The Ethics - Benedictus de Spinoza (ebook reader online free TXT) 📗

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modification of the human body does not involve an adequate

knowledge of the external body. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XXVI. The human mind does not perceive any external body

as actually existing, except through the ideas of the

modifications of its own body.

Proof.-If the human body is in no way affected by a given

external body, then (II. vii.) neither is the idea of the human

body, in other words, the human mind, affected in any way by the

idea of the existence of the said external body, nor does it in

any manner perceive its existence. But, in so far as the human

body is affected in any way by a given external body, thus far

(II. xvi. and Coroll.) it perceives that external body. Q.E.D.

Corollary.-In so far as the human mind imagines an external

body, it has not an adequate knowledge thereof.

Proof.-When the human mind regards external bodies through

the ideas of the modifications of its own body, we say that it

imagines (see II. xvii. note) ; now the mind can only imagine

external bodies as actually existing. Therefore (by II. xxv.),

in so far as the mind imagines external bodies, it has not an

adequate knowledge of them. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XXVII. The idea of each modification of the human body

does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body itself.

Proof.-Every idea of a modification of the human body

involves the nature of the human body, in so far as the human

body is regarded as affected in a given manner (II. xvi.). But,

inasmuch as the human body is an individual which may be affected

in many other ways, the idea of the said modification, &c.

Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XXVIII. The ideas of the modifications of the human body,

in so far as they have reference only to the human mind, are not

clear and distinct, but confused.

Proof.-The ideas of the modifications of the human body

involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies

(II. xvi.) ; they must involve the nature not only of the human

body but also of its parts ; for the modifications are modes

(Post. iii.), whereby the parts of the human body, and,

consequently, the human body as a whole are affected. But (by

II. xxiv., xxv.) the adequate knowledge of external bodies, as

also of the parts composing the human body, is not in God, in so

far as he is regarded as affected by the human mind, but in so

far as he is regarded as affected by other ideas. These ideas of

modifications, in so far as they are referred to the human mind

alone, are as consequences without premisses, in other words,

confused ideas. Q.E.D.

Note.-The idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind

is, in the same manner, proved not to be, when considered in

itself alone, clear and distinct ; as also is the case with the

idea of the human mind, and the ideas of the ideas of the

modifications of the human body, in so far as they are referred

to the mind only, as everyone may easily see.

 

PROP. XXIX. The idea of the idea of each modification of the

human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human

mind.

Proof.-The idea of a modification of the human body (II.

xxvii.) does not involve an adequate knowledge of the said body,

in other words, does not adequately express its nature ; that is

(II. xiii.) it does not agree with the nature of the mind

adequately ; therefore (I. Ax. vi) the idea of this idea does not

adequately express the nature of the human mind, or does not

involve an adequate knowledge thereof.

Corollary.-Hence it follows that the human mind, when it

perceives things after the common order of nature, has not an

adequate but only a confused and fragmentary knowledge of itself,

of its own body, and of external bodies. For the mind does not

know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the

modifications of body (II. xxiii.). It only perceives its own

body (II. xix.) through the ideas of the modifications, and only

perceives external bodies through the same means ; thus, in so

far as it has such ideas of modification, it has not an adequate

knowledge of itself (II. xxix.), nor of its own body (II.

xxvii.), nor of external bodies (II. xxv.), but only a

fragmentary and confused knowledge thereof (II. xxviii. and

note). Q.E.D.

Note.-I say expressly, that the mind has not an adequate but

only a confused knowledge of itself, its own body, and of

external bodies, whenever it perceives things after the common

order of nature ; that is, whenever it is determined from

without, namely, by the fortuitous play of circumstance, to

regard this or that ; not at such times as it is determined from

within, that is, by the fact of regarding several things at once,

to understand their points of agreement, difference, and

contrast. Whenever it is determined in anywise from within, it

regards things clearly and distinctly, as I will show below.

 

PROP. XXX. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the

duration of our body.

Proof.-The duration of our body does not depend on its

essence (II. Ax. i.), nor on the absolute nature of God (I.

xxi.). But (I. xxviii.) it is conditioned to exist and operate

by causes, which in their turn are conditioned to exist and

operate in a fixed and definite relation by other causes, these

last again being conditioned by others, and so on to infinity.

The duration of our body therefore depends on the common order of

nature, or the constitution of things. Now, however a thing may

be constituted, the adequate knowledge of that thing is in God,

in so far as he has the ideas of all things, and not in so far as

he has the idea of the human body only. (II. ix. Coroll.)

Wherefore the knowledge of the duration of our body is in God

very inadequate, in so far as he is only regarded as constituting

the nature of the human mind ; that is (II. xi. Coroll.), this

knowledge is very inadequate to our mind. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XXXI. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the

duration of particular things external to ourselves.

Proof.-Every particular thing, like the human body, must be

conditioned by another particular thing to exist and operate in a

fixed and definite relation ; this other particular thing must

likewise be conditioned by a third, and so on to infinity. (I.

xxviii.) As we have shown in the foregoing proposition, from

this common property of particular things, we have only a very

inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body ; we must draw a

similar conclusion with regard to the duration of particular

things, namely, that we can only have a very inadequate knowledge

of the duration thereof. Q.E.D.

Corollary.-Hence it follows that all particular things are

contingent and perishable. For we can have no adequate idea of

their duration (by the last Prop.), and this is what we must

understand by the contingency and perishableness of things. (I.

xxxiii., Note i.) For (I. xxix.), except in this sense, nothing

is contingent.

 

PROP. XXXII. All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God,

are true.

Proof.-All ideas which are in God agree in every respect with

their objects (II. vii. Coroll.), therefore (I. Ax. vi.) they are

all true. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XXXIII. There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes

them to be called false.

Proof.-If this be denied, conceive, if possible, a positive

mode of thinking, which should constitute the distinctive quality

of falsehood. Such a mode of thinking cannot be in God (II.

xxxii.) ; external to God it cannot be or be conceived (I. xv.).

Therefore there is nothing positive in ideas which causes them to

be called false. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XXXIV. Every idea, which in us is absolute or adequate and

perfect, is true.

Proof.-When we say that an idea in us is adequate and

perfect, we say, in other words (II. xi. Coroll.), that the idea

is adequate and perfect in God, in so far as he constitutes the

essence of our mind ; consequently (II. xxxii.), we say that such

an idea is true. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XXXV. Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge,

which inadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas involve.

Proof.-There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them

to be called false (II. xxxiii.) ; but falsity cannot consist in

simple privation (for minds, not bodies, are said to err and to

be mistaken), neither can it consist in absolute ignorance, for

ignorance and error are not identical ; wherefore it consists in

the privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary, or

confused ideas involve. Q.E.D.

Note.-In the note to II. xvii. I explained how error consists

in the privation of knowledge, but in order to throw more light

on the subject I will give an example. For instance, men are

mistaken in thinking themselves free ; their opinion is made up

of consciousness of their own actions, and ignorance of the

causes by which they are conditioned. Their idea of freedom,

therefore, is simply their ignorance of any cause for their

actions. As for their saying that human actions depend on the

will, this is a mere phrase without any idea to correspond

thereto. What the will is, and how it moves the body, they none

of them know ; those who boast of such knowledge, and feign

dwellings and habitations for the soul, are wont to provoke

either laughter or disgust. So, again, when we look at the sun,

we imagine that it is distant from us about two hundred feet ;

this error does not lie solely in this fancy, but in the fact

that, while we thus imagine, we do not know the sun’s true

distance or the cause of the fancy. For although we afterwards

learn, that the sun is distant from us more than six hundred of

the earth’s diameters, we none the less shall fancy it to be near

; for we do not imagine the sun as near us, because we are

ignorant of its true distance, but because the modification of

our body involves the essence of the sun, in so far as our said

body is affected thereby.

 

PROP. XXXVI. Inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same

necessity, as adequate or clear and distinct ideas.

Proof.-All ideas are in God (I. xv.), and in so far as they

are referred to God are true (II. xxxii.) and (II. vii. Coroll.)

adequate ; therefore there are no ideas confused or inadequate,

except in respect to a particular mind (cf. II. xxiv. and

xxviii.) ; therefore all ideas, whether adequate or inadequate,

follow by the same necessity (II. vi.). Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XXXVII. That which is common to all (cf. Lemma II.,

above), and which is equally in a part and in the whole, does not

constitute the essence of any particular thing.

Proof.-If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that it

constitutes the essence of some particular thing ; for instance,

the essence of B. Then (II. Def. ii.) it cannot without B either

exist or be conceived ; but this is against our hypothesis.

Therefore it does not appertain to B’s essence, nor does it

constitute the essence of any particular thing. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XXXVIII. Those things, which are common to all, and which

are equally in a part and in the whole, cannot be conceived

except adequately.

Proof.-Let A be something, which is common to all bodies, and

which is equally present in the part of any given body and in the

whole. I say A cannot be conceived except adequately. For the

idea thereof