Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (popular e readers .TXT) 📗

mortar–from the west, supported by strong supporting fire and partially in heavy fog … In hours of bitter struggle, until late night, heavy enemy attacks, supported by six aircraft, to secure this important hill were repelled three time … The enemy was finally able to break into and hold their positions, without securing the whole hill. In this dire situation, the last division reserve, Co 2, 138th [Lieutenant Renner)] arrived [30 men and more hand grenades and ammunition] … After four more attacks were repelled, the hill, which had been fought over continually for 15 hours, had to be abandoned around 0800 hours [June 1].13

Company 2 continued its attack against Hill 698 but was stopped by heavy enemy crossfire. The battalion commander also committed Co 7 against this objective. The two companies surprised the German defenders under the cover of a heavy fog on June 2 and gained a precarious foothold on the northern part of the hill. Three Norwegians were killed and nine wounded in the attack.

Heavy fighting continued throughout the following week for Hill 698 and Border Marker 267A (Hill 623). This key objective changed hands a couple of times. Both Norwegians and Germans accused each other of violating Swedish territory. It appears that both sides were guilty. The Norwegian violation was carried out by a unit commanded by a Swedish volunteer, Lieutenant Jan Danielsen. When confronted by a Swedish officer and accused of violating the border, Danielsen is reported to have replied, “To hell with that, we have to attack the Germans wherever they are.”14 This surprise attack from the east led to the capture of this key terrain.

Lieutenant Rohr’s platoon held the far right of the German line, up against the Swedish border. Rohr’s report to Schleebrügge indicates that he felt that what was appropriate for one side should also be appropriate for the other:

On the 7th or 8th of June, about 40 Norwegians with at least three machineguns crossed the border into Sweden and at 0230 hours attacked our right flank on Hill 698. Our weak border security force was thrown back after two soldiers fell. Both platoons Adler and Appeln received orders to immediately retire some distance, cross the border, and attack the Norwegians from the rear.15

The German counterattack forced the Norwegians off the hill but eventually both sides abandoned the area around the border marker as Swedish troops appeared and hoisted the Swedish flag. In his description of the heavy fighting for Hills 620 and 698, Buchner notes that after long having neglected the deep and open German flank, the Norwegians were forced into frontal attacks against well-prepared defensive positions.

The German supply situation was becoming desperate, as was their lack of reinforcements. The bad weather during this period, with heavy fog, rain, snow, and sleet, prevented aerial resupply. Troops on both sides suffered severely and were completely exhausted. They had difficulties in moving around and fell asleep, even while under attack. While these conditions plagued both sides, Group Windisch had reached such a state of exhaustion that a total collapse was imminent.

The 3rd Division journal mentions on June 2 that there had been no resupply of ammunition for six days and that they managed only because there were no enemy attacks on the Narvik Peninsula. The journal also notes that one reason they were able to hold the front was because the Norwegians did not launch simultaneous attacks against more than one objective and this enabled the Germans to bring forward badly needed supplies to the threatened areas. It also allowed the Germans to reinforce the threatened areas in a timely manner with forces from Group Windisch’s left flank and from the units facing the Poles and French.

It is ironic and tragic that the Norwegians and Allies failed to coordinate their efforts. The Norwegians remained virtually idle in the days prior to the Narvik landings and during most of the period when the French and Poles were attacking towards Sildvik. Because of the lack of activity on the northern front, Dietl was able to commit all incoming reinforcements and some units from Group Windisch to counter the Allied drive. When the Norwegians began their offensive, the Poles and French remained inactive, and this allowed Dietl again to switch units to the threatened sector. It is very doubtful that the Germans in the Bjørnefjell area would have survived if these attacks had been coordinated in such a way as to keep maximum pressure on both fronts.

The loss of Hill 620, the threatened loss of Hill 698, and the attacks against Holmevann were direct threats against the German base at Bjørnefjell. Late on May 31, Dietl had already decided that he needed to withdraw his forces to a shorter line in order to make reserves available. On the northern front, the Germans withdrew their left flank to the western slopes of Rauberg. The front on the Narvik Peninsula was also pulled back about two kilometers. These withdrawals allowed the Germans to form a company-size reserve in each battalion.

The Norwegians were within seven kilometers of the Bjørnefjell Railroad Station and the logical next objective of the attack was Rundfjell if the German resistance on Hill 698 and north of Holmevann was overcome. With Rundfjell in Norwegian hands, the forces confronting the French and Poles would be in an untenable position and forced to withdraw. The hope was that the capture of Rundfjell would force Dietl to surrender or withdraw into Sweden.16 The date for the final attack was set for June 8.

E

VACUATION

, A

RMISTICE, AND

D

ISASTER

“You may think we are running away from the enemy, we are not, our chummy ship has sunk, the Glorious is sinking, the least we can do is make a show, good luck to you all.”

ANNOUNCEMENT BY LIEUTENANT COMMANDER GLASFURD TO THE CREW BEFORE TURNING HIS DESTROYER AROUND IN A DESPERATE ATTACK ON THE GERMAN BATTLESHIPS, AS RECALLED BY THE DESTROYER CREW’S LONE SURVIVOR.

Evacuation