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Although he no longer had a reserve that he controlled, Major Kobylińsky, the 1st Bn commander, continued his attack against the two hills but met heavy resistance. A German air attack between 1600 and 1700 hours made things even more difficult.

Company 1 of the 4th Polish Bn was sent on its flanking march by Lieutenant Colonel Chlusewiez as called for in the plan. This unit was able to occupy Hill 606, southeast of Hill 773, making the German positions on the two other hills untenable and this forced a general German withdrawal. They left behind one machinegun and four men on Hill 650 and these managed to hold the hill until 2100 hours, when Co 1 of the 1st Bn stormed it. Hill 773 was occupied at about the same time by Co 3. Co 1 continued its advance after securing Hill 650, occupied Beisfjord village at 0900 hours the following morning, and linked up with a motorcycle troop from the Foreign Legion.

The fighting on the Ankenes Peninsula exacted a heavy toll of both Poles and Germans. The Poles reported that they found 150 fallen Germans on the peninsula. This figure is undoubtedly too high in view of the actual numbers of Germans involved in the fighting. Biegański reports that the German losses in the Polish sector were 190, including 60 captured. Buchner reports that Co 2/137th at Ankenes had 20 killed, five wounded, and 22 missing. No figures are given for Co 7 and Co 8 of the 139th. Polish losses are reported by Biegański as 97 killed, 189 wounded, seven prisoners, and 21 missing.10

The French-Polish Drive towards Sildvik

General Dietl and his staff remained in the dark about what was happening in the Narvik area after their communication station on the Fagernes Mountain was destroyed and abandoned at 1215 hours on May 28. They knew that Lieutenant Schweiger’s counterattack had failed to eliminate the beachhead, that Major Haussels had withdrawn his forces towards Beisfjord, that the three companies on the Ankenes Peninsula were under heavy pressure, and that Allied troops, supported by British warships, were pushing east along the railroad.

Dietl had to make some immediate decisions without knowing the location and status of the various units or enemy intentions. A company from the 1st Parachute Regiment, which had arrived on May 26, was sent towards Sildvik around 0400 hours and at 0700 hours, the division ordered naval infantry Regiment Berger to attack westward along the railroad with all available forces except the paratroopers.

By mid-afternoon, the division assumed that the companies on the Ankenes Peninsula were isolated and lost. Naval infantry battalion Holtorf, in positions between Fornes and the rail line needed help and a platoon of mountain infantry was dispatched to his assistance around 1400 hours. Major Haussels apparently used the prearranged code word for the abandonment of Narvik–Berta. The code word was intended to be used in a critical situation and called for a general withdrawal to the vicinity of Straumnes. Dietl did not think the situation that critical and he did not want the enemy to reach as far as Straumnes without serious opposition. He therefore sent out messages canceling the order for a general withdrawal.

A messenger was sent to Major Haussels around 2200 hours with orders to establish and hold a line from Lakselv to Hill 1446. General Dietl also decided to energize the leadership of the troops along the railroad by dispatching Captain Walther with a company of airborne troops from Bjørnefjell to the area around Tunnel 3 early in the morning of May 29. In addition, the parachute company in Sildvik (Co 4) was moved forward.

General Béthouart issued orders for the continuation of the offensive in the evening of May 29. The 1st Bn of the Foreign Legion and the Poles would undertake the offensive. The 1st Bn was to advance along the railroad while the 1st Polish Bn attacked across the mountains to link up with the Legionnaires in Sildvik. Thereafter, these forces were to carry out reconnaissance in force in the direction of Hundal.

The French Foreign Legion reached Tunnel 4 around midnight on May 28, but here it was stopped temporarily by units from naval infantry battalion Holtorf. However, Holtorf reported to division that he would not be able to hold unless he received reinforcements.

The situation for the Germans was still very unclear on May 29, primarily because of poor conditions for radio communications. Dietl could only communicate with Captain Walther indirectly and he had no communications with Major Haussels until mid-afternoon on May 29, when the major reported that his troops had occupied the designated positions at 0300 that morning. The lack of communications between Captain Walther and Major Haussels was even more disconcerting since there was a strong possibility that a gap had developed between the two commands that the enemy might be able to exploit. This fear was reinforced by the fact that Captain Walther, after a personal reconnaissance in the afternoon, failed to find any of Major Haussels’ units in the vicinity of Hills 1448 (Beisfjordstøtta) and 970 (Resmålsaksla). Major Haussels’ men had reportedly occupied these heights early that morning and it is likely, in view of subsequent events, that Walther made a map-reading mistake.

General Dietl moved additional forces into the area and adjusted his front line late in the evening of May 29. The 83 men from the 1st Bn, 1st Parachute Regiment who arrived on May 29 were rushed to the Sildvik area and the Engineer Platoon assigned to Group Windisch on the northern front was withdrawn to Bjørnefjell as a division reserve. Dietl ordered Captain Walther to pull his forces back to a point about half a kilometer west of Straumnes and to occupy Hills 1436 and 970. There appears to have been confusion at all levels. Major Haussels’ forces were already on Hill 970 and Walther’s troops, believing they were on Hill 1436, were actually on the western slopes of Hill 818.

There were three reasons for Dietl’s redeployments. First, he wanted to make

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