The Ethics - Benedictus de Spinoza (ebook reader online free TXT) 📗

same way it is proved, that there is in the mind

no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, &c.

Whence it follows, that these and similar faculties are either

entirely fictitious, or are merely abstract and general terms,

such as we are accustomed to put together from particular things.

Thus the intellect and the will stand in the same relation to

this or that idea, or this or that volition, as “lapidity” to

this or that stone, or as “man” to Peter and Paul. The cause

which leads men to consider themselves free has been set forth in

the Appendix to Part I. But, before I proceed further, I would

here remark that, by the will to affirm and decide, I mean the

faculty, not the desire. I mean, I repeat, the faculty, whereby

the mind affirms or denies what is true or false, not the desire,

wherewith the mind wishes for or turns away from any given thing.

After we have proved, that these faculties of ours are general

notions, which cannot be distinguished from the particular

instances on which they are based, we must inquire whether

volitions themselves are anything besides the ideas of things.

We must inquire, I say, whether there is in the mind any

affirmation or negation beyond that, which the idea, in so far as

it is an idea, involves. On which subject see the following

proposition, and II. Def. iii., lest the idea of pictures should

suggest itself. For by ideas I do not mean images such as are

formed at the back of the eye, or in the midst of the brain, but

the conceptions of thought.

 

PROP. XLIX. There is in the mind no volition or affirmation and

negation, save that which an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea,

involves.

Proof.-There is in the mind no absolute faculty of positive

or negative volition, but only particular volitions, namely, this

or that affirmation, and this or that negation. Now let us

conceive a particular volition, namely, the mode of thinking

whereby the mind affirms, that the three interior angles of a

triangle are equal to two right angles. This affirmation

involves the conception or idea of a triangle, that is, without

the idea of a triangle it cannot be conceived. It is the same

thing to say, that the concept A must involve the concept B, as

it is to say, that A cannot be conceived without B. Further,

this affirmation cannot be made (II. Ax. iii.) without the idea

of a triangle. Therefore, this affirmation can neither be nor be

conceived, without the idea of a triangle. Again, this idea of a

triangle must involve this same affirmation, namely, that its

three interior angles are equal to two right angles. Wherefore,

and vice vers�, this idea of a triangle can neither be nor be

conceived without this affirmation, therefore, this affirmation

belongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle, and is nothing

besides. What we have said of this volition (inasmuch as we have

selected it at random) may be said of any other volition, namely,

that it is nothing but an idea. Q.E.D.

Corollary.-Will and understanding are one and the same.

Proof.-Will and understanding are nothing beyond the

individual volitions and ideas (II. xlviii. and note). But a

particular volition and a particular idea are one and the same

(by the foregoing Prop.) ; therefore, will and understanding are

one and the same. Q.E.D.

Note.-We have thus removed the cause which is commonly

assigned for error. For we have shown above, that falsity

consists solely in the privation of knowledge involved in ideas

which are fragmentary and confused. Wherefore, a false idea,

inasmuch as it is false, does not involve certainty. When we

say, then, that a man acquiesces in what is false, and that he

has no doubts on the subject, we do not say that he is certain,

but only that he does not doubt, or that he acquiesces in what is

false, inasmuch as there are no reasons, which should cause his

imagination to waver (see II. xliv. note). Thus, although the

man be assumed to acquiesce in what is false, we shall never say

that he is certain. For by certainty we mean something positive

(II. xliii. and note), not merely the absence of doubt.

However, in order that the foregoing proposition may be fully

explained, I will draw attention to a few additional points, and

I will furthermore answer the objections which may be advanced

against our doctrine. Lastly, in order to remove every scruple,

I have thought it worth while to point out some of the

advantages, which follow therefrom. I say “some,” for they will

be better appreciated from what we shall set forth in the fifth

part.

I begin, then, with the first point, and warn my readers to

make an accurate distinction between an idea, or conception of

the mind, and the images of things which we imagine. It is

further necessary that they should distinguish between idea and

words, whereby we signify things. These three-namely, images,

words, and ideas-are by many persons either entirely confused

together, or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care,

and hence people are generally in ignorance, how absolutely

necessary is a knowledge of this doctrine of the will, both for

philosophic purposes and for the wise ordering of life. Those

who think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us by

contact with external bodies, persuade themselves that the ideas

of those things, whereof we can form no mental picture, are not

ideas, but only figments, which we invent by the free decree of

our will ; they thus regard ideas as though they were inanimate

pictures on a panel, and, filled with this misconception, do not

see that an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves an

affirmation or negation. Again, those who confuse words with

ideas, or with the affirmation which an idea involves, think that

they can wish something contrary to what they feel, affirm, or

deny. This misconception will easily be laid aside by one, who

reflects on the nature of knowledge, and seeing that it in no

wise involves the conception of extension, will therefore clearly

understand, that an idea (being a mode of thinking) does not

consist in the image of anything, nor in words. The essence of

words and images is put together by bodily motions, which in no

wise involve the conception of thought.

 

These few words on this subject will suffice : I will

therefore pass on to consider the objections, which may be raised

against our doctrine. Of these, the first is advanced by those,

who think that the will has a wider scope than the understanding,

and that therefore it is different therefrom. The reason for

their holding the belief, that the will has wider scope than the

understanding, is that they assert, that they have no need of an

increase in their faculty of assent, that is of affirmation or

negation, in order to assent to an infinity of things which we do

not perceive, but that they have need of an increase in their

faculty of understanding. The will is thus distinguished from

the intellect, the latter being finite and the former infinite.

Secondly, it may be objected that experience seems to teach us

especially clearly, that we are able to suspend our judgment

before assenting to things which we perceive ; this is confirmed

by the fact that no one is said to be deceived, in so far as he

perceives anything, but only in so far as he assents or dissents.

For instance, he who feigns a winged horse, does not

therefore admit that a winged horse exists ; that is, he is not

deceived, unless he admits in addition that a winged horse does

exist. Nothing therefore seems to be taught more clearly by

experience, than that the will or faculty of assent is free and

different from the faculty of understanding. Thirdly, it may be

objected that one affirmation does not apparently contain more

reality than another ; in other words, that we do not seem to

need for affirming, that what is true is true, any greater power

than for affirming, that what is false is true. We have,

however, seen that one idea has more reality or perfection than

another, for as objects are some more excellent than others, so

also are the ideas of them some more excellent than others ; this

also seems to point to a difference between the understanding and

the will. Fourthly, it may be objected, if man does not act from

free will, what will happen if the incentives to action are

equally balanced, as in the case of Buridan’s ass? Will he

perish of hunger and thirst? If I say that he would, I shall

seem to have in my thoughts an ass or the statue of a man rather

than an actual man. If I say that he would not, he would then

determine his own action, and would consequently possess the

faculty of going and doing whatever he liked. Other objections

might also be raised, but, as I am not bound to put in evidence

everything that anyone may dream, I will only set myself to the

task of refuting those I have mentioned, and that as briefly as

possible.

To the first objection I answer, that I admit that the will

has a wider scope than the understanding, if by the understanding

be meant only clear and distinct ideas ; but I deny that the will

has a wider scope than the perceptions, and the faculty of

forming conceptions ; nor do I see why the faculty of volition

should be called infinite, any more than the faculty of feeling :

for, as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm an

infinite number of things (one after the other, for we cannot

affirm an infinite number simultaneously), so also can we, by the

same faculty of feeling, feel or perceive (in succession) an

infinite number of bodies. If it be said that there is an

infinite number of things which we cannot perceive, I answer,

that we cannot attain to such things by any thinking, nor,

consequently, by any faculty of volition. But, it may still be

urged, if God wished to bring it about that we should perceive

them, he would be obliged to endow us with a greater faculty of

perception, but not a greater faculty of volition than we have

already. This is the same as to say that, if God wished to bring

it about that we should understand an infinite number of other

entities, it would be necessary for him to give us a greater

understanding, but not a more universal idea of entity than that

which we have already, in order to grasp such infinite entities.

We have shown that will is a universal entity or idea, whereby we

explain all particular volitions-in other words, that which is

common to all such volitions.

As, then, our opponents maintain that this idea, common or

universal to all volitions, is a faculty, it is little to be

wondered at that they assert, that such a faculty extends itself

into the infinite, beyond the limits of the understanding : for

what is universal is predicated alike of one, of many, and of an

infinite number of individuals.

To the second objection I reply by denying, that we have a

free power of suspending our judgment : for, when we say that

anyone suspends his judgment, we merely mean that he sees, that

he does not perceive the matter in question adequately.

Suspension of judgment is, therefore, strictly speaking, a

perception, and not free will. In order to illustrate the point,

let us suppose a boy imagining a horse, and perceive nothing

else. Inasmuch as this imagination involves the existence of the