The Ethics - Benedictus de Spinoza (ebook reader online free TXT) 📗

in God will necessarily be adequate (II. vii.

Coroll.), both in so far as God has the idea of the human body,

and also in so far as he has the idea of the modifications of the

human body, which (II. xvi., xxv., xxvii.) involve in part the

nature of the human body and the nature of external bodies ; that

is (II. xii., xiii.), the idea in God will necessarily be

adequate, both in so far as he constitutes the human mind, and in

so far as he has the ideas, which are in the human mind.

Therefore the mind (II. xi. Coroll.) necessarily perceives A

adequately, and has this adequate perception, both in so far as

it perceives itself, and in so far as it perceives its own or any

external body, nor can A be conceived in any other manner.

Q.E.D.

Corollary-Hence it follows that there are certain ideas or

notions common to all men ; for (by Lemma ii.) all bodies agree

in certain respects, which (by the foregoing Prop.) must be

adequately or clearly and distinctly perceived by all.

 

PROP. XXXIX. That, which is common to and a property of the

human body and such other bodies as are wont to affect the human

body, and which is present equally in each part of either, or in

the whole, will be represented by an adequate idea in the mind.

Proof.-If A be that, which is common to and a property of the

human body and external bodies, and equally present in the human

body and in the said external bodies, in each part of each

external body and in the whole, there will be an adequate idea of

A in God (II. vii. Coroll.), both in so far as he has the idea of

the human body, and in so far as he has the ideas of the given

external bodies. Let it now be granted, that the human body is

affected by an external body through that, which it has in common

therewith, namely, A ; the idea of this modification will involve

the property A (II. xvi.), and therefore (II. vii. Coroll.) the

idea of this modification, in so far as it involves the property

A, will be adequate in God, in so far as God is affected by the

idea of the human body ; that is (II. xiii.), in so far as he

constitutes the nature of the human mind ; therefore (II. xi.

Coroll.) this idea is also adequate in the human mind. Q.E.D.

Corollary.-Hence it follows that the mind is fitted to

perceive adequately more things, in proportion as its body has

more in common with other bodies.

 

PROP. XL. Whatsoever ideas in the mind follow from ideas which

are therein adequate, are also themselves adequate.

Proof.-This proposition is self-evident. For when we say

that an idea in the human mind follows from ideas which are

therein adequate, we say, in other words (II. xi. Coroll.), that

an idea is in the divine intellect, whereof God is the cause, not

in so far as he is infinite, nor in so far as he is affected by

the ideas of very many particular things, but only in so far as

he constitutes the essence of the human mind.

Note I.-I have thus set forth the cause of those notions,

which are common to all men, and which form the basis of our

ratiocination. But there are other causes of certain axioms or

notions, which it would be to the purpose to set forth by this

method of ours ; for it would thus appear what notions are more

useful than others, and what notions have scarcely any use at

all. Furthermore, we should see what notions are common to all

men, and what notions are only clear and distinct to those who

are unshackled by prejudice, and we should detect those which are

ill-founded. Again we should discern whence the notions called

secondary derived their origin, and consequently the axioms on

which they are founded, and other points of interest connected

with these questions. But I have decided to pass over the

subject here, partly because I have set it aside for another

treatise, partly because I am afraid of wearying the reader by

too great prolixity. Nevertheless, in order not to omit anything

necessary to be known, I will briefly set down the causes, whence

are derived the terms styled transcendental, such as Being,

Thing, Something. These terms arose from the fact, that the

human body, being limited, is only capable of distinctly forming

a certain number of images (what an image is I explained in the

II. xvii. note) within itself at the same time ; if this number

be exceeded, the images will begin to be confused ; if this

number of images, of which the body is capable of forming

distinctly within itself, be largely exceeded, all will become

entirely confused one with another. This being so, it is evident

(from II. Prop. xvii. Coroll., and xviii.) that the human mind

can distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously, as its body

can form images simultaneously. When the images become quite

confused in the body, the mind also imagines all bodies

confusedly without any distinction, and will comprehend them, as

it were, under one attribute, namely, under the attribute of

Being, Thing, &c. The same conclusion can be drawn from the fact

that images are not always equally vivid, and from other

analogous causes, which there is no need to explain here ; for

the purpose which we have in view it is sufficient for us to

consider one only. All may be reduced to this, that these terms

represent ideas in the highest degree confused. From similar

causes arise those notions, which we call general, such as man,

horse, dog, &c. They arise, to wit, from the fact that so many

images, for instance, of men, are formed simultaneously in the

human mind, that the powers of imagination break down, not indeed

utterly, but to the extent of the mind losing count of small

differences between individuals (e.g. colour, size, &c.) and

their definite number, and only distinctly imagining that, in

which all the individuals, in so far as the body is affected by

them, agree ; for that is the point, in which each of the said

individuals chiefly affected the body ; this the mind expresses

by the name man, and this it predicates of an infinite number of

particular individuals. For, as we have said, it is unable to

imagine the definite number of individuals. We must, however,

bear in mind, that these general notions are not formed by all

men in the same way, but vary in each individual according as the

point varies, whereby the body has been most often affected and

which the mind most easily imagines or remembers. For instance,

those who have most often regarded with admiration the stature of

man, will by the name of man understand an animal of erect

stature ; those who have been accustomed to regard some other

attribute, will form a different general image of man, for

instance, that man is a laughing animal, a two-footed animal

without feathers, a rational animal, and thus, in other cases,

everyone will form general images of things according to the

habit of his body.

It is thus not to be wondered at, that among philosophers,

who seek to explain things in nature merely by the images formed

of them, so many controversies should have arisen.

Note II.-From all that has been said above it is clear, that

we, in many cases, perceive and form our general notions :-(1.)

From particular things represented to our intellect

fragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses

(II. xxix. Coroll.) ; I have settled to call such perceptions by

the name of knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience.4

(2.) From symbols, e.g., from the fact of having read or heard

certain words we remember things and form certain ideas

concerning them, similar to those through which we imagine things

(II. xviii. note). I shall call both these ways of regarding

things knowledge of the first kind, opinion, or imagination.

(3.) From the fact that we have notions common to all men, and

adequate ideas of the properties of things (II. xxxviii. Coroll.,

xxxix. and Coroll. and xl.) ; this I call reason and knowledge of

the second kind. Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is,

as I will hereafter show, a third kind of knowledge, which we

will call intuition. This kind of knowledge proceeds from an

adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of

God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. I will

illustrate all three kinds of knowledge by a single example.

Three numbers are given for finding a fourth, which shall be to

the third as the second is to the first. Tradesmen without

hesitation multiply the second by the third, and divide the

product by the first ; either because they have not forgotten the

rule which they received from a master without any proof, or

because they have often made trial of it with simple numbers, or

by virtue of the proof of the nineteenth proposition of the

seventh book of Euclid, namely, in virtue of the general property

of proportionals.

But with very simple numbers there is no need of this. For

instance, one, two, three, being given, everyone can see that the

fourth proportional is six ; and this is much clearer, because we

infer the fourth number from an intuitive grasping of the ratio,

which the first bears to the second.

 

PROP. XLI. Knowledge of the first kind is the only source of

falsity, knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily

true.

Proof.-To knowledge of the first kind we have (in the

foregoing note) assigned all those ideas, which are inadequate

and confused ; therefore this kind of knowledge is the only

source of falsity (II. xxxv.). Furthermore, we assigned to the

second and third kinds of knowledge those ideas which are

adequate ; therefore these kinds are necessarily true (II.

xxxiv.). Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XLII. Knowledge of the second and third kinds, not

knowledge of the first kind, teaches us to distinguish the true

from the false.

Proof.-This proposition is self-evident. He, who knows how

to distinguish between true and false, must have an adequate idea

of true and false. That is (II. xl., note ii.), he must know the

true and the false by the second or third kind of knowledge.

 

PROP. XLIII. He, who has a true idea, simultaneously knows that

he has a true idea, and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing

perceived.

Proof.-A true idea in us is an idea which is adequate in God,

in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind

(II. xi. Coroll.). Let us suppose that there is in God, in so

far as he is displayed through the human mind, an adequate idea,

A. The idea of this idea must also necessarily be in God, and be

referred to him in the same way as the idea A (by II. xx.,

whereof the proof is of universal application). But the idea A

is supposed to be referred to God, in so far as he is displayed

through the human mind ; therefore, the idea of the idea A must

be referred to God in the same manner ; that is (by II. xi.

Coroll.), the adequate idea of the idea A will be in the mind,

which has the adequate idea A ; therefore he, who has an adequate

idea or knows a thing truly (II. xxxiv.), must at the same time

have an adequate idea or true knowledge of his knowledge ; that

is, obviously, he must be assured. Q.E.D.

Note.-I explained in the note to II. xxi. what