A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1 - Surendranath Dasgupta (free ebook reader for android .txt) 📗

[Footnote 2: The forms of inference used show that Ka@nâda was probably not aware of Gautama's terminology.]

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then it is said that if the self is directly perceived in such experiences as "I am Yajñadatta" or "I am Devadatta," what is the good of turning to inference? The reply to this is that inference lending its aid to the same existence only strengthens the conviction. When we say that Devadatta goes or Yajñadatta goes, there comes the doubt whether by Devadatta or Yajñadatta the body alone is meant; but the doubt is removed when we think that the notion of "I" refers to the self and not to anything else. As there is no difference regarding the production of pleasure, pain, and cognition, the soul is one in all. But yet it is many by special limitations as individuals and this is also proved on the strength of the scriptures [Footnote ref 1].

In the first chapter of the fourth book it is said that that which is existent, but yet has no cause, should be considered eternal (nitya). It can be inferred by its effect, for the effect can only take place because of the cause. When we speak of anything as non-eternal, it is only a negation of the eternal, so that also proves that there is something eternal. The non-eternal is ignorance (avidyâ) [Footnote ref 2]. Colour is visible in a thing which is great (mahat) and compounded. Air (vâyu) is not perceived to have colour, though it is great and made up of parts, because it has not the actuality of colour (rûpasamskâra—i.e. in air there is only colour in its unmanifested form) in it. Colour is thus visible only when there is colour with special qualifications and conditions [Footnote ref 3]. In this way the cognition of taste, smell, and touch is also explained. Number, measure, separateness, contact, and disjoining, the quality of belonging to a higher or lower class, action, all these as they abide in things possessing colour are visible to the eye. The number etc. of those which have no colour are not perceived by the eye. But the notion of being and also of genus of quality (gunatva)

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[Footnote 1: I have differed here from the meaning given in Upaskâra. I think the three sûtras "Sukhaduhkhajñananispattyavis'esadekatmyam," "vyavasthato nana," and "vastrasâmarthyat ca" originally meant that the self was one, though for the sake of many limitations, and also because of the need of the performance of acts enjoined by the scriptures, they are regarded as many.]

[Footnote 2: I have differed here also in my meaning from the Upaskâra, which regards this sûtra "avidya" to mean that we do not know of any reasons which lead to the non-eternality of the atoms.]

[Footnote 3: This is what is meant in the later distinctions of udbhûtarûpavattva and anudbhûtarûpavattva. The word samskâra in Vais'e@sika has many senses. It means inertia, elasticity, collection (samavaya), production (udbhava) and not being overcome (anabhibhava). For the last three senses see Upaskâra IV. i. 7.]

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are perceived by all the senses (just as colour, taste, smell, touch, and sound are perceived by one sense, cognition, pleasure, pain, etc. by the manas and number etc. by the visual and the tactile sense) [Footnote ref 1].

In the second chapter of the fourth book it is said that the earth, etc. exist in three forms, body, sense, and objects. There cannot be any compounding of the five elements or even of the three, but the atoms of different elements may combine when one of them acts as the central radicle (upa@s@tambhaka). Bodies are of two kinds, those produced from ovaries and those which are otherwise produced by the combination of the atoms in accordance with special kinds of dharma. All combinations of atoms are due to special kinds of dharmas. Such super-mundane bodies are to be admitted for explaining the fact that things must have been given names by beings having such super-mundane bodies, and also on account of the authority of the Vedas.

In the first chapter of the fifth book action (karma) is discussed. Taking the example of threshing the corn, it is said that the movement of the hand is due to its contact with the soul in a state of effort, and the movement of the flail is due to its contact with the hand. But in the case of the uprising of the flail in the threshing pot due to impact the movement is not due to contact with the hands, and so the uplifting of the hand in touch with the flail is not due to its contact with the soul; for it is due to the impact of the flail. On account of heaviness (gurutva) the flail will fall when not held by the hand. Things may have an upward or side motion by specially directed motions (nodanavis'e@sa) which are generated by special kinds of efforts. Even without effort the body may move during sleep. The movement of needles towards magnets is due to an unknown cause (adr@s@takâranaka). The arrow first acquires motion by specially directed movement, and then on account of its inertia (vegasamskâra) keeps on moving and when that ceases it falls down through heaviness.

The second chapter abounds with extremely crude explanations

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[Footnote 1: This portion has been taken from the Upaskâra of S'ankara Mis'ra on the Vais'e@sika sûtras of Ka@nâda. It must be noted here that the notion of number according to Vais'e@sika is due to mental relativity or oscillation (apeksabuddhijanya). But this mental relativity can only start when the thing having number is either seen or touched; and it is in this sense that notion of number is said to depend on the visual or the tactual sense.]

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of certain physical phenomena which have no philosophical importance. All the special phenomena of nature are explained as being due to unknown cause (ad@r@s@takâritam) and no explanation is given as to the nature of this unknown (ad@r@s@ta). It is however said that with the absence of ad@r@s@ta there is no contact of body with soul, and thus there is no rebirth, and therefore mok@sa (salvation); pleasure and pain are due to contact of the self, manas, senses and objects. Yoga is that in which the mind is in contact with the self alone, by which the former becomes steady and there is no pain in the body. Time, space, âkâs'a are regarded as inactive.

The whole of the sixth book is devoted to showing that gifts are made to proper persons not through sympathy but on account of the injunction of the scriptures, the enumeration of certain Vedic performances, which brings in ad@r@s@ta, purification and impurities of things, how passions are often generated by ad@r@s@ta, how dharma and adharma lead to birth and death and how mok@sa takes place as a result of the work of the soul.

In the seventh book it is said that the qualities in eternal things are eternal and in non-eternal things non-eternal. The change of qualities produced by heat in earth has its beginning in the cause (the atoms). Atomic size is invisible while great size is visible. Visibility is due to a thing's being made up of many causes [Footnote ref 1], but the atom is therefore different from those that have great size. The same thing may be called great and small relatively at the same time. In accordance with a@nutva (atomic) and mahattva (great) there are also the notions of small and big. The eternal size of parima@n@dala (round) belongs to the atoms. Âkâs'a and âtman are called mahân or paramamahân (the supremely great or all-pervasive); since manas is not of the great measure it is of atomic size. Space and time are also considered as being of the measure "supremely great" (paramamahat), Atomic size (parima@n@dala) belonging to the atoms and the mind (manas) and the supremely great size belonging to space, time, soul and ether (âkâs'a) are regarded as eternal.

In the second chapter of the seventh book it is said that unity and separateness are to be admitted as entities distinct from other qualities. There is no number in movement and quality; the appearance of number in them is false. Cause and effect are

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[Footnote 1: I have differed from the Upaskâra in the interpretation of this sûtra.]

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neither one, nor have they distinctive separateness (ekap@rthaktva). The notion of unity is the cause of the notion of duality, etc. Contact may be due to the action of one or two things, or the effect of another contact and so is disjoining. There is neither contact nor disjoining in cause and effect since they do not exist independently (yutasiddhyabhâvât). In the eighth book it is said that soul and manas are not perceptible, and that in the apprehension of qualities, action, generality, and particularity perception is due to their contact with the thing. Earth is the cause of perception of smell, and water, fire, and air are the cause of taste, colour and touch[Footnote ref 1]. In the ninth book negation is described; non-existence (asat) is defined as that to which neither action nor quality can be attributed. Even existent things may become non-existent and that which is existent in one way may be non-existent in another; but there is another kind of non-existence which is different from the above kinds of existence and non-existence [Footnote ref 2]. All negation can be directly perceived through the help of the memory which keeps before the mind the thing to which the negation applies. Allusion is also made in this connection to the special perceptual powers of the yogins (sages attaining mystical powers through Yoga practices).

In the second chapter the nature of hetu (reason) or the middle term is described. It is said that anything connected with any other thing, as effect, cause, as in contact, or as contrary or as inseparably connected, will serve as li@nga (reason). The main point is the notion "this is associated with this," or "these two are related as cause and effect," and since this may also be produced through premisses, there may be a formal syllogism from propositions fulfilling the above condition. Verbal cognition comes without inference. False knowledge (avidyâ) is due to the defect of the senses or non-observation and mal-observation due to wrong expectant impressions. The opposite of this is true knowledge (vidyâ). In the tenth it is said that pleasure and pain are not cognitions, since they are not related to doubt and certainty.

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[Footnote 1: Upaskâra here explains that it is intended that the senses are produced by those specific elements, but this cannot be found in the sûtras.]

[Footnote 2: In the previous three kinds of non-existence, prâgabhâva (negation before production), dhvamsâbhâva (negation after destruction), and anyonyabhava (mutual negation of each other in each other), have been described. The fourth one is sâmânyâbhâva (general negation).]

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A dravya may be caused by the inhering of the effect in it, for because of its contact with another thing the effect is produced. Karma (motion) is also a cause since it inheres in the cause. Contact is also a cause since it inheres in the cause. A contact which inheres in the cause of the cause and thereby helps the production of the effect is also a cause. The special quality of the heat of fire is also a cause.

Works according to the injunctions of the scriptures since they have no visible effect are the cause of prosperity, and because the Vedas direct them, they have validity.

Philosophy in the Nyâya sûtras [Footnote ref 1].

The Nyâya sûtras begin with an enumeration of the sixteen subjects, viz. means of right knowledge (pramâ@na), object of right knowledge (prameya), doubt (sa@ms'aya), purpose (prayojana), illustrative instances (d@r@s@tânta), accepted conclusions (siddhânta), premisses (avayava), argumentation (tarka), ascertainment (nir@naya), debates (vâda), disputations (jalpa), destructive criticisms (vita@n@dâ), fallacy (hetvâbhâsa), quibble (chala), refutations (jâti), points of opponent's defeat (nigrahasthâna), and hold that by a thorough knowledge of these the highest good (nihs'reyasa), is attained. In the second sûtra it is said that salvation (apavarga) is attained by the successive disappearance of false knowledge (mithyâjñâna), defects (do@sa), endeavours (prav@rtti, birth (janma), and ultimately of sorrow. Then the means of proof are said to be of four kinds, perception (pratyak@sa), inference (anumâna), analogy (upamana), and testimony (s'abda). Perception is defined as uncontradicted determinate knowledge unassociated with names proceeding out of sense contact with objects. Inference is of three kinds, from cause to effect (pûrvavat), effect to cause (s'e@savat), and inference from common characteristics (sâmânyato d@r@s@ta). Upamâna is the knowing of anything by similarity with any well-known thing.

S'abda is defined as the testimony of reliable authority (âpta)
[Footnote ref 2].

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[Footnote 1: This is a brief summary of the doctrines found in Nyâya sûtras, supplemented here and there with the views of Vâtsyâyana, the commentator. This follows the order of the sûtras, and tries to present their ideas with