The Ethics - Benedictus de Spinoza (ebook reader online free TXT) 📗

in consequence (III. xv. Coroll. and III. xxvii.),

determined to wonder at, love, or fear that thing. But if from

the presence, or more accurate contemplation of the said thing,

we are compelled to deny concerning it all that can be the cause

of wonder, love, fear, &c., the mind then, by the presence of the

thing, remains determined to think rather of those qualities

which are not in it, than of those which are in it ; whereas, on

the other hand, the presence of the object would cause it more

particularly to regard that which is therein. As devotion

springs from wonder at a thing which we love, so does Derision

spring from contempt of a thing which we hate or fear, and Scorn

from contempt of folly, as veneration from wonder at prudence.

Lastly, we can conceive the emotions of love, hope, honour, &c.,

in association with contempt, and can thence deduce other

emotions, which are not distinguished one from another by any

recognized name.

 

PROP. LIII. When the mind regards itself and its own power of

activity, it feels pleasure : and that pleasure is greater in

proportion to the distinctness wherewith it conceives itself and

its own power of activity.

Proof.-A man does not know himself except through the

modifications of his body, and the ideas thereof (II. xix. and

xxiii.). When, therefore, the mind is able to contemplate

itself, it is thereby assumed to pass to a greater perfection, or

(III. xi. note) to feel pleasure ; and the pleasure will be

greater in proportion to the distinctness, wherewith it is able

to conceive itself and its own power of activity. Q.E.D.

Corollary.-This pleasure is fostered more and more, in

proportion as a man conceives himself to be praised by others.

For the more he conceives himself as praised by others, the more

he will imagine them to be affected with pleasure, accompanied by

the idea of himself (III. xxix. note) ; thus he is (III. xxvii.)

himself affected with greater pleasure, accompanied by the idea

of himself. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. LIV. The mind endeavours to conceive only such things as

assert its power of activity.

Proof.-The endeavour or power of the mind is the actual

essence thereof (III. vii.) ; but the essence of the mind

obviously only affirms that which the mind is and can do ; not

that which it neither is nor can do ; therefore the mind

endeavours to conceive only such things as assert or affirm its

power of activity. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. LV. When the mind contemplates its own weakness, it feels

pain thereat.

Proof.-The essence of the mind only affirms that which the

mind is, or can do ; in other words, it is the mind’s nature to

conceive only such things as assert its power of activity (last

Prop.). Thus, when we say that the mind contemplates its own

weakness, we are merely saying that while the mind is attempting

to conceive something which asserts its power of activity, it is

checked in its endeavour - in other words (III. xi. note), it

feels pain. Q.E.D.

Corollary.-This pain is more and more fostered, if a man

conceives that he is blamed by others ; this may be proved in the

same way as the corollary to III. liii.

Note.-This pain, accompanied by the idea of our own weakness,

is called humility ; the pleasure, which springs from the

contemplation of ourselves, is called self-love or

self-complacency. And inasmuch as this feeling is renewed as

often as a man contemplates his own virtues, or his own power of

activity, it follows that everyone is fond of narrating his own

exploits, and displaying the force both of his body and mind, and

also that, for this reason, men are troublesome to one another.

Again, it follows that men are naturally envious (III. xxiv.

note, and III. xxxii. note), rejoicing in the shortcomings of

their equals, and feeling pain at their virtues. For whenever a

man conceives his own actions, he is affected with pleasure (III.

liii.), in proportion as his actions display more perfection, and

he conceives them more distinctly-that is (II. xl. note), in

proportion as he can distinguish them from others, and regard

them as something special. Therefore, a man will take most

pleasure in contemplating himself, when he contemplates some

quality which he denies to others. But, if that which he affirms

of himself be attributable to the idea of man or animals in

general, he will not be so greatly pleased : he will, on the

contrary, feel pain, if he conceives that his own actions fall

short when compared with those of others. This pain (III.

xxviii.) he will endeavour to remove, by putting a wrong

construction on the actions of his equals, or by, as far as he

can, embellishing his own.

It is thus apparent that men are naturally prone to hatred

and envy, which latter is fostered by their education. For

parents are accustomed to incite their children to virtue solely

by the spur of honour and envy. But, perhaps, some will scruple

to assent to what I have said, because we not seldom admire men’s

virtues, and venerate their possessors. In order to remove such

doubts, I append the following corollary.

Corollary.-No one envies the virtue of anyone who is not his

equal.

Proof.-Envy is a species of hatred (III. xxiv. note) or (III.

xiii. note) pain, that is (III. xi. note), a modification whereby

a man’s power of activity, or endeavour towards activity, is

checked. But a man does not endeavour or desire to do anything,

which cannot follow from his nature as it is given ; therefore a

man will not desire any power of activity or virtue (which is the

same thing) to be attributed to him, that is appropriate to

another’s nature and foreign to his own ; hence his desire cannot

be checked, nor he himself pained by the contemplation of virtue

in some one unlike himself, consequently he cannot envy such an

one. But he can envy his equal, who is assumed to have the same

nature as himself. Q.E.D.

Note.-When, therefore, as we said in the note to III. lii.,

we venerate a man, through wonder at his prudence, fortitude,

&c., we do so, because we conceive those qualities to be peculiar

to him, and not as common to our nature ; we, therefore, no more

envy their possessor, than we envy trees for being tall, or lions

for being courageous.

 

PROP. LVI. There are as many kinds of pleasure, of pain, of

desire, and of every emotion compounded of these, such as

vacillations of spirit, or derived from these, such as love,

hatred, hope, fear, &c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we

are affected.

Proof.-Pleasure and pain, and consequently the emotions

compounded thereof, or derived therefrom, are passions, or

passive states (III. xi. note) ; now we are necessarily passive

(III. i.), in so far as we have inadequate ideas ; and only in so

far as we have such ideas are we passive (III. iii.) ; that is,

we are only necessarily passive (II. xl. note), in so far as we

conceive, or (II. xvii. and note) in so far as we are affected by

an emotion, which involves the nature of our own body, and the

nature of an external body. Wherefore the nature of every

passive state must necessarily be so explained, that the nature

of the object whereby we are affected be expressed. Namely, the

pleasure, which arises from, say, the object A, involves the

nature of that object A, and the pleasure, which arises from the

object B, involves the nature of the object B ; wherefore these

two pleasurable emotions are by nature different, inasmuch as the

causes whence they arise are by nature different. So again the

emotion of pain, which arises from one object, is by nature

different from the pain arising from another object, and,

similarly, in the case of love, hatred, hope, fear, vacillation,

&c.

Thus, there are necessarily as many kinds of pleasure, pain,

love, hatred, &c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we are

affected. Now desire is each man’s essence or nature, in so far

as it is conceived as determined to a particular action by any

given modification of itself (III. ix. note) ; therefore,

according as a man is affected through external causes by this or

that kind of pleasure, pain, love, hatred, &c., in other words,

according as his nature is disposed in this or that manner, so

will his desire be of one kind or another, and the nature of one

desire must necessarily differ from the nature of another desire,

as widely as the emotions differ, wherefrom each desire arose.

Thus there are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of

pleasure, pain, love, &c., consequently (by what has been shown)

there are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of objects

whereby we are affected. Q.E.D.

Note.-Among the kinds of emotions, which, by the last

proposition, must be very numerous, the chief are luxury,

drunkenness, lust, avarice, and ambition, being merely species of

love or desire, displaying the nature of those emotions in a

manner varying according to the object, with which they are

concerned. For by luxury, drunkenness, lust, avarice, ambition,

&c., we simply mean the immoderate love of feasting, drinking,

venery, riches, and fame. Furthermore, these emotions, in so far

as we distinguish them from others merely by the objects

wherewith they are concerned, have no contraries. For

temperance, sobriety, and chastity, which we are wont to oppose

to luxury, drunkenness, and lust, are not emotions or passive

states, but indicate a power of the mind which moderates the

last-named emotions. However, I cannot here explain the

remaining kinds of emotions (seeing that they are as numerous as

the kinds of objects), nor, if I could, would it be necessary.

It is sufficient for our purpose, namely, to determine the

strength of the emotions, and the mind’s power over them, to have

a general definition of each emotion. It is sufficient, I

repeat, to understand the general properties of the emotions and

the mind, to enable us to determine the quality and extent of the

mind’s power in moderating and checking the emotions. Thus,

though there is a great difference between various emotions of

love, hatred, or desire, for instance between love felt towards

children, and love felt towards a wife, there is no need for us

to take cognizance of such differences, or to track out further

the nature and origin of the emotions.

 

PROP. LVII. Any emotion of a given individual differs from the

emotion of another individual, only in so far as the essence of

the one individual differs from the essence of the other.

Proof.-This proposition is evident from Ax. i. (which see

after Lemma iii. Prop. xiii., Part II.). Nevertheless, we will

prove it from the nature of the three primary emotions.

All emotions are attributable to desire, pleasure, or pain,

as their definitions above given show. But desire is each man’s

nature or essence (III. ix. note) ; therefore desire in one

individual differs from desire in another individual, only in so

far as the nature or essence of the one differs from the nature

or essence of the other. Again, pleasure and pain are passive

states or passions, whereby every man’s power or endeavour to

persist in his being is increased or diminished, helped or

hindered (III. xi. and note). But by the endeavour to persist in

its being, in so far as it is attributable to mind and body in

conjunction, we mean appetite and desire (III. ix. note) ;

therefore pleasure and pain are identical with desire or

appetite, in so far as by external causes they are increased or

diminished, helped or hindered, in other words, they are every