Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (popular e readers .TXT) 📗

Von Falkenhorst and his chief of staff had their first meeting with General Halder, the Army Chief of Staff, on February 26. Halder took a hard attitude with respect to von Falkenhorst’s troop requirements. He requested full and timely information about all future requests. He insisted that OKH should be fully informed about future requirements before they became formal OKW demands, and received von Falkenhorst’s verbal assurance to this effect.

The OKW issued the directive for Weserübung on March 1, over Hitler’s signature. The directive was issued in nine copies. Five copies were for OKW and one each for von Falkenhorst and the service chiefs. On the same day as Hitler signed the Weserübung directive, OKW presented the services with the force requirements. This came without prior consultations despite von Falkenhorst’s assurances to the contrary three days earlier. The requirements presented to OKH included a corps headquarters, two divisions, and a motorized brigade for Denmark, as well as five divisions and a number of special units for Norway. The requirements caused anger in the services and a flurry of wrangling and power struggles between the service chiefs and OKW over the next week.

The army managed to obtain some reduction in forces they were required to provide. However, Luftwaffe chief Hermann Göring caused most of the difficulties. He had a large ego, felt slighted, and refused to tolerate subordinating air force units (except for tactical control) to any other service or joint commands. While the attack on Denmark and Norway was the first combined operation of the war, any semblance of a unified command structure for Group XXI disappeared because of Göring’s protests. The air force component of Weserübung, X Air Corps, was removed from von Falkenhorst’s control. It would now report to Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (Air Force High Command, OKL) and von Falkenhorst would have to submit his requirements and requests to OKL. To compensate for the lack of a unified command structure, OKW had to make detailed decisions about command relationships and even had to exercise direct control in certain cases to ensure smooth cooperation between the services.

However, Göring also caused difficulties for the other service chiefs. He was very critical of previous planning, and the result was that the concessions OKH had wrung from the OKW were not only rescinded, but the original requirements were increased. In a directive on March 7, the number of requested divisions rose from seven plus to nine plus. The navy had planned on a rapid return of its warships, in order to escape the expected furious counterattacks by the British Navy. They were now required to keep ships in Norwegian harbors, particularly in Narvik.

The Army commander-in-chief, General Brauchitsch, did not raise further issues about the size of the army requirements. He appears to have been satisfied to take a back seat in all future planning for the Scandinavian venture. He did not even attend Hitler’s final conference with the service chiefs and General von Falkenhorst about Weserübung on April 2. OKH had been opposed to the Scandinavian adventure from the very start, regarding it as a lunatic idea. Brauschitsch’s absence from the conference on April 2 is only one of many indications that the army wanted nothing to do with Weserübung, an operation with so many inherent flaws and dangers that they fully expected it to fail.

There had been an undercurrent of opposition to Hitler among high-ranking members of the army, if not outright plotting. Their goal was the removal of Hitler and a conclusion of peace with the Allies. To have any hope of success they needed the support of Brauchitsch and Halder. There were no prospects of these two officers turning against Hitler, to whom they were bound by both traditional loyalty and fear, as long as he remained popular and respected by the German people. His popularity had increased over the years after a series of successes, often achieved despite doubts or opposition from the armed forces. It may well be that the army leaders believed strongly that the Scandinavian adventure was doomed. The failure could then be laid squarely at Hitler’s feet and would be a serious blow to his prestige and standing with the German people. The prestige of the General Staff, on the other hand, would be enhanced by its non-participation in the preparation for and execution of Weserübung. Under such conditions, the time could be ripe for planning a regime change.43

The Germans were increasingly concerned that the Allies would soon make their move in Scandinavia and present the Germans with the worst of all possible scenarios. Speed had become a necessity. On March 3, Hitler called for a substantial speed-up of preparations and indicated that he would not tolerate any delays by the services. He directed that the forces for Weserübung assemble by March 10 and be ready to launch within four days. During a stormy session with the service chiefs on March 5, Hitler again reiterated that he wanted preparations for the Scandinavian operation hastened.

The German Navy was well pleased with the developments in the plans for Weserübung, with one major exception. Almost the entire surface fleet would participate in the attack on Norway, and a few older ships would be used against Denmark. The outward journey to Norway would be hazardous, and the return journey, after the British had a chance to recover from what the Germans hoped would be surprise, would involve extreme risks for the units deployed to central and northern Norway. The navy considered the critical point of the outward journey to be at the latitude of the Bergen-Shetland Islands. There was a good chance that the German ships would be discovered by the British in this area, and it was planned that they would pass during the hours of darkness. If the German naval units were discovered before reaching this point, operations north of Bergen could well become impossible because of the proximity of the British naval bases in Scotland.

The one exception to the navy’s satisfaction was the requirement that