Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (popular e readers .TXT) 📗

but its mission was nevertheless formidable. Information on Norway, its armed forces, and its facilities was limited, since it had not enjoyed a high priority within the German intelligence services. The personnel limitations dictated by secrecy were handicaps and the lack of such basic items as maps became serious problems. However, within three weeks the staff produced the first practical plan.

The plan called for the capture of seven ports simultaneously: Oslo, Kristiansand, Arendal, Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik. These cities constituted the population centers in Norway and contained many of the country’s industries. Furthermore, the capture of these cities would gain control of almost all Norwegian naval facilities, forts, most operational airfields, and more than half of the supply depots the Norwegian Army needed for mobilization.

The Krancke Staff increased the force level from the one division envisioned by SKL to an army corps consisting of one airborne division, one mountain division, one motorized brigade, and six reinforced infantry regiments. The Krancke Staff planned to transport the troops in three ways: by aircraft, by warships, and by merchant ships.

Eight transport groups of the 7th Air Division would bring five parachute battalions in the first wave. The rest of the assault wave would arrive on warships. The second air transport wave would bring about half of the airborne division over a period of three days, while the third and fourth echelons of the troops would arrive by sea on the fifth day. The Krancke plan envisioned that about half of the assault echelon would arrive on warships while aircraft transported the rest. The Trondheim and Narvik assault units would all arrive on warships since these cities were outside the range of transport aircraft.

The Krancke Staff concluded that the Norwegian armed forces had neither the desire nor the ability to offer any effective resistance, and that the Germans could consolidate their positions after the landings through diplomatic means. The plan urged that the Norwegians be assured of maximum independence in internal affairs, that Germans take over all forts and supply depots, that the Norwegian armed forces be reduced to a caretaker status except for the units along the Finnish border, and that no Norwegian mobilization take place without prior German approval.

With respect to Denmark, the Krancke Staff believed that airfields in northern Denmark could be acquired peacefully by threatening to take them by military force. The SKL proposed that the threat against Sweden should be dropped, and instead both the Soviet Union and Sweden were to receive assurances that the occupation would only be for the duration of the war and that Germany guaranteed Norway’s borders.

The Krancke plan was a great improvement over the more rudimentary work of the SKL. However, it contained serious flaws. The combined services operation was the first of its kind to be undertaken by Germany and the plan underestimated the potential problems posed by Norwegian and British forces. The will and fighting abilities of the opponents were minimized. The underlying assumption in the plan was that the operation would remain shrouded in complete secrecy until the actual landing of German troops on Norwegian soil. This was an unrealistic military assumption in view of the buildup requirements. Over 100,000 troops along with thousands of tons of supplies and equipment, required movement to debarkation ports, and the shipping to carry these had to be assembled in a very limited number of north German ports. There were no good reasons to believe that this would not be observed or commented on.

Hitler Expedites Planning and Appoints a Commander

Whatever the legal pros and cons of the Altmark incident described earlier, they mattered little to Hitler. As Churchill and his supporters may have hoped, it was the event that energized him into action. Hitler was convinced that the British government would no longer respect Norwegian neutrality—a conclusion supported by the dramatic increase in British violations over the weeks that followed—and that Norwegian territorial waters would no longer offer a safe route for the transport of iron ore. On February 19, Hitler ordered the planning for Weserübung expedited and forces designated for the operation.

In addition to the Altmark affair, Hitler had other reasons to be worried. In the middle of February, German naval intelligence succeeded in breaking British naval codes, and this gave them important and accurate information about Allied activities and intentions. The information gathered was provided to OKW. The intercepts indicated that intense Allied preparations were underway for operations against Norway under the pretext of helping Finland. This confirmed Raeder and Hitler’s conclusions about British intentions.

When Hitler decided to expedite Weserübung, Jodl suggested that a commander for the operation be selected, and he and Keitel, apparently without consulting the army,37 recommended the 54-year old General der Infanterie Nikolaus von Falkenhorst, born in Breslau and a descendant of a military/ aristocratic family named von Jastrzembski.38 In 1918, at the end of World War I, von Falkenhorst had served as operations officer of General von der Goltz’s division in Finland. Von Falkenhorst had commanded the XXI Army Corps in the Polish campaign. He was still commander of the XXI Corps, stationed at Bacharach, and its troops were undergoing training in Grafenwöhr. Jodl and Keitel recommended von Falkenhorst for the Norwegian operation because of his experience in Finland. Hitler accepted the recommendation and Falkenhorst was summoned to Berlin.

Hitler interviewed von Falkenhorst on February 21, and the following day, after he had reviewed plans prepared by the Krancke Staff, Hitler confirmed his appointment. Hitler told von Falkenhorst he would have five divisions for the operation.

In a statement to the Norwegian High Command (Forsvarets overkommando) on September 30, 1945, General von Falkenhorst related how General Brauchitsch viewed the Norwegian operation. He let von Falkenhorst understand that he did not agree with Hitler’s decision and opined that the operation did not serve any useful purpose. Brauchitsch pointed out that his opinion had not been solicited, that Hitler alone had made the decision, and that he was now making all arrangements with the help of Admiral Raeder.39

Von Falkenhorst brought