What Has Been Already Advanced Has Failed To Convince The Reader

Of The Hopelessness Of Attempting To Explain Instinct As A Mode Of

Conscious Deliberation,  He Must Admit That The Following

Considerations Are Conclusive.  It Is Most Certain That Deliberation

And Conscious Reflection Can Only Take Account Of Such Data As Are

Consciously Perceived; If,  Then,  It Can Be Shown That Data Absolutely

Indispensable For The Arrival At A Just Conclusion Cannot By Any

Possibility Have Been Known Consciously,  The Result Can No Longer Be

Held As Having Had Its Source In Conscious Deliberation.  It Is

Admitted That The Only Way In Which Consciousness Can Arrive At A

Knowledge Of Exterior Facts Is By Way Of An Impression Made Upon The

Senses.  We Must,  Therefore,  Prove That A Knowledge Of The Facts

Indispensable For Arrival At A Just Conclusion Could Not Have Been

Thus Acquired.  This May Be Done As Follows:  {111} For,  Firstly,  The

Facts In Question Lie In The Future,  And The Present Gives No Ground

Chapter 8 Pg 97

For Conjecturing The Time And Manner Of Their Subsequent Development.

 

Secondly,  They Are Manifestly Debarred From The Category Of

Perceptions Perceived Through The Senses,  Inasmuch As No Information

Can Be Derived Concerning Them Except Through Experience Of Similar

Occurrences In Time Past,  And Such Experience Is Plainly Out Of The

Question.

 

It Would Not Affect The Argument If,  As I Think Likely,  It Were To

Turn Out,  With The Advance Of Our Physiological Knowledge,  That All

The Examples Of The First Case That I Am About To Adduce Reduce

Themselves To Examples Of The Second,  As Must Be Admitted To Have

Already Happened In Respect Of Many That I Have Adduced Hitherto.

For It Is Hardly More Difficult To Conceive Of A Priori Knowledge,

Disconnected From Any Impression Made Upon The Senses,  Than Of

Knowledge Which,  It Is True,  Does At The Present Day Manifest Itself

Upon The Occasion Of Certain General Perceptions,  But Which Can Only

Be Supposed To Be Connected With These By Means Of Such A Chain Of

Inferences And Judiciously Applied Knowledge As Cannot Be Believed To

Exist When We Have Regard To The Capacity And Organisation Of The

Animal We May Be Considering.

 

An Example Of The First Case Is Supplied By The Larva Of The Stag-

Beetle In Its Endeavour To Make Itself A Convenient Hole In Which To

Become A Chrysalis.  The Female Larva Digs A Hole Exactly Her Own

Size,  But The Male Makes One As Long Again As Himself,  So As To Allow

For The Growth Of His Horns,  Which Will Be About The Same Length As

His Body.  A Knowledge Of This Circumstance Is Indispensable If The

Result Achieved Is To Be Considered As Due To Reflection,  Yet The

Actual Present Of The Larva Affords It No Ground For Conjecturing

Beforehand The Condition In Which It Will Presently Find Itself.

 

As Regards The Second Case,  Ferrets And Buzzards Fall Forthwith Upon

Blind Worms Or Other Non-Poisonous Snakes,  And Devour Them Then And

There.  But They Exhibit The Greatest Caution In Laying Hold Of

Adders,  Even Though They Have Never Before Seen One,  And Will

Endeavour First To Bruise Their Heads,  So As To Avoid Being Bitten.

As There Is Nothing In Any Other Respect Alarming In The Adder,  A

Conscious Knowledge Of The Danger Of Its Bite Is Indispensable,  If

The Conduct Above Described Is To Be Referred To Conscious

Deliberation.  But This Could Only Have Been Acquired Through

Experience,  And The Possibility Of Such Experience May Be Controlled

In The Case Of Animals That Have Been Kept In Captivity From Their

Youth Up,  So That The Knowledge Displayed Can Be Ascertained To Be

Independent Of Experience.  On The Other Hand,  Both The Above

Illustrations Afford Evidence Of An Unconscious Perception Of The

Facts,  And Prove The Existence Of A Direct Knowledge Underivable From

Any Sensual Impression Or From Consciousness.

 

This Has Always Been Recognised,  {113} And Has Been Described Under

The Words "Presentiment" Or "Foreboding."  These Words,  However,

Refer,  On The One Hand,  Only To An Unknowable In The Future,

Separated From Us By Space,  And Not To One That Is Actually Present;

On The Other Hand,  They Denote Only The Faint,  Dull,  Indefinite Echo

Chapter 8 Pg 98

Returned By Consciousness To An Invariably Distinct State Of

Unconscious Knowledge.  Hence The Word "Presentiment," Which Carries

With It An Idea Of Faintness And Indistinctness,  While,  However,  It

May Be Easily Seen That Sentiment Destitute Of All,  Even Unconscious,

Ideas Can Have No Influence Upon The Result,  For Knowledge Can Only

Follow Upon An Idea.  A Presentiment That Sounds In Consonance With

Our Consciousness Can Indeed,  Under Certain Circumstances,  Become

Tolerably Definite,  So That In The Case Of Man It Can Be Expressed In

Thought And Language; But Experience Teaches Us That Even Among

Ourselves This Is Not So When Instincts Special To The Human Race

Come Into Play; We See Rather That The Echo Of Our Unconscious

Knowledge Which Finds Its Way Into Our Consciousness Is So Weak That

It Manifests Itself Only In The Accompanying Feelings Or Frame Of

Mind,  And Represents But An Infinitely Small Fraction Of The Sum Of

Our Sensations.  It Is Obvious That Such A Faintly Sympathetic

Consciousness Cannot Form A Sufficient Foundation For A

Superstructure Of Conscious Deliberation; On The Other Hand,

Conscious Deliberation Would Be Unnecessary,  Inasmuch As The Process

Of Thinking Must Have Been Already Gone Through Unconsciously,  For

Every Faint Presentiment That Obtrudes Itself Upon Our Consciousness

Is In Fact Only The Consequence Of A Distinct Unconscious Knowledge,

And The Knowledge With Which It Is Concerned Is Almost Always An Idea

Of The Purpose Of Some Instinctive Action,  Or Of One Most Intimately

Connected Therewith.  Thus,  In The Case Of The Stag-Beetle,  The

Purpose Consists In The Leaving Space For The Growth Of The Horns;

The Means,  In The Digging The Hole Of A Sufficient Size; And The

Unconscious Knowledge,  In Prescience Concerning The Future

Development Of The Horns.

 

Lastly,  All Instinctive Actions Give Us An Impression Of Absolute

Security And Infallibility.  With Instinct The Will Is Never

Hesitating Or Weak,  As It Is When Inferences Are Being Drawn

Consciously.  We Never Find Instinct Making Mistakes; We Cannot,

Therefore,  Ascribe A Result Which Is So Invariably Precise To Such An

Obscure Condition Of Mind As Is Implied When The Word Presentiment Is

Used; On The Contrary,  This Absolute Certainty Is So Characteristic A

Feature Of Instinctive Actions,  That It Constitutes Almost The Only

Well-Marked Point Of Distinction Between These And Actions That Are

Done Upon Reflection.  But From This It Must Again Follow That Some

Principle Lies At The Root Of Instinct Other Than That Which

Underlies Reflective Action,  And This Can Only Be Looked For In A

Determination Of The Will Through A Process That Lies In The

Unconscious,  {115a} To Which This Character Of Unhesitating

Infallibility