Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (popular e readers .TXT) 📗

The Norwegian General Staff intervened and implored Ruge to remain behind since they believed that to do otherwise in this crisis would have a severe negative effect on the morale of the army and the people. Ruge told his officers that he had debated the issue as far as possible with the government but that he had no problems with others trying to bring the government to a different decision. A delegation met with the President of the Parliament and various members of the government and the result was that the cabinet decided on June 7 to transfer all authority in North Norway to General Ruge when the government departed. The same decision ordered General Fleischer to accompany the government to England.

Hovland’s biography of Fleischer is very critical of the decision to leave Ruge behind to handle the demobilization and surrender in North Norway. He claims that Ruge wished to remain at home in Norway and that he used his influence with politicians to achieve this goal and that it would have been logical for Ruge to accompany the government while leaving the affairs in North Norway in Fleischer’s hands. Hovland asserts that Ruge’s campaign to be allowed to remain in Norway focused on weakening the government’s faith in Fleischer.

It is difficult to find a personal benefit for Ruge in remaining behind and spending five years in German prisoner of war camps. There is no evidence that he tried to use this fact to his advantage after the war. It is true that some members of the government had less faith in Fleischer’s than in Ruge’s abilities to handle the political–military situation in North Norway after the departure of the government. This lack of faith may have more to do with a protest letter from Fleischer to the government about their decision to leave the country than it had with any attempt by Ruge to discredit his fellow officer.

When Fleischer returned to his headquarters in Soløy after meeting with the government on June 3, he discussed the situation with his chief of staff. A letter to the government was prepared for the general’s signature. Lindbäck-Larsen does not state in his report or book who wrote the letter. Hovland writes that Lindbäck-Larsen “returned to Fleischer in the afternoon of June 4 and stated that he found it unacceptable to surrender the whole country to German troops after the division had covered the withdrawal of the Allies unless all other possibilities had been tried.”10 Hovland writes that Lindbäck-Larsen thereupon presented Fleischer with a draft document. The document stated that since the government had decided that it would not continue the war in Norway, it should enter into negotiations with the Germans for an armistice and peace. If the enemy refused, the Norwegian Army should cross the border to Sweden and Finland and be interned. The letter warned the government not to leave the country and implored the king to remain to insure that peace was concluded.

It is, as noted by Hovland, a strange document that far exceeds the authority and prerogatives of a division commander. It challenged a political decision already taken and called for a separate peace with Germany. Hovland maintains that the document only makes sense by understanding the desperate situation in which Fleischer and Lindbäck-Larsen found themselves and that it should be regarded as an attempt to secure peace and maintain a reasonable degree of independence in part of the country. This would have been a settlement along the line of that reached by the Soviet Union and Finland. However, if this was their thinking, they failed to recognize the fundamental political-military differences between the situation in Finland and that in Norway.

Fleischer and his chief of staff flew to Tromsø on June 5 to brief the government on the military situation and to present the document that represented their view to the ministers of foreign affairs and defense. According to Fleischer, the document was not looked upon favorably and according to Lindbäck-Larsen, it was withdrawn. Fleischer writes that he asked the foreign minister not to forward it to the king or other members of the government. In answer to a question from the Investigative Commission in 1945, Koht did not remember Fleischer withdrawing the document. However, he noted that Fleischer, in their conversation on the way to England, gave every indication that he supported the decision by the government and royal family to leave the country.11

While the document did not receive serious consideration, it was obviously not withdrawn as claimed by Lindbäck-Larsen and Fleischer. It was reported to the prime minister and discussed by the government in a conference on June 6. Lie writes that, “After the prime minister had read the letter, we agreed that the general’s thinking was a little unclear” and “the Government decided to stand by its earlier views about departing Norway if it could not be avoided, in order to organize and carry on the war outside the country’s borders.”12 This document was not forgotten and, according to Hovland, had later repercussions for General Fleischer.

In what appears to be an astonishing attempt to revise history, General Hovland shifts the blame for the letter to General Ruge. He writes, “In retrospect, the letter appears to mirror Ruge’s ideas and it is not improbable that Lindbäck-Larsen was influenced by the General Staff.”13 This damaging accusation is not documented and a review of Ruge’s writings, memoranda, or statements reveals nothing to support Hovland’s contention. On the contrary, Ruge had argued consistently since he assumed command of the army that the country should carry out active resistance against the Germans and he supported the government’s decision to depart the country in order to carry on this resistance.

Hovland is right in criticizing Ruge for not providing Fleischer with a staff as he left the country. Fleischer left without his own staff or members of the Norwegian General Staff. These remained in Norway. While