Unconscious Memory(Fiscle Part-3) - Samuel Butler (digital e reader TXT) 📗

No Farther Into The "Philosophy Of

The Unconscious."  Over And Above This,  I Have Been So Often Told

That The Views Concerning Unconscious Action Contained In The

Foregoing Lecture And In "Life And Habit" Are Only The Very Fallacy

Of Von Hartmann Over Again,  That I Should Like To Give The Public An

Opportunity Of Seeing Whether This Is So Or No,  By Placing The Two

Contending Theories Of Unconscious Action Side By Side.  I Hope That

It Will Thus Be Seen That Neither Professor Hering Nor I Have Fallen

Into The Fallacy Of Von Hartmann,  But That Rather Von Hartmann Has

Fallen Into His Fallacy Through Failure To Grasp The Principle Which

Professor Hering Has Insisted Upon,  And To Connect Heredity With

Memory.

 

Professor Hering's Philosophy Of The Unconscious Is Of Extreme

Simplicity.  He Rests Upon A Fact Of Daily And Hourly Experience,

Namely,  That Practice Makes Things Easy That Were Once Difficult,  And

Often Results In Their Being Done Without Any Consciousness Of

Effort.  But If The Repetition Of An Act Tends Ultimately,  Under

Certain Circumstances,  To Its Being Done Unconsciously,  So Also Is

The Fact Of An Intricate And Difficult Action Being Done

Unconsciously An Argument That It Must Have Been Done Repeatedly

Already.  As I Said In "Life And Habit," It Is More Easy To Suppose

That Occasions On Which Such An Action Has Been Performed Have Not

Been Wanting,  Even Though We Do Not See When And Where They Were,

Than That The Facility Which We Observe Should Have Been Attained

Without Practice And Memory (P. 56).

 

There Can Be Nothing Better Established Or More Easy,  Whether To

Understand Or Verify,  Than The Unconsciousness With Which Habitual

Chapter 7 Pg 82

Actions Come To Be Performed.  If,  However,  It Is Once Conceded That

It Is The Manner Of Habitual Action Generally,  Then All A Priori

Objection To Professor Hering's Philosophy Of The Unconscious Is At

An End.  The Question Becomes One Of Fact In Individual Cases,  And Of

Degree.

 

How Far,  Then,  Does The Principle Of The Convertibility,  As It Were,

Of Practice And Unconsciousness Extend?  Can Any Line Be Drawn Beyond

Which It Shall Cease To Operate?  If Not,  May It Not Have Operated

And Be Operating To A Vast And Hitherto Unsuspected Extent?  This Is

All,  And Certainly It Is Sufficiently Simple.  I Sometimes Think It

Has Found Its Greatest Stumbling-Block In Its Total Want Of Mystery,

As Though We Must Be Like Those Conjurers Whose Stock In Trade Is A

Small Deal Table And A Kitchen-Chair With Bare Legs,  And Who,  With

Their Parade Of "No Deception" And "Examine Everything For

Yourselves," Deceive Worse Than Others Who Make Use Of All Manner Of

Elaborate Paraphernalia.  It Is True We Require No Paraphernalia,  And

We Produce Unexpected Results,  But We Are Not Conjuring.

 

To Turn Now To Von Hartmann.  When I Read Mr. Sully's Article In The

Westminster Review,  I Did Not Know Whether The Sense Of Mystification

Which It Produced In Me Was Wholly Due To Von Hartmann Or No; But On

Making Acquaintance With Von Hartmann Himself,  I Found That Mr. Sully

Has Erred,  If At All,  In Making Him More Intelligible Than He

Actually Is.  Von Hartmann Has Not Got A Meaning.  Give Him Professor

Hering's Key And He Might Get One,  But It Would Be At The Expense Of

Seeing What Approach He Had Made To A System Fallen To Pieces.

Granted That In His Details And Subordinate Passages He Often Both

Has And Conveys A Meaning,  There Is,  Nevertheless,  No Coherence

Between These Details,  And The Nearest Approach To A Broad Conception

Covering The Work Which The Reader Can Carry Away With Him Is At Once

So Incomprehensible And Repulsive,  That It Is Difficult To Write

About It Without Saying More Perhaps Than Those Who Have Not Seen The

Original Will Accept As Likely To Be True.  The Idea To Which I Refer

Is That Of An Unconscious Clairvoyance,  Which,  From The Language

Continually Used Concerning It,  Must Be Of The Nature Of A Person,

And Which Is Supposed To Take Possession Of Living Beings So Fully As

To Be The Very Essence Of Their Nature,  The Promoter Of Their

Embryonic Development,  And The Instigator Of Their Instinctive

Actions.  This Approaches Closely To The Personal God Of Mosaic And

Christian Theology,  With The Exception That The Word "Clairvoyance"

{89} Is Substituted For God,  And That The God Is Supposed To Be

Unconscious.

 

Mr. Sully Says:-

 

 

 

 

 

"When We Grasp It [The Philosophy Of Von Hartmann] As A Whole,  It

Amounts To Nothing More Than This,  That All Or Nearly All The

Phenomena Of The Material And Spiritual World Rest Upon And Result

From A Mysterious,  Unconscious Being,  Though To Call It Being Is

Chapter 7 Pg 83

Really To Add On An Idea Not Immediately Contained Within The All-

Sufficient Principle.  But What Difference Is There Between This And

Saying That The Phenomena Of The World At Large Come We Know Not

Whence? . . . The Unconscious,  Therefore,  Tends To Be Simple Phrase

And Nothing More . . . No Doubt There Are A Number Of Mental

Processes . . . Of Which We Are Unconscious . . . But To Infer From

This That They Are Due To An Unconscious Power,  And To Proceed To

Demonstrate Them In The Presence Of The Unconscious Through All

Nature,  Is To Make An Unwarrantable Saltus In Reasoning.  What,  In

Fact,  Is This 'Unconscious' But A High-Sounding Name To Veil Our

Ignorance?  Is The Unconscious Any Better Explanation Of Phenomena We

Do Not Understand Than The 'Devil-Devil' By Which Australian Tribes

Explain The Leyden Jar And Its Phenomena?  Does It Increase Our

Knowledge To Know That We Do Not Know The Origin Of Language Or The

Cause Of Instinct? . . . Alike In Organic Creation And The Evolution

Of History 'Performances And Actions'--The Words Are Those Of

Strauss--Are Ascribed To An Unconscious,  Which Can Only Belong To A

Conscious Being. {90a}

 

. . . . .

 

"The Difficulties Of The System Advance As We Proceed. {90b}

Subtract This Questionable Factor--The Unconscious From Hartmann's

'Biology And Psychology,' And The Chapters Remain Pleasant And

Instructive Reading.  But With The Third Part Of His Work--The

Metaphysic Of The Unconscious--Our Feet Are Clogged At Every Step.

We Are Encircled By The Merest Play Of Words,  The Most Unsatisfactory

Demonstrations,  And Most Inconsistent Inferences.  The Theory Of

Final Causes Has Been Hitherto Employed To Show The Wisdom Of The

World; With Our Pessimist Philosopher It Shows Nothing But Its

Irrationality And Misery.  Consciousness Has Been Generally Supposed

To Be The Condition Of All Happiness And Interest In Life; Here It

Simply Awakens Us To Misery,  And The Lower An Animal Lies In The

Scale Of Conscious Life,  The Better And The Pleasanter Its Lot.

 

. . . . .

 

"Thus,  Then,  The Universe,  As An Emanation Of The Unconscious,  Has

Been Constructed. {90c}  Throughout It Has Been Marked By Design,  By

Purpose,  By Finality; Throughout A Wonderful Adaptation Of Means To

Ends,  A Wonderful Adjustment And Relativity In Different Portions Has

Been Noticed--And All This For What Conclusion?  Not,  As In The Hands

Of The Natural Theologians Of The Eighteenth Century,  To Show That

The World Is The Result Of Design,  Of An Intelligent,  Beneficent

Creator,  But The Manifestation Of A Being Whose Only Predicates Are

Negatives,  Whose Very Essence Is To Be Unconscious.  It Is Not Only

Like Ancient Athens,  To An Unknown,  But To An Unknowing God,  That

Modern Pessimism Rears Its Altar.  Yet Surely The Fact That The

Motive Principle Of Existence Moves In A Mysterious Way Outside Our

Consciousness No Way Requires That The All-One Being Should Be

Himself Unconscious.

 

 

 

Chapter 7 Pg 84

 

I Believe The Foregoing To Convey As Correct An Idea Of Von

Hartmann's System As It Is Possible To Convey,  And Will Leave It To

The Reader To Say How Much In Common There Is Between This And The

Lecture Given In The Preceding Chapter,  Beyond The Fact That Both

Touch Upon Unconscious Actions.  The Extract Which Will Form My Next

Chapter Is Only About A Thirtieth Part Of The Entire "Philosophy Of

The Unconscious," But It Will,  I Believe,  Suffice To Substantiate The

Justice Of What Mr. Sully Has Said In The Passages Above Quoted.

 

As Regards The Accuracy Of The Translation,  I Have Submitted All

Passages About Which I Was In The Least Doubtful To The Same

Gentleman Who Revised My Translation Of Professor Hering's Lecture; I

Have Also Given The German Wherever I Thought The Reader Might Be

Glad To See It.

Chapter 8 Pg 85

 

Translation Of The Chapter On "The Unconscious In Instinct," From Von

Hartmann's "Philosophy Of The Unconscious."

 

Von Hartmann's Chapter On Instinct Is As Follows:-

 

Instinct Is Action Taken In Pursuance Of A Purpose But Without

Conscious Perception Of What The Purpose Is. {92a}

 

A Purposive Action,  With Consciousness Of The Purpose And Where The

Course Taken Is The Result Of Deliberation Is Not Said To Be

Instinctive; Nor Yet,  Again,  Is Blind Aimless Action,  Such As

Outbreaks Of Fury On The Part Of Offended Or Otherwise Enraged

Animals.  I See No Occasion For Disturbing The Commonly Received

Definition Of Instinct As Given Above; For Those Who Think They Can

Refer All The So-Called Ordinary Instincts Of Animals To Conscious

Deliberation Ipso Facto Deny That There Is Such A Thing As Instinct

At All,  And Should Strike The Word Out Of Their Vocabulary.  But Of

This More Hereafter.

 

Assuming,  Then,  The Existence Of Instinctive Action As Above Defined,

It Can Be Explained As -