Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (popular e readers .TXT) 📗

Foreign Minister Koht and Defense Minister Ljungberg were in London when the Germans attacked in the west on May 10. Lord Halifax asked to see them and they met in the afternoon of May 10. Ljungberg asked the British Foreign Secretary if the events in Holland, Belgium, and France would cause any changes in the help promised Norway in the form of troops and materiel. Halifax assured his visitors that a cabinet meeting earlier in the day had decided there would be no changes.

There is no reason to question Halifax’s sincerity. In fact, two days later Churchill, who had become Prime Minister on May 10, offered Admiral Cork the 2nd French Light Division, located in Scotland. The return of this unit to France was delayed for three days pending a reply. Cork answered that, for administrative reasons, he could not receive the French troops before May 30. In a message to Cork on May 14, Churchill sounded even more positive by expressing the hope that Cork would clear out Narvik as soon as possible and thereafter work himself southward in increasing strength.1

Even as late as May 19, there were no hints that Churchill was thinking about a possible withdrawal. He was adamantly opposed to the Mowinkel Plan (discussed later in this chapter), which called for the neutralization of North Norway. “The main remaining value of our forces in Norway is to entice and retain largely superior German forces in that area away from the main decision. Norway is paying a good dividend now and must be held down to the job.”2

Churchill’s tone changed the following day, May 20, after a report by the Inter-Service Planning Staff to the Chiefs of Staff. The consequences of a defeat in France and the loss or withdrawal of the British forces from that country were beginning to set in. It was emphasized that every ship, aircraft, and anti-aircraft gun was needed at home. That night, Churchill informed the new defense committee that since the Germans were now in a position of strength where they could demand troop transit through Sweden, the Allies would no longer be able to advance from Narvik to the iron ore fields and that Narvik had no significant importance as a naval base.3 He concluded that holding Narvik drained British resources, a stark reversal of the position he had expressed the day before. However, as late as May 23, Churchill considered leaving the evacuation in a planning stage.

The situation appeared more distressing the next day as the noose around the British, Belgian, and French forces began to tighten. The Chiefs of Staff, in an appreciation of the military implications of a withdrawal from Norway, provided the necessary impetus for an evacuation order and spelled the end to any hopes the Norwegians might have had of carrying on the struggle with Allied air and logistic support. The Chiefs estimated that it would take 28 days from the time the order was given to bring the forces in Norway back to Great Britain in an operational condition. A telegram ordering the evacuation was sent to Cork that evening (May 24) and the War Cabinet approved the order on May 25, followed by the Supreme Allied War Council on May 31. While the evacuation decision proved final, there were misgivings within the War Cabinet and even Churchill toyed with the idea of leaving a garrison in Narvik.

The British also decided to proceed with the attack on Narvik. The reasons given for proceeding were to ensure that the harbor facilities were destroyed and to cover the evacuation, which are difficult to square with the actual situation. In anticipation of losing the city, the Germans had carried out a thorough and systematic destruction of the harbor facilities, starting on April 22. The German troops were in no position to interfere seriously with an Allied evacuation. In fact, it is arguable that it would have been simpler to evacuate from the positions occupied by the Allies prior to Narvik’s capture than it was after they had advanced into the interior. However, operations in the final days of May and early June diverted German attention away from any thoughts that the Allies were about to depart. They were completely unaware of the evacuation since they considered that the Norwegians and Allies were in ideal positions to undertake a final push that they felt incapable of containing.

The real reasons for capturing Narvik before the evacuation were probably due to pride and prestige or, as argued by General Béthouart in retrospect, because a victory was needed for Allied morale. In the process, several hundred Allied and Norwegian soldiers and sailors gave their lives without any major benefits. The delay, although impossible to foresee by the planners and decision-makers, meant that it took place at the same time as the German fleet made a sortie that brought a calamity to the British Navy.

The British government had instructed Cork and Auchinleck to keep the evacuation a close secret, with knowledge limited to senior British and French officers. The need for secrecy is understandable. Allied mistrust of Norwegians continued and any leakage of information would jeopardize the evacuation.

The Allied commanders had a distasteful task. Not only were they required to abandon a campaign when final victory was within reach, but they were required to keep that knowledge from the Norwegians and they no doubt felt that they were again abandoning their comrades on the field of battle. General Béthouart said as much, “I am operating with Norwegian troops whom for reasons of national honor, I will not abandon in difficulties on the battlefield.”4 Auchinleck’s feelings are summed up in a hand-written letter he sent to General Dill on May 30, one day after Churchill decided that the Norwegians still could not be told about the evacuation. “The worst of it all is the need for lying to all and sundry in order to preserve secrecy. The situation vis-à-vis the Norwegians is particularly difficult and one feels a most despicable creature in