Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (popular e readers .TXT) 📗

planning to continue “without excessive haste.”49 However, he agreed with Raeder that the British had not abandoned their strategic objective of eliminating German ore imports through Norwegian territorial waters and that, for this reason, Scandinavia would remain an area of unrest that had to be dealt with eventually. Hitler reaffirmed his intention to carry out Weserübung before the attack in the west.

Hitler left Berlin on March 17 for a meeting with Benito Mussolini, the Italian fascist leader, at the Brenner Pass. There are no indications that he mentioned anything to Mussolini about his plans for Norway and Denmark. Hitler spent the following days at Obersalzberg, and called for an immediate meeting with Raeder, Keitel, and Jodl when he returned on March 26.

Raeder reported to Hitler that he no longer considered a British landing in Norway imminent, but that their goal of cutting off Germany’s iron ore import remained. He expected this to take the form of disruption of the ore traffic in Norwegian waters in the hope that this would create a pretext for action against Norway. Raeder concluded that the Germans would be forced to carry out Weserübung eventually and argued for early action. He pointed out that the new moon on April 7 would provide favorable conditions, and that the northern nights would be too short after April 15; that German U-boats covering the planned operation could remain in position for only two or three additional weeks; and that the anticipated foggy and overcast weather conditions in early April favored the Germans. Hitler agreed that the landings should take place on April 7, but the following day, March 27, he told Halder that he wanted the operation to take place on April 9 or 10. We do not know what caused this postponement, which was strongly opposed by the navy, but it probably had something to do with a new round of inter-service squabbling.

Raeder wanted the air force to drop mines in all major British estuaries in order to hamper the movement of their fleet during the most critical part of the operation. Göring resisted this request and offered instead to bomb Scapa Flow. The navy believed bombing would be ineffective in preventing the movement of the fleet. Raeder also wanted the German ships to return to Germany as quickly as possible after landing the troops. Göring argued that the ships should remain to support the operations, and it appears that Hitler was also leaning in this direction. Raeder considered this a life and death issue for the German Navy, and after the regular meeting with Hitler, General Keitel, General Jodl, and Commander von Püttkammer in the afternoon of March 29, 1940, he requested to see the Führer privately. Hitler still wanted to leave naval forces behind in Narvik and Trondheim, but after Raeder had again enumerated the many arguments against such an idea, Hitler relented and allowed for the ships in Narvik to return to Germany immediately after landing the troops and refueling. With respect to Trondheim, he asked Raeder to “investigate the matter once more.”50

Hitler held a final review of the Weserübung plan and preparations on April 1. Von Falkenhorst, the senior officers from each service, and the commanders of each landing force gave the briefing. Hitler gave the plan and preparations his blessings and concluded with a short pep talk to those present, including his justification for carrying out the operation. He stated that, while he had full confidence in the carefully prepared operation and its commanders, the time between this review and the completion of the operation would impose on him the greatest nervous anxiety of his life.51 Rosenberg’s diary entry for April 9 depicts a more euphoric Hitler, who is alleged to have said, “Just as Bismarck’s Reich was born in 1866, the Great German Reich will be born from what is going on today.”52

The following day Hitler set the date and time for the operation as April 9 at 0415 hours. He also relented in his desire to keep warships in Trondheim.

The Operational Plan

Von Falkenhorst, his staff, and other headquarters within the Wehrmacht tasked to support Weserübung had been busy during the month of March. The German military officers at times displayed some weaknesses when it came to strategic assessments, and political, economic, and psychological considerations were often not given the proper weight. However, the officers were superb when it came to operational planning. The final operational plans for Weserübung, which were issued on March 5, 1940 and for Narvik on March 12 are excellent examples of meticulous planning. But they are remarkable plans not only for their attention to details and close cooperation between the services, despite the failure to achieve a unified command structure, but also for their display of imagination, innovation, and the assumption of calculated risks. This superb planning was combined with boldness and skill in execution. These were important factors in making an operation that the General Staff regarded as “lunatic” a stunning operational success. In both planning and execution, Weserübung stands in sharp contrast to the dilatory and rather unprofessional efforts on the part of the Allies.

Nevertheless, it must be recognized that the operation was a gamble, and the German General Staff could well have been proven correct in its expectation of failure. While superb planning and bold execution were important factors in its eventual success, the element of luck, hoped for but not planned for in military operations, was equally important. If the Norwegians and the British had heeded the many warnings they received, the stunning operational success could easily have turned into military disaster.

It is rather amazing that the operation succeeded as well as it did, not only because of those risks already alluded to, but also because of the rather makeshift command and operational control mechanism. Much of this can be traced back to inter-service rivalries, but German lack of experience in combined operations also played a large role. Von Falkenhorst commanded only the ground forces, and had no command authority over