The Ethics - Benedictus de Spinoza (ebook reader online free TXT) 📗
- Author: Benedictus de Spinoza
- Performer: -
Book online «The Ethics - Benedictus de Spinoza (ebook reader online free TXT) 📗». Author Benedictus de Spinoza
PROP. XXXVIII. If a man has begun to hate an object of his love,
so that love is thoroughly destroyed, he will, causes being
equal, regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it,
and his hatred will be in proportion to the strength of his
former love.
Proof.-If a man begins to hate that which he had loved, more
of his appetites are put under restraint than if he had never
loved it. For love is a pleasure (III. xiii. note) which a man
endeavours as far as he can to render permanent (III. xxviii.) ;
he does so by regarding the object of his love as present, and by
affecting it as far as he can pleasurably ; this endeavour is
greater in proportion as the love is greater, and so also is the
endeavour to bring about that the beloved should return his
affection (III. xxxiii.). Now these endeavours are constrained
by hatred towards the object of love (III. xiii. Coroll. and III.
xxiii.) ; wherefore the lover (III. xi. note) will for this cause
also be affected with pain, the more so in proportion as his love
has been greater ; that is, in addition to the pain caused by
hatred, there is a pain caused by the fact that he has loved the
object ; wherefore the lover will regard the beloved with greater
pain, or in other words, will hate it more than if he had never
loved it, and with the more intensity in proportion as his former
love was greater. Q.E.D.
PROP. XXXIX. He who hates anyone will endeavour to do him an
injury, unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby accrue
to himself ; on the other hand, he who loves anyone will, by the
same law, seek to benefit him.
Proof.-To hate a man is (III. xiii. note) to conceive him as
a cause of pain ; therefore he who hates a man will endeavour to
remove or destroy him. But if anything more painful, or, in
other words, a greater evil, should accrue to the hater
thereby-and if the hater thinks he can avoid such evil by not
carrying out the injury, which he planned against the object of
his hate-he will desire to abstain from inflicting that injury
(III. xxviii.), and the strength of his endeavour (III. xxxvii.)
will be greater than his former endeavour to do injury, and will
therefore prevail over it, as we asserted. The second part of
this proof proceeds in the same manner. Wherefore he who hates
another, etc. Q.E.D.
Note.-By good I here mean every kind of pleasure, and all
that conduces thereto, especially that which satisfies our
longings, whatsoever they may be. By evil, I mean every kind of
pain, especially that which frustrates our longings. For I have
shown (III. ix. note) that we in no case desire a thing because
we deem it good, but, contrariwise, we deem a thing good because
we desire it : consequently we deem evil that which we shrink
from ; everyone, therefore, according to his particular emotions,
judges or estimates what is good, what is bad, what is better,
what is worse, lastly, what is best, and what is worst. Thus a
miser thinks that abundance of money is the best, and want of
money the worst ; an ambitious man desires nothing so much as
glory, and fears nothing so much as shame. To an envious man
nothing is more delightful than another’s misfortune, and nothing
more painful than another’s success. So every man, according to
his emotions, judges a thing to be good or bad, useful or
useless. The emotion, which induces a man to turn from that
which he wishes, or to wish for that which he turns from, is
called timidity, which may accordingly be defined as the fear
whereby a man is induced to avoid an evil which he regards as
future by encountering a lesser evil (III. xxviii.). But if the
evil which he fears be shame, timidity becomes bashfulness.
Lastly, if the desire to avoid a future evil be checked by the
fear of another evil, so that the man knows not which to choose,
fear becomes consternation, especially if both the evils feared
be very great.
PROP. XL. He, who conceives himself to be hated by another, and
believes that he has given him no cause for hatred, will hate
that other in return.
Proof.-He who conceives another as affected with hatred, will
thereupon be affected himself with hatred (III. xxvii.), that is,
with pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause. But, by
the hypothesis, he conceives no cause for this pain except him
who is his enemy ; therefore, from conceiving that he is hated by
some one, he will be affected with pain, accompanied by the idea
of his enemy ; in other words, he will hate his enemy in return.
Q.E.D.
Note.-He who thinks that he has given just cause for hatred
will (III. xxx. and note) be affected with shame ; but this case
(III. xxv.) rarely happens. This reciprocation of hatred may
also arise from the hatred, which follows an endeavour to injure
the object of our hate (III. xxxix.). He therefore who conceives
that he is hated by another will conceive his enemy as the cause
of some evil or pain ; thus he will be affected with pain or
fear, accompanied by the idea of his enemy as cause ; in other
words, he will be affected with hatred towards his enemy, as I
said above.
Corollary I.-He who conceives, that one whom he loves hates
him, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love. For, in so
far as he conceives that he is an object of hatred, he is
determined to hate his enemy in return. But, by the hypothesis,
he nevertheless loves him : wherefore he will be a prey to
conflicting hatred and love.
Corollary II.-If a man conceives that one, whom he has
hitherto regarded without emotion, has done him any injury from
motives of hatred, he will forthwith seek to repay the injury in
kind.
Proof.-He who conceives, that another hates him, will (by the
last proposition) hate his enemy in return, and (III. xxvi.) will
endeavour to recall everything which can affect him painfully ;
he will moreover endeavour to do him an injury (III. xxxix.).
Now the first thing of this sort which he conceives is the injury
done to himself ; he will, therefore, forthwith endeavour to
repay it in kind. Q.E.D.
Note.-The endeavour to injure one whom we hate is called
Anger ; the endeavour to repay in kind injury done to ourselves
is called Revenge.
PROP. XLI. If anyone conceives that he is loved by another, and
believes that he has given no cause for such love, he will love
that other in return. (Cf. III. xv. Coroll., and III. xvi.)
Proof.-This proposition is proved in the same way as the
preceding one. See also the note appended thereto.
Note.-If he believes that he has given just cause for the
love, he will take pride therein (III. xxx. and note) ; this is
what most often happens (III. xxv.), and we said that its
contrary took place whenever a man conceives himself to be hated
by another. (See note to preceding proposition.) This
reciprocal love, and consequently the desire of benefiting him
who loves us (III. xxxix.), and who endeavours to benefit us, is
called gratitude or thankfulness. It thus appears that men are
much more prone to take vengeance than to return benefits.
Corollary.-He who imagines that he is loved by one whom he
hates, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love. This is
proved in the same way as the first corollary of the preceding
proposition.
Note.-If hatred be the prevailing emotion, he will endeavour
to injure him who loves him ; this emotion is called cruelty,
especially if the victim be believed to have given no ordinary
cause for hatred.
PROP. XLII. He who has conferred a benefit on anyone from
motives of love or honour will feel pain, if he sees that the
benefit is received without gratitude.
Proof.-When a man loves something similar to himself, he
endeavours, as far as he can, to bring it about that he should be
loved thereby in return (III. xxxiii.). Therefore he who has
conferred a benefit confers it in obedience to the desire, which
he feels of being loved in return ; that is (III. xxxiv.) from
the hope of honour or (III. xxx. note) pleasure ; hence he will
endeavour, as far as he can, to conceive this cause of honour, or
to regard it as actually existing. But, by the hypothesis, he
conceives something else, which excludes the existence of the
said cause of honour : wherefore he will thereat feel pain (III.
xix.). Q.E.D.
PROP. XLIII. Hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can
on the other hand be destroyed by love.
Proof.-He who conceives, that an object of his hatred hates
him in return, will thereupon feel a new hatred, while the former
hatred (by hypothesis) still remains (III. xl.). But if, on the
other hand, he conceives that the object of hate loves him, he
will to this extent (III. xxxviii.) regard himself with pleasure,
and (III. xxix.) will endeavour to please the cause of his
emotion. In other words, he will endeavour not to hate him (III.
xli.), and not to affect him painfully ; this endeavour (III.
xxxvii.) will be greater or less in proportion to the emotion
from which it arises. Therefore, if it be greater than that
which arises from hatred, and through which the man endeavours to
affect painfully the thing which he hates, it will get the better
of it and banish the hatred from his mind. Q.E.D.
PROP. XLIV. Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes
into love : and love is thereupon greater than if hatred had not
preceded it.
Proof.-The proof proceeds in the same way as Prop. xxxviii.
of this Part : for he who begins to love a thing, which he was
wont to hate or regard with pain, from the very fact of loving
feels pleasure. To this pleasure involved in love is added the
pleasure arising from aid given to the endeavour to remove the
pain involved in hatred (III. xxxvii.), accompanied by the idea
of the former object of hatred as cause.
Note.-Though this be so, no one will endeavour to hate
anything, or to be affected with pain, for the sake of enjoying
this greater pleasure ; that is, no one will desire that he
should be injured, in the hope of recovering from the injury, nor
long to be ill for the sake of getting well. For everyone will
always endeavour to persist in his being, and to ward off pain as
far as he can. If the contrary is conceivable, namely, that a
man should desire to hate someone, in order that he might love
him the more thereafter, he will always desire to hate him. For
the strength of love is in proportion to the strength of the
hatred, wherefore the man would desire, that the hatred be
continually increased more and more, and, for a similar reason,
he would desire to become more and more ill, in order that he
might take a greater pleasure in being restored to health : in
such a case he would always endeavour to be ill, which (III. vi.)
is absurd.
PROP. XLV. If a man conceives, that anyone similar to himself
hates anything also similar to himself, which he loves, he will
hate that person.
Proof.-The beloved object feels reciprocal hatred towards him
who hates it (III. xl.) ; therefore the lover, in conceiving that
anyone hates the
Comments (0)