A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1 - Surendranath Dasgupta (free ebook reader for android .txt) 📗

previous speculations on the subject by thinkers of other schools. Thus in commenting on I.i. 32 in which the sûtra states that a syllogism consists of five premisses (avayava) Vâtsyâyana says that this sûtra was written to refute the views of those who held that there should be ten premisses [Footnote ref 3]. The Vais'e@sika sûtras also give us some of the earliest types of inference, which do not show any acquaintance with the technic of the Nyâya doctrine of inference [Footnote ref 4].

Does Vais'e@sika represent an Old School of Mîmâ@msâ?

The Vais'e@sika is so much associated with Nyâya by tradition that it seems at first sight quite unlikely that it could be supposed to represent an old school of Mîmâ@msâ, older than that represented in the Mîmâ@msâ sûtras. But a closer inspection of the Vais'e@sika sûtras seems to confirm such a supposition in a very remarkable way. We have seen in the previous section that Caraka quotes a Vais'e@sika sûtra. An examination of Caraka's Sûtrasthâna (I.35-38) leaves us convinced that the writer of the verses had some compendium of Vais'e@sika such as that of the Bhâ@sâpariccheda before him. Caraka sûtra or kârikâ (I.i. 36) says that the gu@nas are those which have been enumerated such as heaviness, etc., cognition, and those which begin with the gu@na "para" (universality) and end with "prayatna" (effort) together with the sense-qualities (sârthâ). It seems that this is a reference to some well-known enumeration. But this enumeration is not to be found in the Vais'e@sika sûtra (I.i. 6) which leaves out the six gu@nas,

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[Footnote 1: Caraka, S'ârîra, 39.]

[Footnote 2: See the next section.]

[Footnote 3: Vâtsyâyana's Bhâ@sya on the Nyâya sûtras, I.i.32. This is undoubtedly a reference to the Jaina view as found in Das'avaikâlikaniryukti as noted before.]

[Footnote 4: Nyâya sûtra I.i. 5, and Vais'e@sika sûtras IX. ii. 1-2, 4-5, and III. i. 8-17.]

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heaviness (gurutva), liquidity (dravatva), oiliness(sneha), elasticity (sa@mskâra), merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma); in one part of the sûtra the enumeration begins with "para" (universality) and ends in "prayatna," but buddhi (cognition) comes within the enumeration beginning from para and ending in prayatna, whereas in Caraka buddhi does not form part of the list and is separately enumerated. This leads me to suppose that Caraka's sûtra was written at a time when the six gu@nas left out in the Vais'e@sika enumeration had come to be counted as gu@nas, and compendiums had been made in which these were enumerated. Bhâ@sâpariccheda (a later Vais'e@sika compendium), is a compilation from some very old kârikâs which are referred to by Vis'vanâtha as being collected from "atisa@mk@siptacirantanoktibhi@h"—(from very ancient aphorisms [Footnote ref 1]); Caraka's definition of sâmânya and vis'e@sa shows that they had not then been counted as separate categories as in later Nyâya-Vais'e@sika doctrines; but though slightly different it is quite in keeping with the sort of definition one finds in the Vais'e@sika sûtra that sâmânya (generality) and vi'se@sa are relative to each other [Footnote ref 2]. Caraka's sûtras were therefore probably written at a time when the Vais'e@sika doctrines were undergoing changes, and well-known compendiums were beginning to be written on them.

The Vais'e@sika sûtras seem to be ignorant of the Buddhist doctrines. In their discussions on the existence of soul, there is no reference to any view as to non-existence of soul, but the argument turned on the point as to whether the self is to be an object of inference or revealed to us by our notion of "I." There is also no other reference to any other systems except to some Mîmâ@msâ doctrines and occasionally to Sâ@mkhya. There is no reason to suppose that the Mîmâ@msâ doctrines referred to allude to the Mîmâ@msâ sûtras of Jaimini. The manner in which the nature of inference has been treated shows that the Nyâya phraseology of "pûrvavat" and "s'e@savat" was not known. Vais'e@sika sûtras in more than one place refer to time as the ultimate cause [Footnote ref 3]. We know that the S'vetâs'vatara Upani@sad refers to those who regard time as the cause of all things, but in none of the

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[Footnote 1: Professor Vanamâlî Vedântatîrtha's article in J.A.S.B., 1908.]

[Footnote 2: Caraka (I.i. 33) says that sâmânya is that which produces unity and vis'e@sa is that which separates. V.S. II. ii. 7. Sâmânya and vis'e@sa depend upon our mode of thinking (as united or as separate).]

[Footnote 3: Vais'e@sika sûtra (II. ii. 9 and V. ii. 26).]

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systems that we have can we trace any upholding of this ancient view [Footnote ref 1]. These considerations as well as the general style of the work and the methods of discussion lead me to think that these sûtras are probably the oldest that we have and in all probability are pre-Buddhistic.

The Vais'e@sika sûtra begins with the statement that its object is to explain virtue, "dharma" This is we know the manifest duty of Mîmâ@msâ and we know that unlike any other system Jaimini begins his Mîmâ@msâ sûtras by defining "dharma". This at first seems irrelevant to the main purpose of Vais'e@sika, viz, the description of the nature of padartha [Footnote ref 2]. He then defines dharma as that which gives prosperity and ultimate good (nihsreyasa) and says that the Veda must be regarded as valid, since it can dictate this. He ends his book with the remarks that those injunctions (of Vedic deeds) which are performed for ordinary human motives bestow prosperity even though their efficacy is not known to us through our ordinary experience, and in this matter the Veda must be regarded as the authority which dictates those acts [Footnote ref 3]. The fact that the Vais'e@sika begins with a promise to describe dharma and after describing the nature of substances, qualities and actions and also the ad@r@s@ta (unknown virtue) due to dharma (merit accruing from the performance of Vedic deeds) by which many of our unexplained experiences may be explained, ends his book by saying that those Vedic works which are not seen to produce any direct effect, will produce prosperity through adrsta, shows that Ka@nâda's method of explaining dharma has been by showing that physical phenomena involving substances, qualities, and actions can only be explained up to a certain extent while a good number cannot be explained at all except on the assumption of ad@r@s@ta (unseen virtue) produced by dharma. The

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[Footnote 1: S'vetâs'vatara I.i.2]

[Footnote 2: I remember a verse quoted in an old commentary of the Kalâpa Vyâkara@na, in which it is said that the description of the six categories by Ka@nâda in his Vais'e@sika sûtras, after having proposed to describe the nature of dharma, is as irrelevant as to proceed towards the sea while intending to go to the mountain Himavat (Himâlaya).

"Dnarma@m vyâkhyâtukâmasya @sa@tpadârthopavar@nana@m Himavadgantukâmasya sâgaragamanopamam."]

[Footnote 3: The sutra "Tadvacanâd âmnâyasya prâmâ@nyam (I.i.3 and X.ii.9) has been explained by Upaskâra as meaning "The Veda being the word of Îs'vara (God) must be regarded as valid," but since there is no mention of Îs'vara anywhere in the text this is simply reading the later Nyâya ideas into the Vais'e@sika. Sûtra X.ii.8 is only a repetition of VI.ii.1.]

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description of the categories of substance is not irrelevant, but is the means of proving that our ordinary experience of these cannot explain many facts which are only to be explained on the supposition of ad@r@s@ta proceeding out of the performance of Vedic deeds. In V.i. 15 the movement of needles towards magnets, in V. ii. 7 the circulation of water in plant bodies, V. ii. 13 and IV. ii. 7 the upward motion of fire, the side motion of air, the combining movement of atoms (by which all combinations have taken place), and the original movement of the mind are said to be due to ad@r@s@ta. In V. ii. 17 the movement of the soul after death, its taking hold of other bodies, the assimilation of food and drink and other kinds of contact (the movement and development of the foetus as enumerated in Upaskara) are said to be due to ad@r@s@ta. Salvation (moksa) is said to be produced by the annihilation of ad@r@s@ta leading to the annihilation of all contacts and non production of rebirths Vais'esika marks the distinction between the drsta (experienced) and the ad@r@s@ta. All the categories that he describes are founded on drsta (experience) and those unexplained by known experience are due to ad@r@s@ta These are the acts on which depend all life-process of animals and plants, the continuation of atoms or the construction of the worlds, natural motion of fire and air, death and rebirth (VI. ii. 15) and even the physical phenomena by which our fortunes are affected in some way or other (V. ii. 2), in fact all with which we are vitally interested in philosophy. Ka@nâda's philosophy gives only some facts of experience regarding substances, qualities and actions, leaving all the graver issues of metaphysics to ad@r@s@ta But what leads to ad@r@s@ta? In answer to this, Ka@nâda does not speak of good or bad or virtuous or sinful deeds, but of Vedic works, such as holy ablutions (snana), fasting, holy student life (brahmacarya), remaining at the house of the teacher (gurukulavasa), retired forest life (vanaprastha), sacrifice (yajña), gifts (dana), certain kinds of sacrificial sprinkling and rules of performing sacrificial works according to the prescribed time of the stars, the prescribed hymns (mantras) (VI. ii. 2).

He described what is pure and what is impure food, pure food being that which is sacrificially purified (VI. ii. 5) the contrary being impure, and he says that the taking of pure food leads to prosperity through ad@r@s@ta. He also described how

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feelings of attachment to things are also generated by ad@r@s@ta. Throughout almost the whole of VI. i Ka@nâda is busy in showing the special conditions of making gifts and receiving them. A reference to our chapter on Mîmâ@msâ will show that the later Mîmâ@msâ writers agreed with the Nyâya-Vais`e@sika doctrines in most of their views regarding substance, qualities, etc. Some of the main points in which Mîmâ@msâ differs from Nyâya-Vais`e@sika are (1) self-validity of the Vedas, (2) the eternality of the Vedas, (3) disbelief in any creator or god, (4) eternality of sound (s'abda), (5) (according to Kumârila) direct perception of self in the notion of the ego. Of these the first and the second points do not form any subject of discussion in the Vais'e@sika. But as no Îs'vara is mentioned, and as all ad@r@s@ta depends upon the authority of the Vedas, we may assume that Vais'e@sika had no dispute with Mîmâ@msâ. The fact that there is no reference to any dissension is probably due to the fact that really none had taken place at the time of the Vais`e@sika sûtras. It is probable that Ka@nâda believed that the Vedas were written by some persons superior to us (II. i. 18, VI. i. 1-2). But the fact that there is no reference to any conflict with Mîmâ@msâ suggests that the doctrine that the Vedas were never written by anyone was formulated at a later period, whereas in the days of the Vais'e@sika sûtras, the view was probably what is represented in the Vais'e@sika sûtras. As there is no reference to Îs`vara and as ad@r@s@ta proceeding out of the performance of actions in accordance with Vedic injunctions is made the cause of all atomic movements, we can very well assume that Vais'e@sika was as atheistic or non-theistic as the later Mîmâ@msâ philosophers. As regards the eternality of sound, which in later days was one of the main points of quarrel between the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika and the Mîmâ@msâ, we find that in II. ii. 25-32, Ka@nâda gives reasons in favour of the non-eternality of sound, but after that from II. ii. 33 till the end of the chapter he closes the argument in favour of the eternality of sound, which is the distinctive Mîmâ@msâ view as we know from the later Mîmâ@msâ writers [Footnote ref 1]. Next comes the question of the proof of the existence of self. The traditional Nyâya view is

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[Footnote 1: The last two concluding sûtras II. ii. 36 and 37 are in my opinion wrongly interpreted by S'a@nkara Mis'ra in his Upaskâra (II. ii. 36 by adding an "api" to the sûtra and thereby changing the issue, and II. ii. 37 by misreading the phonetic combination "samkhyabhava" as sâ@mkhya and bhava instead of sâ@mkhya and abhava, which in my opinion is the right combination here) in favour of the non-eternality of sound as we find in the later Nyâya Vais'e@sika view.]

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that the self is supposed to exist because it must be inferred as the seat of the qualities of pleasure, pain, cognition, etc. Traditionally this is regarded as the Vais'e@sika view as well. But in Vais'e@sika III. ii. 4 the existence of soul is first inferred by reason of its activity and the existence of pleasure, pain, etc., in III. ii. 6-7 this inference is challenged by saying that we do not perceive that the activity, etc. belongs to the soul and not to the body