The Ethics - Benedictus de Spinoza (ebook reader online free TXT) 📗

the body.

Note.-From what has been said we may clearly understand the

nature of Love and Hate. Love is nothing else but pleasure

accompanied by the idea of an external cause : Hate is nothing

else but pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause. We

further see, that he who loves necessarily endeavours to have,

and to keep present to him, the object of his love ; while he who

hates endeavours to remove and destroy the object of his hatred.

But I will treat of these matters at more length hereafter.

 

PROP. XIV. If the mind has once been affected by two emotions at

the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected by one

of these two, be also affected by the other.

Proof.-If the human body has once been affected by two bodies

at once, whenever afterwards the mind conceives one of them, it

will straightway remember the other also (II. xviii.). But the

mind’s conceptions indicate rather the emotions of our body than

the nature of external bodies (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.) ; therefore,

if the body, and consequently the mind (III. Def. iii.) has been

once affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever

it is afterwards affected by one of the two, be also affected by

the other.

 

PROP. XV. Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure,

pain, or desire.

Proof.-Let it be granted that the mind is simultaneously

affected by two emotions, of which one neither increases nor

diminishes its power of activity, and the other does either

increase or diminish the said power (III. Post. i.). From the

foregoing proposition it is evident that, whenever the mind is

afterwards affected by the former, through its true cause, which

(by hypothesis) neither increases nor diminishes its power of

action, it will be at the same time affected by the latter, which

does increase or diminish its power of activity, that is (III.

xi. note) it will be affected with pleasure or pain. Thus the

former of the two emotions will, not through itself, but

accidentally, be the cause of pleasure or pain. In the same way

also it can be easily shown, that a thing may be accidentally the

cause of desire. Q.E.D.

Corollary.-Simply from the fact that we have regarded a thing

with the emotion of pleasure or pain, though that thing be not

the efficient cause of the emotion, we can either love or hate

it.

Proof.-For from this fact alone it arises (III. xiv.), that

the mind afterwards conceiving the said thing is affected with

the emotion of pleasure or pain, that is (III. xi. note),

according as the power of the mind and body may be increased or

diminished, &c. ; and consequently (III. xii.), according as the

mind may desire or shrink from the conception of it (III. xiii.

Coroll.), in other words (III. xiii. note), according as it may

love or hate the same. Q.E.D.

Note.-Hence we understand how it may happen, that we love or

hate a thing without any cause for our emotion being known to us

; merely, as a phrase is, from sympathy or antipathy. We should

refer to the same category those objects, which affect us

pleasurably or painfully, simply because they resemble other

objects which affect us in the same way. This I will show in the

next Prop. I am aware that certain authors, who were the first

to introduce these terms “sympathy” and “antipathy,” wished to

signify thereby some occult qualities in things ; nevertheless I

think we may be permitted to use the same terms to indicate known

or manifest qualities.

 

PROP. XVI. Simply from the fact that we conceive, that a given

object has some point of resemblance with another object which is

wont to affect the mind pleasurably or painfully, although the

point of resemblance be not the efficient cause of the said

emotions, we shall still regard the first-named object with love

or hate.

Proof.-The point of resemblance was in the object (by

hypothesis), when we regarded it with pleasure or pain, thus

(III. xiv.), when the mind is affected by the image thereof, it

will straightway be affected by one or the other emotion, and

consequently the thing, which we perceive to have the same point

of resemblance, will be accidentally (III. xv.) a cause of

pleasure or pain. Thus (by the foregoing Corollary), although

the point in which the two objects resemble one another be not

the efficient cause of the emotion, we shall still regard the

first-named object with love or hate. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XVII. If we conceive that a thing, which is wont to affect

us painfully, has any point of resemblance with another thing

which is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of

pleasure, we shall hate the first-named thing, and at the same

time we shall love it.

Proof.-The given thing is (by hypothesis) in itself a cause

of pain, and (III. xiii. note), in so far as we imagine it with

this emotion, we shall hate it : further, inasmuch as we conceive

that it has some point of resemblance to something else, which is

wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we

shall with an equally strong impulse of pleasure love it

(III.xvi.) ; thus we shall both hate and love the same thing.

Q.E.D.

Note.-This disposition of the mind, which arises from two

contrary emotions, is called vacillation ; it stands to the

emotions in the same relation as doubt does to the imagination

(II. xliv. note) ; vacillation and doubt do not differ one from

the other, except as greater differs from less. But we must bear

in mind that I have deduced this vacillation from causes, which

give rise through themselves to one of the emotions, and to the

other accidentally. I have done this, in order that they might

be more easily deduced from what went before ; but I do not deny

that vacillation of the disposition generally arises from an

object, which is the efficient cause of both emotions. The human

body is composed (II. Post. i.) of a variety of individual parts

of different nature, and may therefore (Ax.i. after Lemma iii.

after II. xiii.) be affected in a variety of different ways by

one and the same body ; and contrariwise, as one and the same

thing can be affected in many ways, it can also in many different

ways affect one and the same part of the body. Hence we can

easily conceive, that one and the same object may be the cause of

many and conflicting emotions.

 

PROP. XVIII. A man is as much affected pleasurably or painfully

by the image of a thing past or future as by the image of a thing

present.

Proof.-So long as a man is affected by the image of anything,

he will regard that thing as present, even though it be

non-existent (II. xvii. and Coroll.), he will not conceive it as

past or future, except in so far as its image is joined to the

image of time past or future (II. xliv. note). Wherefore the

image of a thing, regarded in itself alone, is identical, whether

it be referred to time past, time future, or time present ; that

is (II. xvi. Coroll.), the disposition or emotion of the body is

identical, whether the image be of a thing past, future, or

present. Thus the emotion of pleasure or pain is the ssame,

whether the image be of a thing past or future. Q.E.D.

Note I.-I call a thing past or future, according as we either

have been or shall be affected thereby. For instance, according

as we have seen it, or are about to see it, according as it has

recreated us, or will recreate us, according as it has harmed us,

or will harm us. For, as we thus conceive it, we affirm its

existence ; that is, the body is affected by no emotion which

excludes the existence of the thing, and therefore (II. xvii.)

the body is affected by the image of the thing, in the same way

as if the thing were actually present. However, as it generally

happens that those, who have had many experiences, vacillate, so

long as they regard a thing as future or past, and are usually in

doubt about its issue (II. xliv. note) ; it follows that the

emotions which arise from similar images of things are not so

constant, but are generally disturbed by the images of other

things, until men become assured of the issue.

Note II.-From what has just been said, we understand what is

meant by the terms Hope, Fear, Confidence, Despair, Joy, and

Disappointment.5 Hope is nothing else but an inconstant

pleasure, arising from the image of something future or past,

whereof we do not yet know the issue. Fear, on the other hand,

is an inconstant pain also arising from the image of something

concerning which we are in doubt. If the element of doubt be

removed from these emotions, hope becomes Confidence and fear

becomes Despair. In other words, Pleasure or Pain arising from

the image of something concerning which we have hoped or feared.

Again, Joy is Pleasure arising from the image of something past

whereof we have doubted the issue. Disappointment is the Pain

opposed to Joy.

 

PROP. XIX. He who conceives that the object of his love is

destroyed will feel pain ; if he conceives that it is preserved

he will feel pleasure.

Proof.-The mind, as far as possible, endeavours to conceive

those things which increase or help the body’s power of activity

(III. xii.) ; in other words (III. xii. note), those things which

it loves. But conception is helped by those things which

postulate the existence of a thing, and contrariwise is hindered

by those which exclude the existence of a thing (II. xvii.) ;

therefore the images of things, which postulate the existence of

an object of love, help the mind’s endeavour to conceive the

object of love, in other words (III. xi. note), affect the mind

pleasurably ; contrariwise those things, which exclude the

existence of an object of love, hinder the aforesaid mental

endeavour ; in other words, affect the mind painfully. He,

therefore, who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed

will feel pain, &c. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XX. He who conceives that the object of his hate is

destroyed will also feel pleasure.

Proof.-The mind (III. xiii.) endeavours to conceive those

things, which exclude the existence of things whereby the body’s

power of activity is diminished or constrained ; that is (III.

xiii. note), it endeavours to conceive such things as exclude the

existence of what it hates ; therefore the image of a thing,

which excludes the existence of what the mind hates, helps the

aforesaid mental effort, in other words (III. xi. note), affects

the mind pleasurably. Thus he who conceives that the object of

his hate is destroyed will feel pleasure. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XXI. He who conceives, that the object of his love is

affected pleasurably or painfully, will himself be affected

pleasurably or painfully ; and the one or the other emotion will

be greater or less in the lover according as it is greater or

less in the thing loved.

Proof.-The images of things (as we showed in III. xix.) which

postulate the existence of the object of love, help the mind’s

endeavour to conceive the said object. But pleasure postulates

the existence of something feeling pleasure, so much the more in

proportion as the emotion of pleasure is greater ; for it is

(III. xi. note) a transition to a greater perfection ; therefore

the image of pleasure in the object of love helps the mental

endeavour of the lover ; that is, it affects the lover

pleasurably, and so