El Alamein by Jack Murray (spanish books to read .TXT) 📗

III tanks were much less effective against the British Sherman, Grant and Valentine tanks and, in the case of the Mark III, outgunned.

The Axis plan was to envelop the Eighth Army by a march around its southern flank. The British were forewarned by decoded German radio messages, so they concentrated their armour at Alam el Halfa Ridge, which blocked the Axis advance 20miles (32km) behind the front).

The Panzers attacked on the night of 30th/31st August. Progress was hampered both by the minefields they encountered as well as by shelling. Dawn on the 31st revealed that they had advanced only eight mile past the mines and came under fire from artillery and 1st/5th RTR. The Panzers exacted a heavy toll on the Allied tanks during the day. However, the RAF bombed the Germans all night, forcing them to withdraw.

The usual problem was beginning to impede the Axis attack – lack of petrol. Low fuel stocks led to an orderly withdrawal from the field by the Panzers. The Rifle Brigade then harried the Germans all the way back through the minefields.

The Battle of Alam el Halfa saw the Allies successfully fight a static defensive engagement, rather one of movement, which had previously been the mantra of British tank warfare. Hindered by Allied aircraft bombing, the Axis attacks on the ridge failed, supplies ran dangerously low and Rommel had to order a retreat. The Eighth Army lost 1,750 men and 68 tanks; the Axis lost 2,900 men, 49 tanks, 36 aircraft, 60 guns and 400 lorries.

Aside from the morale-boost the victory provided to the Allies, it revealed to the senior commanders the value of coordinating the various strands of the military rather than have them fighting separately in isolation. The Germans had been fighting in this manner since the very start. The lesson had been learned and was now ready to be applied in the next engagement.

Battle of El Alamein (Oct – Nov 1942)

 

Following Alam el Halfa, the 8th Army spent five weeks in training, at Montgomery’s insistence. Reinforcements were arriving increasing strength to 1,350 tanks, 195,000 men, 908 guns and 1,451 anti-tank guns. Axis strength increased more slowly, limited by the relentless attacks on shipping by the RAF. The Panzerarmee had 104,000 men, (50,000 Germans, of whom only 24,000 were front line troops). There were 496 Axis tanks, 290 of which were Italian, 500 guns and 850 anti-tank guns.

Montgomery’s insistence on training resulted in a delay for the push out from Alamein until the October full moon. The plan was to begin an artillery bombardment on the night of 23rd October prior to the assault. Delaying until October also had the benefit of diverting attention away from landings in Tunisia (Operation Torch) scheduled for 8th November.

The plan was to create gaps in the minefields and the Axis defences to allow armour to come through. This "crumbling phase" was expected to many days. It would wear down the enemy allowing Montgomery to take full advantage of his materiel superiority.

Aware that they were probably outgunned, the Axis dug in, laying mines and building up tank strength. When the attack finally began, Rommel was actually in Germany recovering from jaundice. He left the aging General Stumme in charge.

‘Sappers’ were tasked with creating four gaps in the minefields the night before the battle was due to start. Infantry, then armour, would follow. Although the attack was planned for the north, a second, diversionary, assault was planned for the south to keep the 21st Panzers busy.

The barrage at El Alamein began at 21:40 on 23rd October 1942. Around 1,000 guns rained down hell on Axis positions. This was the biggest artillery barrage since the Great War.

Operation Lightfoot began as the Sappers cleared the way through the 'January' minefield. Around 178 men were killed, wounded or missing in this part of the operation. Behind the Sappers, Signallers were laying cables to ensure communications back to the rear areas. Gaps in the minefields became heavily congested and a target for Axis machine guns, anti-tank guns and artillery. Losses on both sides were immense with prisoners being taken by both sides. Rather like the Great War, the initial stages of El Alamein were very much a war of attrition. However, the Allies were slowly making progress, albeit at great cost.

By the night of 24th/25th October, a bridgehead, west of the second enemy minefield, had been secured so that tanks could follow. Progress was slow and many tanks were lost. The battle was relentless, taking place day and night. This was deliberate on the part of Montgomery who saw this as an essential element of his plan to wear down the enemy.

By 27th October, the Axis was down to around 114 German tanks. The battle raged on and by 2nd November the Axis were running low on ammunition. Around 32 German and 120 Italian tanks were left. On 3rd November it seemed certain that the Axis front was about to crack. "Operation Supercharge" began that night.

At this point, Rommel realised he risked losing not only the battle but his whole army. He decided on a retirement, but Hitler ordered him to fight to the last. On 4th November, the Eighth Army broke through the Axis defences. Rommel had no choice but to order a retreat. They abandoned the non-motorized units, leaving the Italians to cover their retreat. This effective abandonment of the Italians would lead to the destruction of their remaining divisions as a fighting force.

The Afrika Korps suffered 37,000 casualties, lost 450 tanks (320 completely out of action), and 1,000 guns. The Eighth Army suffered 13,500 casualties, around 500 tanks (only 150 were destroyed) and about 110 guns (mainly anti-tank guns). This left Rommel with around 5,000 men, 20 tanks, 20 anti-tank guns and 50 field guns

As ever, their retreat was ordered, and the remainder of the Afrika Korps had escaped by 7 November. They retreated along the coast road but were unable to stand and fight due to lack of men, tanks and ammunition. This meant the Allies were able to retake Tobruk (13 November); Benghazi (20