The Ethics - Benedictus de Spinoza (ebook reader online free TXT) 📗

divine nature. So that it is

hardly to be wondered at, that these persons contradict

themselves freely.

However, I pass over this point. My intention her was only

to give a reason for not saying, that that, without which a thing

cannot be or be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing :

individual things cannot be or be conceived without God, yet God

does not appertain to their essence. I said that “I considered

as belonging to the essence of a thing that, which being given,

the thing is necessarily given also, and which being removed, the

thing is necessarily removed also ; or that without which the

thing, and which itself without the thing can neither be nor be

conceived.” (II. Def. ii.)

 

PROP. XI. The first element, which constitutes the actual being

of the human mind, is the idea of some particular thing actually

existing.

Proof.-The essence of man (by the Coroll. of the last Prop.)

is constituted by certain modes of the attributes of God, namely

(by II. Ax. ii.), by the modes of thinking, of all which (by II.

Ax. iii.) the idea is prior in nature, and, when the idea is

given, the other modes (namely, those of which the idea is prior

in nature) must be in the same individual (by the same Axiom).

Therefore an idea is the first element constituting the human

mind. But not the idea of a non-existent thing, for then (II.

viii. Coroll.) the idea itself cannot be said to exist ; it must

therefore be the idea of something actually existing. But not of

an infinite thing. For an infinite thing (I.xxi., xxii.), must

always necessarily exist ; this would (by II. Ax. i.) involve an

absurdity. Therefore the first element, which constitutes the

actual being of the human mind, is the idea of something actually

existing. Q.E.D.

Corollary.-Hence it follows, that the human mind is part of

the infinite intellect of God ; thus when we say, that the human

mind perceives this or that, we make the assertion, that God has

this or that idea, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far

as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind, or in so

far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind ; and when we

say that God has this or that idea, not only in so far as he

constitutes the essence of the human mind, but also in so far as

he, simultaneously with the human mind, has the further idea of

another thing, we assert that the human mind perceives a thing in

part or inadequately.

Note.-Here, I doubt not, readers will come to a stand, and

will call to mind many things which will cause them to hesitate ;

I therefore beg them to accompany me slowly, step by step, and

not to pronounce on my statements, till they have read to the

end.

 

PROP. XII. Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of the idea,

which constitutes the human mind, must be perceived by the human

mind, or there will necessarily be an idea in the human mind of

the said occurrence. That is, if the object of the idea

constituting the human mind be a body, nothing can take place in

that body without being perceived by the mind.

Proof.-Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of any idea,

the knowledge thereof is necessarily in God (II. ix. Coroll.), in

so far as he is considered as affected by the idea of the said

object, that is (II. xi.), in so far as he constitutes the mind

of anything. Therefore, whatsoever takes place in the object

constituting the idea of the human mind, the knowledge thereof is

necessarily in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of

the human mind ; that is (by II. xi. Coroll.) the knowledge of

the said thing will necessarily be in the mind, in other words

the mind perceives it.

Note.-This proposition is also evident, and is more clearly

to be understood from II. vii., which see.

 

PROP. XIII. The object of the idea constituting the human mind

is the body, in other words a certain mode of extension which

actually exists, and nothing else.

Proof.-If indeed the body were not the object of the human

mind, the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in

God (II. ix. Coroll.) in virtue of his constituting our mind, but

in virtue of his constituting the mind of something else ; that

is (II. xi. Coroll.) the ideas of the modifications of the body

would not be in our mind : now (by II. Ax. iv.) we do possess the

idea of the modifications of the body. Therefore the object of

the idea constituting the human mind is the body, and the body as

it actually exists (II. xi.). Further, if there were any other

object of the idea constituting the mind besides body, then, as

nothing can exist from which some effect does not follow (I.

xxxvi.) there would necessarily have to be in our mind an idea,

which would be the effect of that other object (II. xi.) ; but

(I. Ax. v.) there is no such idea. Wherefore the object of our

mind is the body as it exists, and nothing else. Q.E.D.

Note.-We thus comprehend, not only that the human mind is

united to the body, but also the nature of the union between mind

and body. However, no one will be able to grasp this adequately

or distinctly, unless he first has adequate knowledge of the

nature of our body. The propositions we have advanced hitherto

have been entirely general, applying not more to men than to

other individual things, all of which, though in different

degrees, are animated.3 For of everything there is necessarily

an idea in God, of which God is the cause, in the same way as

there is an idea of the human body ; thus whatever we have

asserted of the idea of the human body must necessarily also be

asserted of the idea of everything else. Still, on the other

hand, we cannot deny that ideas, like objects, differ one from

the other, one being more excellent than another and containing

more reality, just as the object of one idea is more excellent

than the object of another idea, and contains more reality.

Wherefore, in order to determine, wherein the human mind

differs from other things, and wherein it surpasses them, it is

necessary for us to know the nature of its object, that is, of

the human body. What this nature is, I am not able here to

explain, nor is it necessary for the proof of what I advance,

that I should do so. I will only say generally, that in

proportion as any given body is more fitted than others for doing

many actions or receiving many impressions at once, so also is

the mind, of which it is the object, more fitted than others for

forming many simultaneous perceptions ; and the more the actions

of the body depend on itself alone, and the fewer other bodies

concur with it in action, the more fitted is the mind of which it

is the object for distinct comprehension. We may thus recognize

the superiority of one mind over others, and may further see the

cause, why we have only a very confused knowledge of our body,

and also many kindred questions, which I will, in the following

propositions, deduce from what has been advanced. Wherefore I

have thought it worth while to explain and prove more strictly my

present statements. In order to do so, I must premise a few

propositions concerning the nature of bodies.

AXIOM I. All bodies are either in motion or at rest.

AXIOM II. Every body is moved sometimes more slowly,

sometimes more quickly.

LEMMA I. Bodies are distinguished from one another in

respect of motion and rest, quickness and slowness, and not in

respect of substance.

Proof.-The first part of this proposition is, I take it,

self-evident. That bodies are not distinguished in respect of

substance, is plain both from I. v. and I. viii. It is brought

out still more clearly from I. xv, note.

LEMMA II. All bodies agree in certain respects.

Proof.-All bodies agree in the fact, that they involve the

conception of one and the same attribute (II., Def. i.).

Further, in the fact that they may be moved less or more quickly,

and may be absolutely in motion or at rest.

LEMMA III. A body in motion or at rest must be determined to

motion or rest by another body, which other body has been

determined to motion or rest by a third body, and that third

again by a fourth, and so on to infinity.

Proof.-Bodies are individual things (II., Def. i.), which

(Lemma I.) are distinguished one from the other in respect to

motion and rest ; thus (I. xxviii.) each must necessarily be

determined to motion or rest by another individual thing, namely

(II. vi.), by another body, which other body is also (Ax. i.) in

motion or at rest. And this body again can only have been set in

motion or caused to rest by being determined by a third body to

motion or rest. This third body again by a fourth, and so on to

infinity. Q.E.D.

Corollary.-Hence it follows, that a body in motion keeps in

motion, until it is determined to a state of rest by some other

body ; and a body at rest remains so, until it is determined to a

state of motion by some other body. This is indeed self-evident.

For when I suppose, for instance, that a given body, A, is at

rest, and do not take into consideration other bodies in motion,

I cannot affirm anything concerning the body A, except that it is

at rest. If it afterwards comes to pass that A is in motion,

this cannot have resulted from its having been at rest, for no

other consequence could have been involved than its remaining at

rest. If, on the other hand, A be given in motion, we shall, so

long as we only consider A, be unable to affirm anything

concerning it, except that it is in motion. If A is

subsequently found to be at rest, this rest cannot be the result

of A’s previous motion, for such motion can only have led to

continued motion ; the state of rest therefore must have resulted

from something, which was not in A, namely, from an external

cause determining A to a state of rest.

Axiom I.-All modes, wherein one body is affected by another

body, follow simultaneously from the nature of the body affected

and the body affecting ; so that one and the same body may be

moved in different modes, according to the difference in the

nature of the bodies moving it ; on the other hand, different

bodies may be moved in different modes by one and the same body.

Axiom II.-When a body in motion impinges on another body at

rest, which it is unable to move, it recoils, in order to

continue its motion, and the angle made by the line of motion in

the recoil and the plane of the body at rest, whereon the moving

body has impinged, will be equal to the angle formed by the line

of motion of incidence and the same plane.

So far we have been speaking only of the most simple bodies,

which are only distinguished one from the other by motion and

rest, quickness and slowness. We now pass on to compound bodies.

Definition.-When any given bodies of the same or different

magnitude are compelled by other bodies to remain in contact, or

if they be moved at the same or different rates of speed, so that

their mutual