The Ethics - Benedictus de Spinoza (ebook reader online free TXT) 📗

class="calibre1">PROP. III. The activities of the mind arise solely from adequate

ideas ; the passive states of the mind depend solely on

inadequate ideas.

Proof.-The first element, which constitutes the essence of

the mind, is nothing else but the idea of the actually existent

body (II. xi. and xiii.), which (II. xv.) is compounded of many

other ideas, whereof some are adequate and some inadequate (II.

xxix. Coroll., II. xxxviii. Coroll.). Whatsoever therefore

follows from the nature of mind, and has mind for its proximate

cause, through which it must be understood, must necessarily

follow either from an adequate or from an inadequate idea. But

in so far as the mind (III. i.) has inadequate ideas, it is

necessarily passive : wherefore the activities of the mind follow

solely from adequate ideas, and accordingly the mind is only

passive in so far as it has inadequate ideas. Q.E.D.

Note.-Thus we see, that passive states are not attributed to

the mind, except in so far as it contains something involving

negation, or in so far as it is regarded as a part of nature,

which cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived through itself

without other parts : I could thus show, that passive states are

attributed to individual things in the same way that they are

attributed to the mind, and that they cannot otherwise be

perceived, but my purpose is solely to treat of the human mind.

 

PROP. IV. Nothing can be destroyed, except by a cause external

to itself.

Proof.-This proposition is self-evident, for the definition

of anything affirms the essence of that thing, but does not

negative it ; in other words, it postulates the essence of the

thing, but does not take it away. So long therefore as we regard

only the thing itself, without taking into account external

causes, we shall not be able to find in it anything which could

destroy it. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. V. Things are naturally contrary, that is, cannot exist in

the same object, in so far as one is capable of destroying the

other.

Proof.-If they could agree together or co-exist in the same

object, there would then be in the said object something which

could destroy it ; but this, by the foregoing proposition, is

absurd, therefore things, &c. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. VI. Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours

to persist in its own being.

Proof.-Individual things are modes whereby the attributes of

God are expressed in a given determinate manner (I. xxv. Coroll.)

; that is, (I. xxxiv.), they are things which express in a given

determinate manner the power of God, whereby God is and acts ;

now no thing contains in itself anything whereby it can be

destroyed, or which can take away its existence (III. iv.) ; but

contrariwise it is opposed to all that could take away its

existence (III. v.). Therefore, in so far as it can, and in so

far as it is in itself, it endeavours to persist in its own

being. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. VII. The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to

persist in its own being, is nothing else but the actual essence

of the thing in question.

Proof.-From the given essence of any thing certain

consequences necessarily follow (I. xxxvi.), nor have things any

power save such as necessarily follows from their nature as

determined (I. xxix.) ; wherefore the power of any given thing,

or the endeavour whereby, either alone or with other things, it

acts, or endeavours to act, that is (III. vi.), the power or

endeavour, wherewith it endeavours to persist in its own being,

is nothing else but the given or actual essence of the thing in

question. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. VIII. The endeavour, whereby a thing endeavours to persist

in its own being, involves no finite time, but an indefinite

time.

Proof.-If it involved a limited time, which should determine

the duration of the thing, it would then follow solely from that

power whereby the thing exists, that the thing could not exist

beyond the limits of that time, but that it must be destroyed ;

but this (III. iv.) is absurd. Wherefore the endeavour wherewith

a thing exists involves no definite time ; but, contrariwise,

since (III. iv.) it will by the same power whereby it already

exists always continue to exist, unless it be destroyed by some

external cause, this endeavour involves an indefinite time.

 

PROP. IX. The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct

ideas, and also in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours to

persist in its being for an indefinite period, and of this

endeavour it is conscious.

Proof.-The essence of the mind is constituted by adequate and

inadequate ideas (III. iii.), therefore (III. vii.), both in so

far as it possesses the former, and in so far as it possesses the

latter, it endeavours to persist in its own being, and that for

an indefinite time (III. viii.). Now as the mind (II. xxiii.) is

necessarily conscious of itself through the ideas of the

modifications of the body, the mind is therefore (III. vii.)

conscious of its own endeavour.

Note.-This endeavour, when referred solely to the mind, is

called will, when referred to the mind and body in conjunction it

is called appetite ; it is, in fact, nothing else but man’s

essence, from the nature of which necessarily follow all those

results which tend to its preservation ; and which man has thus

been determined to perform.

Further, between appetite and desire there is no difference,

except that the term desire is generally applied to men, in so

far as they are conscious of their appetite, and may accordingly

be thus defined : Desire is appetite with consciousness thereof.

It is thus plain from what has been said, that in no case do we

strive for, wish for, long for, or desire anything, because we

deem it to be good, but on the other hand we deem a thing to be

good, because we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or

desire it.

 

PROP. X. An idea, which excludes the existence of our body,

cannot be postulated in our mind, but is contrary thereto.

Proof.-Whatsoever can destroy our body, cannot be postulated

therein (III. v.). Therefore neither can the idea of such a

thing occur in God, in so far as he has the idea of our body (II.

ix. Coroll.) ; that is (II.xi., xiii.), the idea of that thing

cannot be postulated as in our mind, but contrariwise, since (II.

xi., xiii.) the first element, that constitutes the essence of

the mind, is the idea of the human body as actually existing, it

follows that the first and chief endeavour of our mind is the

endeavour to affirm the existence of our body : thus, an idea,

which negatives the existence of our body, is contrary to our

mind, &c. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XI. Whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders

the power of activity in our body, the idea thereof increases or

diminishes, helps or hinders the power of thought in our mind.

Proof.-This proposition is evident from II. vii. or from II.

xiv.

Note.-Thus we see, that the mind can undergo many changes,

and can pass sometimes to a state of greater perfection,

sometimes to a state of lesser perfection. These passive states

of transition explain to us the emotions of pleasure and pain.

By pleasure therefore in the following propositions I shall

signify a passive state wherein the mind passes to a greater

perfection. By pain I shall signify a passive state wherein the

mind passes to a lesser perfection. Further, the emotion of

pleasure in reference to the body and mind together I shall call

stimulation (titillatio) or merriment (hilaritas), the emotion of

pain in the same relation I shall call suffering or melancholy.

But we must bear in mind, that stimulation and suffering are

attributed to man, when one part of his nature is more affected

than the rest, merriment and melancholy, when all parts are alike

affected. What I mean by desire I have explained in the note to

Prop. ix. of this part ; beyond these three I recognize no other

primary emotion ; I will show as I proceed, that all other

emotions arise from these three. But, before I go further, I

should like here to explain at greater length Prop. x of this

part, in order that we may clearly understand how one idea is

contrary to another. In the note to II. xvii. we showed that the

idea, which constitutes the essence of mind, involves the

existence of body, so long as the body itself exists. Again, it

follows from what we pointed out in the Corollary to II. viii.,

that the present existence of our mind depends solely on the

fact, that the mind involves the actual existence of the body.

Lastly, we showed (II. xvii., xviii. and note) that the power of

the mind, whereby it imagines and remembers things, also depends

on the fact, that it involves the actual existence of the body.

Whence it follows, that the present existence of the mind and its

power of imagining are removed, as soon as the mind ceases to

affirm the present existence of the body. Now the cause, why the

mind ceases to affirm this existence of the body, cannot be the

mind itself (III. iv.), nor again the fact that the body ceases

to exist. For (by II. vi.) the cause, why the mind affirms the

existence of the body, is not that the body began to exist ;

therefore, for the same reason, it does not cease to affirm the

existence of the body, because the body ceases to exist ; but

(II. xvii.) this result follows from another idea, which excludes

the present existence of our body and, consequently, of our mind,

and which is therefore contrary to the idea constituting the

essence of our mind.

 

PROP. XII. The mind, as far as it can, endeavours to conceive

those things, which increase or help the power of activity in the

body.

Proof.-So long as the human body is affected in a mode, which

involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will

regard that external body as present (II. xvii.), and

consequently (II. vii.), so long as the human mind regards an

external body as present, that is (II. xvii. note), conceives it,

the human body is affected in a mode, which involves the nature

of the said external body ; thus so long as the mind conceives

things, which increase or help the power of activity in our body,

the body is affected in modes which increase or help its power of

activity (III. Post. i.) ; consequently (III. xi.) the mind’s

power of thinking is for that period increased or helped. Thus

(III. vi., ix.) the mind, as far as it can, endeavours to imagine

such things. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XIII. When the mind conceives things which diminish or

hinder the body’s power of activity, it endeavours, as far as

possible, to remember things which exclude the existence of the

first-named things.

Proof.-So long as the mind conceives anything of the kind

alluded to, the power of the mind and body is diminished or

constrained (cf. III. xii. Proof) ; nevertheless it will continue

to conceive it, until the mind conceives something else, which

excludes the present existence thereof (II. xvii.) ; that is (as

I have just shown), the power of the mind and of the body is

diminished, or constrained, until the mind conceives something

else, which excludes the existence of the former thing conceived

: therefore the mind (III. ix.), as far as it can, will endeavour

to conceive or remember the latter. Q.E.D.

Corollary.-Hence it follows that the mind shrinks from

conceiving those things, which diminish or constrain the power of

itself and of