A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1 - Surendranath Dasgupta (free ebook reader for android .txt) 📗

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[Footnote 1: It is well to remember that Sâ@mkhya did not believe that the senses were constituted of the gross elements. But the Sâ@mkhya-Yoga view represented in Âtreya-sa@mhitâ (Caraka) regarded the senses as bhautika or constituted of the gross elements.]

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the old milk is destroyed and the curd originates anew. The contact of manas with soul (âtman) takes place within the body and not in that part of âtman which is outside the body; knowledge belongs to the self and not to the senses or the object for even when they are destroyed knowledge remains. New cognitions destroy the old ones. No two recollections can be simultaneous. Desire and antipathy also belong to the soul. None of these can belong either to the body or to the mind (manas). Manas cannot be conscious for it is dependent upon self. Again if it was conscious then the actions done by it would have to be borne by the self and one cannot reap the fruits of the actions of another. The causes of recollection on the part of self are given as follows: (1) attention, (2) context, (3) repetition, (4) sign, (5) association, (6) likeness, (7) association of the possessor and the possessed or master and servant, or things which are generally seen to follow each other, (8) separation (as of husband and wife), (9) simpler employment, (10) opposition, (11) excess, (12) that from which anything can be got, (13) cover and covered, (14) pleasure and pain causing memory of that which caused them, (15) fear, (16) entreaty, (17) action such as that of the chariot reminding the charioteer, (18) affection, (19) merit and demerit [Footnote ref 1]. It is said that knowledge does not belong to body, and then the question of the production of the body as due to ad@r@s@ta is described. Salvation (apavarga) is effected by the manas being permanently separated from the soul (âtman) through the destruction of karma.

In the fourth book in course of the examination of do@sa (defects), it is said that moha (ignorance), is at the root of all other defects such as râga (attachment) and dve@sa (antipathy). As against the Buddhist view that a thing could be produced by destruction, it is said that destruction is only a stage in the process of origination. Îs'vara is regarded as the cause of the production of effects of deeds performed by men's efforts, for man is not always found to attain success according to his efforts. A reference is made to the doctrine of those who say that all things have come into being by no-cause (animitta), for then no-cause would be the cause, which is impossible.

The doctrine of some that all things are eternal is next refuted on the ground that we always see things produced and destroyed.

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[Footnote 1: Nyâya sûtra III. ii. 44.]

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The doctrine of the nihilistic Buddhists (s'ûnyavâdin Bauddhas) that all things are what they are by virtue of their relations to other things, and that of other Buddhists who hold that there are merely the qualities and parts but no substances or wholes, are then refuted. The fruits of karmas are regarded as being like the fruits of trees which take some time before they can ripen. Even though there may be pleasures here and there, birth means sorrow for men, for even the man who enjoys pleasure is tormented by many sorrows, and sometimes one mistakes pains for pleasures. As there is no sorrow in the man who is in deep dreamless sleep, so there is no affliction (kles'a) in the man who attains apavarga (salvation) [Footnote ref 1]. When once this state is attained all efforts (prav@rtti) cease for ever, for though efforts were beginningless with us they were all due to attachment, antipathy, etc. Then there are short discussions regarding the way in which egoism (aha@mkâra) ceases with the knowledge of the true causes of defects (do@sa); about the nature of whole and parts and about the nature of atoms (a@nus) which cannot further be divided. A discussion is then introduced against the doctrine of the Vijñânavâdins that nothing can be regarded as having any reality when separated from thoughts. Incidentally Yoga is mentioned as leading to right knowledge.

The whole of the fifth book which seems to be a later addition is devoted to the enumeration of different kinds of refutations (nigrahasthâna) and futilities (jâti).

Caraka, Nyâya sûtras and Vais'e@sika sûtras.

When we compare the Nyâya sûtras with the Vais'e@sika sûtras we find that in the former two or three differentstreams of purposes have met, whereas the latter is much more homogeneous. The large amount of materials relating to debates treated as a practical art for defeating an opponent would lead one to suppose that it was probably originally compiled from some other existing treatises which were used by Hindus and Buddhists alike for rendering themselves fit to hold their own in debates with their opponents [Footnote ref 2]. This assumption is justified when

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[Footnote 1: Vâtsyâyana notes that this is the salvation of him who has known Brahman, IV. i. 63.]

[Footnote 2: A reference to the Suvar@naprabhâsa sûtra shows that the Buddhist missionaries used to get certain preparations for improving their voice in order to be able to argue with force, and they took to the worship of Sarasvatî (goddess of learning), who they supposed would help them in bringing readily before their mind all the information and ideas of which they stood so much in need at the time of debates.]

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we compare the futilities (jâti) quibbles (chala), etc., relating to disputations as found in the Nyâya sûtra with those that are found in the medical work of Caraka (78 A.D.), III. viii. There are no other works in early Sanskrit literature, excepting the Nyâya sûtra and Caraka-sa@mhitâ which have treated of these matters. Caraka's description of some of the categories (e.g. d@r@s@tânta, prayojana, pratijñâ and vita@n@dâ) follows very closely the definitions given of those in the Nyâya sûtras. There are others such as the definitions of jalpa, chala, nigrahasthâna, etc., where the definitions of two authorities differ more. There are some other logical categories mentioned in Caraka (e.g. prati@s@thâpanâ, jijñâsâ, vyavasâya, vâkyado@sa, vâkyapras'a@msâ, upalambha, parihâra, abhyanujñâ, etc.) which are not found in the Nyâya sûtra [Footnote ref 1]. Again, the various types of futilities (jâti) and points of opponent's refutation (nigrahasthâna) mentioned in the Nyâya sûtra are not found in Caraka. There are some terms which are found in slightly variant forms in the two works, e.g. aupamya in Caraka, upamâna in Nyâya sûtra, arthâpatti in Nyâya sûtra and arthaprâpti in Caraka. Caraka does not seem to know anything about the Nyâya work on this subject, and it is plain that the treatment of these terms of disputations in the Caraka is much simpler and less technical than what we find in the Nyâya sûtras. If we leave out the varieties of jâti and nigrahasthâna of the fifth book, there is on the whole a great agreement between the treatment of Caraka and that of the Nyâya sûtras. It seems therefore in a high degree probable that both Caraka and the Nyâya sûtras were indebted for their treatment of these terms of disputation to some other earlier work. Of these, Caraka's compilation was earlier, whereas the compilation of the Nyâya sûtras represents a later work when a hotter atmosphere of disputations had necessitated the use of more technical terms which are embodied in this work, but which were not contained in the earlier work. It does not seem therefore that this part of the work could have been earlier than the second century A.D. Another stream flowing through the Nyâya sûtras is that of a polemic against the doctrines which could be attributed to the Sautrântika Buddhists, the Vijñânavâda Buddhists, the nihilists, the Sâ@mkhya, the Cârvâka, and some other unknown schools of thought to which we find no

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[Footnote 1: Like Vais'e@sika, Caraka does not know the threefold division of inference (anumâna) as pûrvavat, s'e@savat and sâmânyatod@r@s@ta.]

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further allusion elsewhere. The Vais'e@sika sûtras as we have already seen had argued only against the Mîmâ@msâ, and ultimately agreed with them on most points. The dispute with Mîmâ@msâ in the Nyâya sûtras is the same as in the Vais'e@sika over the question of the doctrine of the eternality of sound. The question of the self-validity of knowledge (svata@h prâmâ@nyavâda)and the akhyâti doctrine of illusion of the Mîmâ@msists, which form the two chief points of discussion between later Mîmâ@msâ and later Nyâya, are never alluded to in the Nyâya sûtras. The advocacy of Yoga methods (Nyâya sûtras, IV.ii.38-42 and 46) seems also to be an alien element; these are not found in Vais'e@sika and are not in keeping with the general tendency of the Nyâya sûtras, and the Japanese tradition that Mirok added them later on as Mahâmahopâdhyâya Haraprasâda S'astri has pointed out [Footnote ref l] is not improbable.

The Vais'e@sika sûtras, III.i.18 and III.ii.1, describe perceptional knowledge as produced by the close proximity of the self (âtman), the senses and the objects of sense, and they also adhere to the doctrine, that colour can only be perceived under special conditions of sa@mskâra (conglomeration etc.). The reason for inferring the existence of manas from the non-simultaneity (ayaugapadya) of knowledge and efforts is almost the same with Vais'e@sika as with Nyâya. The Nyâya sûtras give a more technical definition of perception, but do not bring in the questions of sa@mskâra or udbhûtarûpavattva which Vais'e@sika does. On the question of inference Nyâya gives three classifications as pûrvavat, s'e@savat and samânyatod@r@s@ta, but no definition. The Vais'e@sika sûtras do not know of these classifications, and give only particular types or instances of inference (V.S. III. i. 7-17, IX. ii. 1-2, 4-5). Inference is said to be made when a thing is in contact with another, or when it is in a relation of inherence in it, or when it inheres in a third thing; one kind of effect may lead to the inference of another kind of effect, and so on. These are but mere collections of specific instances of inference without reaching a general theory. The doctrine of vyâpti (concomitance of hetu (reason) and sâdhya (probandum)) which became so important in later Nyâya has never been properly formulated either in the Nyâya sûtras or in the Vais'e@sika. Vais'e@sika sutra, III. i. 24, no doubt assumes the knowledge of concomitance between hetu and sadhya (prasiddhipûrvakatvât apades'asya),

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[Footnote 1: J.A.S.B. 1905.]

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but the technical vyâpti is not known, and the connotation of the term prasiddhipûrvakatva of Vais'e@sika seems to be more loose than the term vyâpti as we know it in the later Nyâya. The Vais'e@sika sûtras do not count scriptures (s'abda) as a separate pramâ@na, but they tacitly admit the great validity of the Vedas. With Nyâya sûtras s'abda as a pramâ@na applies not only to the Vedas, but to the testimony of any trustworthy person, and Vâtsyâyana says that trustworthy persons may be of three kinds @r@si, ârya and mleccha (foreigners). Upamâna which is regarded as a means of right cognition in Nyâya is not even referred to in the Vais'e@sika sûtras. The Nyâya sûtras know of other pramâ@nas, such as arthâpatti, sambhava and aitihya, but include them within the pramâ@nas admitted by them, but the Vais'e@sika sûtras do not seem to know them at all [Footnote ref 1]. The Vais'e@sika sûtras believe in the perception of negation (abhâva) through the perception of the locus to which such negation refers (IX. i. 1-10). The Nyâya sûtras (II. ii. 1, 2, 7-12) consider that abhâva as non-existence or negation can be perceived; when one asks another to "bring the clothes which are not marked," he finds that marks are absent in some clothes and brings them; so it is argued that absence or non-existence can be directly perceived [Footnote ref 2]. Though there is thus an agreement between the Nyâya and the Vais'e@sika sûtras about the acceptance of abhâva as being due to perception, yet their method of handling the matter is different. The Nyâya sûtras say nothing about the categories of dravya, gu@na, karma, vis'e@sa and samavâya which form the main subjects of Vais'e@ska discussions [Footnote ref 3]. The Nyâya sûtras take much pains to prove the materiality of the senses. But this question does not seem to have been important with Vais'e@sika. The slight reference to this question in VIII. ii. 5-6 can hardly be regarded as sufficient. The Vais'e@sika sûtras do not mention the name of "Îs'vara," whereas the Nyâya sûtras try to prove his existence on eschatological grounds. The reasons given in support of the existence of self in the Nyâya sûtras are mainly on the ground of the unity of sense-cognitions and the phenomenon of recognition, whereas the

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[Footnote 1: The only old authority which knows these pramâ@nas is Caraka.
But he also gives an interpretation of sambhava which is different from
Nyâya and calls arthâpatti arthaprâpti (Caraka III. viii.).]

[Footnote 2: The details of this example