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it should leave naval units in Norwegian harbors. To do so without air support amounted to suicide in the views of the naval staff. Admiral Raeder, who was more adept at handling Hitler than his army counterpart, wasted no time in appealing the decision to leave naval units in Norwegian harbors after the invasion. He wrapped this appeal very nicely into an overall appreciation of the Norwegian situation that he presented to Hitler on March 9.44 Hitler was impressed by Raeder’s arguments, but because of Göring’s objections, the matter remained unsettled for nearly two weeks.

Peace negotiations between the Finns and Soviets were underway, but the Finnish Foreign Minister had made it known that if the Soviet demands were too harsh, Finland would ask for Allied assistance. The British Prime Minister stated on March 10 that help would be provided if asked for. Also that day, public reports and German knowledge of the concentration of British naval forces in Scotland caused the German Naval Staff to conclude that preparations for an Allied invasion of Norway might already be completed and carried out as early as the following week. SKL made this accurate assessment in its journal:

The enemy can not see any possibility of obtaining victory in the European theater of war. The enemy views the spreading of the theater of war into the north to cut off Germany’s import of iron ore as a strategic necessity. Because of Finland’s predicament, such an operation would have to take place soon, and the Finnish situation gives the enemy the justification to carry it out before the anticipated German offensive in the west. The ice conditions in the Baltic Sea prevent Germany from carrying out operations there.45

It appears that Raeder had lost some of his earlier enthusiasm for the Scandinavian venture by February and March 1940. We can only guess at the reasons. The navy had three objectives in mind in its initial planning for an operation against Scandinavia. One was the securing of iron ore from Sweden, so important for the shipbuilding program. Second, bases in Norway would improve the German navy’s strategic position. Third, preventing British occupation of bases in southern Norway would secure the Baltic approaches and increase the security of naval facilities in the Baltic against air attacks. It was not at all certain in the autumn of 1939 that the war would be short, and securing the great French mines in Lorraine was by no means assured. Under these circumstances, Raeder saw a chance for his service to play an important role and he attempted to draw Hitler’s attention to the north, away from the great offensive in the west. However, by the spring of 1940, it had become obvious to Raeder that Hitler could not be distracted from his western plans.

The prospects for success in the west were improved greatly by the plan General Erich von Manstein developed and sold to Hitler. It was now more reasonable to assume that a breakthrough to the English Channel would succeed. This would provide the navy with bases on the French Atlantic coast and force the French to retreat from the Lorraine region. Norwegian bases no longer had the same importance. Equally significant to Raeder was a decision taken by Hitler on January 17, 1940 with respect to the long struggle over rearmament priorities. Hitler decided that the army should have priority, and he even suggested that it could become necessary to disband large naval units. Raeder’s protests over this decision were not successful.46

The blow to Raeder’s hopes of having a navy in the mid-1940s that could secure Germany’s trade routes while threatening those of Great Britain, together with a more promising chance of securing naval bases in France at virtually no cost to the navy, must have caused him to have second thoughts about the wisdom of attacking Norway. The preservation of the navy now assumed greater importance. The greatest concentration of British sea power in North Sea harbors since World War I threatened the very existence of the German Navy, unless complete operational secrecy was maintained. Raeder’s concerns are shown by the fact that he expressed doubts to Jodl about the importance of “playing a preventive role in Norway.” There also appears to have been some reluctance within von Falkenhorst’s command, based on entries in Jodl’s diary: “Certain naval officers seem to be lukewarm about Weserübung and need a shot in the arm. Even von Falkenhorst’s three immediate subordinates bring up points that are none of their business.”47

There remained the objective of securing the flow of Swedish iron ore, and this was the argument used by Raeder in his meetings with Hitler in the spring of 1940.48 The availability of this source and the prospect of the Lorraine fields preserved the chance that Hitler could still be prevailed upon to shift the armament priority to the navy after a successful campaign in the west. The loss of the Swedish ore, while a severe blow to the German war industry, would be particularly devastating to the navy.

The conclusion of peace between Finland and the Soviet Union on March 12 caused problems not only for the British but also for the Germans. An entry in Jodl’s diary on March 10 warned, “For us the situation is troublesome because the justification for Falkenhorst’s action becomes difficult if peace (between Finland and Russia) is soon concluded.” Notations in the same diary from March 12 to 14 indicate that Hitler was also searching for a way to justify Weserübung. For example, an entry for 13 March reads, “Fuehrer does not give the order for ‘W’ [Weserübung]. He is still trying to find a justification.”

As noted, Raeder appears to have become somewhat more cautious, and there was disagreement among senior members of his staff, as well as within von Falkenhorst’s staff, about the necessity for and wisdom of the Norwegian operation. For his part, Hitler would probably not have minded a delay in Weserübung as evidenced by his order on March 13 for the

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