A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1 - Surendranath Dasgupta (free ebook reader for android .txt) 📗

as little additions from those of later day Nyâya as possible. The general treatment of Nyâya-Vais'e@sika expounds the two systems in the light of later writers and commentators.]

[Footnote 2: It is curious to notice that Vâtsyâyana says that an ârya, a @r@si or a mleccha (foreigner), may be an âpta (reliable authority).]

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Such a testimony may tell us about things which may be experienced and which are beyond experience. Objects of knowledge are said to be self (âtman), body, senses, sense-objects, understanding (buddhi), mind (manas}, endeavour (prav@rtti), rebirths, enjoyment of pleasure and suffering of pain, sorrow and salvation. Desire, antipathy, effort (prayatna), pleasure, pain, and knowledge indicate the existence of the self. Body is that which upholds movement, the senses and the rise of pleasure and pain as arising out of the contact of sense with sense-objects [Footnote ref l]; the five senses are derived from the five elements, such as prthivi, ap, tejas, vâyu and âkâs'a; smell, taste, colour, touch, and sound are the qualities of the above five elements, and these are also the objects of the senses. The fact that many cognitions cannot occur at any one moment indicates the existence of mind (manas). Endeavour means what is done by speech, understanding, and body. Do@sas (attachment, antipathy, etc) are those which lead men to virtue and vice. Pain is that which causes suffering [Footnote ref 2]. Ultimate cessation from pain is called apavarga [Footnote ref 3]. Doubt arises when through confusion of similar qualities or conflicting opinions etc., one wants to settle one of the two alternatives. That for attaining which, or for giving up which one sets himself to work is called prayojana.

Illustrative example (d@r@s@tânta) is that on which both the common man and the expert (parîk@saka) hold the same opinion. Established texts or conclusions (siddhânta) are of four kinds, viz (1) those which are accepted by all schools of thought called the sarvatantrasiddhânta; (2) those which are held by one school or similar schools but opposed by others called the pratitantrasiddhânta; (3) those which being accepted other conclusions will also naturally follow called adhikara@nasiddhânta; (4) those of the opponent's views which are uncritically granted by a debater, who proceeds then to refute the consequences that follow and thereby show his own special skill and bring the opponent's intellect to disrepute (abhyupagamasiddhânta) [Footnote ref 4]. The premisses are five:

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[Footnote 1: Here I have followed Vâtsyâyana's meaning.]

[Footnote 2: Vâtsyâyana comments here that when one finds all things full of misery, he wishes to avoid misery, and finding birth to be associated with pain becomes unattached and thus is emancipated.]

[Footnote 3: Vâtsyâyana wants to emphasise that there is no bliss in salvation, but only cessation from pain.]

[Footnote 4: I have followed Vâtsyâyana's interpretation here.]

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(1) pratijñâ (the first enunciation of the thing to be proved); (2) hetu (the reason which establishes the conclusion on the strength of the similarity of the case in hand with known examples or negative instances); (3) udâhara@na (positive or negative illustrative instances); (4) upanaya (corroboration by the instance); (5) nigamana (to reach the conclusion which has been proved). Then come the definitions of tarka, nir@naya, vâda, jalpa, vita@n@dâ, the fallacies (hetvâbhâsa), chala, jâti, and nigrahasthâna, which have been enumerated in the first sûtra.

The second book deals with the refutations of objections against the means of right knowledge (pramâna). In refutation of certain objections against the possibility of the happening of doubt, which held that doubt could not happen, since there was always a difference between the two things regarding which doubt arose, it is held that doubt arises when the special differentiating characteristics between the two things are not noted. Certain objectors, probably the Buddhists, are supposed to object to the validity of the pramâ@na in general and particularly of perceptions on the ground that if they were generated before the sense-object contact, they could not be due to the latter, and if they are produced after the sense-object contact, they could not establish the nature of the objects, and if the two happened together then there would be no notion of succession in our cognitions. To this the Nyâya reply is that if there were no means of right knowledge, then there would be no means of knowledge by means of which the objector would refute all means of right knowledge; if the objector presumes to have any means of valid knowledge then he cannot say that there are no means of valid knowledge at all. Just as from the diverse kinds of sounds of different musical instruments, one can infer the previous existence of those different kinds of musical instruments, so from our knowledge of objects we can infer the previous existence of those objects of knowledge [Footnote ref 1].

The same things (e.g. the senses, etc.) which are regarded as instruments of right knowledge with reference to the right cognition of other things may themselves be the objects of right

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[Footnote 1: Yathâpas'câtsiddhena s'abdena pûrvasiddham âtodyamanumîyate sâdhyam ca âtodyam sâdhanam ca s'abda@h antarhite hyâtodye svanata@h anumânam bhavatîti, vî@nâ vâdyate ve@nu@h pûryyate iti svanavis'e@se@na âtodyavis'e@sam pratipadyate tathâ pûrvasiddham upalabdhivi@sayam pas'câtsiddhena upalabdhihetunâ pratipadyate. Vâtsyâyana bhâ@sya, II. i. 15.]

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knowledge. There are no hard and fast limits that those which are instruments of knowledge should always be treated as mere instruments, for they themselves may be objects of right knowledge. The means of right knowledge (pramâ@na) do not require other sets of means for revealing them, for they like the light of a lamp in revealing the objects of right knowledge reveal themselves as well.

Coming to the question of the correctness of the definition of perception, it is held that the definition includes the contact of the soul with the mind [Footnote ref 1]. Then it is said that though we perceive only parts of things, yet since there is a whole, the perception of the part will naturally refer to the whole. Since we can pull and draw things wholes exist, and the whole is not merely the parts collected together, for were it so one could say that we perceived the ultimate parts or the atoms [Footnote ref 2]. Some objectors hold that since there may be a plurality of causes it is wrong to infer particular causes from particular effects. To this the Nyáya answer is that there is always such a difference in the specific nature of each effect that if properly observed each particular effect will lead us to a correct inference of its own particular cause [Footnote ref 3]. In refuting those who object to the existence of time on the ground of relativity, it is said that if the present time did not exist, then no perception of it would have been possible. The past and future also exist, for otherwise we should not have perceived things as being done in the past or as going to be done in the future. The validity of analogy (upamána) as a means of knowledge and the validity of the Vedas is then proved. The four pramâ@nas of perception, inference, analogy, and scripture

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[Footnote 1: Here the sûtras, II. i. 20-28, are probably later interpolations to answer criticisms, not against the Nyâya doctrine of perception, but against the wording of the definition of perception as given in the,Nyâya sûtra, II. i. 4.]

[Footnote 2: This is a refutation of the doctrines of the Buddhists, who rejected the existence of wholes (avayavî). On this subject a later Buddhist monograph by Pandita As'oka (9th century A.D.), Avayavinirâkara@na in Six Buddhist Nyâya Tracts, may be referred to.]

[Footnote 3: Pûrvodakavis'i@s@tam khalu var@sodakan s'îghrataram srotasâ bahutaraphenaphalapar@nakâs@thâdivahanañcopalabhamâna@h pûr@natvena, nadya upari v@r@sto deva ityanuminoti nodakab@rddhimâtre@na. V@atsyâyana bhâ@sya, II. i. 38. The inference that there has been rain up the river is not made merely from seeing the rise of water, but from the rainwater augmenting the previous water of the river and carrying with its current large quantities of foam, fruits, leaves, wood, etc. These characteristics, associated with the rise of water, mark it as a special kind of rise of water, which can only be due to the happening of rain up the river].

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are quite sufficient and it is needless to accept arthâpatti (implication), aitihya (tradition), sambhava (when a thing is understood in terms of higher measure the lower measure contained in it is also understood—if we know that there is a bushel of corn anywhere we understand that the same contains eight gallons of corn as well) and abhâva (non-existence) as separate pramâ@nas for the tradition is included in verbal testimony and arthâpatti, sambhava and abhâva are included within inference.

The validity of these as pramâ@nas is recognized, but they are said to be included in the four pramâ@nas mentioned before. The theory of the eternity of sound is then refuted and the non-eternity proved in great detail. The meaning of words is said to refer to class-notions (jâti), individuals (vyakti), and the specific position of the limbs (âk@rti), by which the class notion is manifested. Class (jâti} is defined as that which produces the notion of sameness (samânaprasavâtmikâ jâti@h).

The third book begins with the proofs for the existence of the self or âtman. It is said that each of the senses is associated with its own specific object, but there must exist some other entity in us which gathered together the different sense-cognitions and produced the perception of the total object as distinguished from the separate sense-perceptions. If there were no self then there would be no sin in injuring the bodies of men: again if there were no permanent self, no one would be able to recognize things as having seen them before; the two images produced by the eyes in visual perception could not also have been united together as one visual perception of the things [Footnote ref 1]; moreover if there were no permanent cognizer then by the sight of a sour fruit one could not be reminded of its sour taste. If consciousness belonged to the senses only, then there would be no recognition, for the experience of one could not be recognized by another. If it is said that the unity of sensations could as well be effected by manas (mind), then the manas would serve the same purpose as self and it would only be a quarrel over a name, for this entity the knower would require some instrument by which it would co-ordinate the sensations and cognize; unless manas is admitted as a separate instrument of the soul, then though the sense perceptions could be explained as being the work of the

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[Footnote 1: According to Vâtsyâyana, in the two eyes we have two different senses. Udyotakara, however, thinks that there is one visual sense which works in both eyes.]

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senses, yet imagining, thinking, etc., could not be explained. Another argument for the admission of soul is this, that infants show signs of pleasure and pain in quite early stages of infancy and this could not be due to anything but similar experiences in previous lives. Moreover every creature is born with some desires, and no one is seen to be born without desires. All attachments and desires are due to previous experiences, and therefore it is argued that desires in infants are due to their experience in previous existences.

The body is made up of the k@siti element. The visual sense is material and so also are all other senses [Footnote ref l]. Incidentally the view held by some that the skin is the only organ of sensation is also refuted. The earth possesses four qualities, water three, fire two, air one, and ether one, but the sense of smell, taste, eye, and touch which are made respectively by the four elements of earth, etc., can only grasp the distinctive features of the elements of which they are made. Thus though the organ of smell is made by earth which contains four qualities, it can only grasp the distinctive quality of earth, viz. smell.

Against the Sâ@mkhya distinction of buddhi (cognition) and cit (pure intelligence) it is said that there is no difference between the buddhi and cit. We do not find in our consciousness two elements of a phenomenal and a non-phenomenal consciousness, but only one, by whichever name it may be called. The Sâ@mkhya epistemology that the anta@hkara@na assumes diverse forms in cognitive acts is also denied, and these are explained on the supposition of contacts of manas with the senses, âtman and external objects. The Buddhist objection against the Sâ@mkhya explanation that the anta@hkara@nas catch reflection from the external world just as a crystal does from the coloured objects that may lie near it, that there were really momentary productions of crystals and no permanent crystal catching different reflections at different times is refuted by Nyâya; for it says that it cannot be said that all creations are momentary, but it can only be agreed to in those cases where momentariness was actually experienced. In the case of the transformation of milk into curd there is no coming in of