The Ethics - Benedictus de Spinoza (ebook reader online free TXT) 📗
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differ from the pleasure and pain felt by another man, only in so
far as the nature or essence of the one man differs from the
essence of the other ; consequently, any emotion of one
individual only differs, &c. Q.E.D.
Note.-Hence it follows, that the emotions of the animals
which are called irrational (for after learning the origin of
mind we cannot doubt that brutes feel) only differ from man’s
emotions, to the extent that brute nature differs from human
nature. Horse and man are alike carried away by the desire of
procreation ; but the desire of the former is equine, the desire
of the latter is human. So also the lusts and appetites of
insects, fishes, and birds must needs vary according to the
several natures. Thus, although each individual lives content
and rejoices in that nature belonging to him wherein he has his
being, yet the life, wherein each is content and rejoices, is
nothing else but the idea, or soul, of the said individual, and
hence the joy of one only differs in nature from the joy of
another, to the extent that the essence of one differs from the
essence of another. Lastly, it follows from the foregoing
proposition, that there is no small difference between the joy
which actuates, say, a drunkard, and the joy possessed by a
philosopher, as I just mention here by the way. Thus far I have
treated of the emotions attributable to man, in so far as he is
passive. It remains to add a few words on those attributable to
him in so far as he is active.
PROP. LVIII. Besides pleasure and desire, which are passivities
or passions, there are other emotions derived from pleasure and
desire, which are attributable to us in so far as we are active.
Proof.-When the mind conceives itself and its power of
activity, it feels pleasure (III. liii.) : now the mind
necessarily contemplates itself, when it conceives a true or
adequate idea (II. xliii.). But the mind does conceive certain
adequate ideas (II. xl. note 2.). Therefore it feels pleasure in
so far as it conceives adequate ideas ; that is, in so far as it
is active (III. i.). Again, the mind, both in so far as it has
clear and distinct ideas, and in so far as it has confused ideas,
endeavours to persist in its own being (III. ix.) ; but by such
an endeavour we mean desire (by the note to the same Prop.) ;
therefore, desire is also attributable to us, in so far as we
understand, or (III. i.) in so far as we are active. Q.E.D.
PROP. LIX. Among all the emotions attributable to the mind as
active, there are none which cannot be referred to pleasure or
desire.
Proof.-All emotions can be referred to desire, pleasure, or
pain, as their definitions, already given, show. Now by pain we
mean that the mind’s power of thinking is diminished or checked
(III. xi. and note) ; therefore, in so far as the mind feels
pain, its power of understanding, that is, of activity, is
diminished or checked (III. i.) ; therefore, no painful emotions
can be attributed to the mind in virtue of its being active, but
only emotions of pleasure and desire, which (by the last Prop.)
are attributable to the mind in that condition. Q.E.D.
Note.-All actions following from emotion, which are
attributable to the mind in virtue of its understanding, I set
down to strength of character (fortitudo), which I divide into
courage (animositas) and highmindedness (generositas). By
courage I mean the desire whereby every man strives to preserve
his own being in accordance solely with the dictates of reason.
By highmindedness I mean the desire whereby every man endeavours,
solely under the dictates of reason, to aid other men and to
unite them to himself in friendship. Those actions, therefore,
which have regard solely to the good of the agent I set down to
courage, those which aim at the good of others I set down to
highmindedness. Thus temperance, sobriety, and presence of mind
in danger, &c., are varieties of courage ; courtesy, mercy, &c.,
are varieties of highmindedness.
I think I have thus explained, and displayed through their
primary causes the principal emotions and vacillations of spirit,
which arise from the combination of the three primary emotions,
to wit, desire, pleasure, and pain. It is evident from what I
have said, that we are in many ways driven about by external
causes, and that like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds
we toss to and fro unwitting of the issue and of our fate. But I
have said, that I have only set forth the chief conflicting
emotions, not all that might be given. For, by proceeding in the
same way as above, we can easily show that love is united to
repentance, scorn, shame, &c. I think everyone will agree from
what has been said, that the emotions may be compounded one with
another in so many ways, and so many variations may arise
therefrom, as to exceed all possibility of computation. However,
for my purpose, it is enough to have enumerated the most
important ; to reckon up the rest which I have omitted would be
more curious than profitable. It remains to remark concerning
love, that it very often happens that while we are enjoying a
thing which we longed for, the body, from the act of enjoyment,
acquires a new disposition, whereby it is determined in another
way, other images of things are aroused in it, and the mind
begins to conceive and desire something fresh. For example, when
we conceive something which generally delights us with its
flavour, we desire to enjoy, that is, to eat it. But whilst we
are thus enjoying it, the stomach is filled and the body is
otherwise disposed. If, therefore, when the body is thus
otherwise disposed, the image of the food which is present be
stimulated, and consequently the endeavour or desire to eat it be
stimulated also, the new disposition of the body will feel
repugnance to the desire or attempt, and consequently the
presence of the food which we formerly longed for will become
odious. This revulsion of feeling is called satiety or
weariness. For the rest, I have neglected the outward
modifications of the body observable in emotions, such, for
instance, as trembling, pallor, sobbing, laughter, &c., for these
are attributable to the body only, without any reference to the
mind. Lastly, the definitions of the emotions require to be
supplemented in a few points ; I will therefore repeat them,
interpolating such observations as I think should here and there
be added.
DEFINITIONS OF THE EMOTIONSI. Desire is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is
conceived, as determined to a particular activity by some given
modification of itself.
Explanation.-We have said above, in the note to Prop. ix. of
this part, that desire is appetite, with consciousness thereof ;
further, that appetite is the essence of man, in so far as it is
determined to act in a way tending to promote its own
persistence. But, in the same note, I also remarked that,
strictly speaking, I recognize no distinction between appetite
and desire. For whether a man be conscious of his appetite or
not, it remains one and the same appetite. Thus, in order to
avoid the appearance of tautology, I have refrained from
explaining desire by appetite ; but I have take care to define it
in such a manner, as to comprehend, under one head, all those
endeavours of human nature, which we distinguish by the terms
appetite, will, desire, or impulse. I might, indeed, have said,
that desire is the essence of man, in so far as it is conceived
as determined to a particular activity ; but from such a
definition (cf. II. xxiii.) it would not follow that the mind can
be conscious of its desire or appetite. Therefore, in order to
imply the cause of such consciousness, it was necessary to add,
in so far as it is determined by some given modification, &c.
For, by a modification of man’s essence, we understand every
disposition of the said essence, whether such disposition be
innate, or whether it be conceived solely under the attribute of
thought, or solely under the attribute of extension, or whether,
lastly, it be referred simultaneously to both these attributes.
By the term desire, then, I here mean all man’s endeavours,
impulses, appetites, and volitions, which vary according to each
man’s disposition, and are, therefore, not seldom opposed one to
another, according as a man is drawn in different directions, and
knows not where to turn.
II. Pleasure is the transition of a man from a less to a greater
perfection.
III. Pain is the transition of a man from a greater to a less
perfection.
Explanation-I say transition : for pleasure is not perfection
itself. For, if man were born with the perfection to which he
passes, he would possess the same, without the emotion of
pleasure. This appears more clearly from the consideration of
the contrary emotion, pain. No one can deny, that pain consists
in the transition to a less perfection, and not in the less
perfection itself : for a man cannot be pained, in so far as he
partakes of perfection of any degree. Neither can we say, that
pain consists in the absence of a greater perfection. For
absence is nothing, whereas the emotion of pain is an activity ;
wherefore this activity can only be the activity of transition
from a greater to a less perfection-in other words, it is an
activity whereby a man’s power of action is lessened or
constrained (cf. III. xi. note). I pass over the definitions of
merriment, stimulation, melancholy, and grief, because these
terms are generally used in reference to the body, and are merely
kinds of pleasure or pain.
IV. Wonder is the conception (imaginatio) of anything, wherein
the mind comes to a stand, because the particular concept in
question has no connection with other concepts (cf. III. lii. and
note).
Explanation-In the note to II. xviii. we showed the reason,
why the mind, from the contemplation of one thing, straightway
falls to the contemplation of another thing, namely, because the
images of the two things are so associated and arranged, that one
follows the other. This state of association is impossible, if
the image of the thing be new ; the mind will then be at a stand
in the contemplation thereof, until it is determined by other
causes to think of something else.
Thus the conception of a new object, considered in itself, is
of the same nature as other conceptions ; hence, I do not include
wonder among the emotions, nor do I see why I should so include
it, inasmuch as this distraction of the mind arises from no
positive cause drawing away the mind from other objects, but
merely from the absence of a cause, which should determine the
mind to pass from the contemplation of one object to the
contemplation of another.
I, therefore, recognize only three primitive or primary
emotions (as I said in the note to III. xi.), namely, pleasure,
pain, and desire. I have spoken of wonder simply because it is
customary to speak of certain emotions springing from the three
primitive ones by different names, when they are referred to the
objects of our wonder. I am led by the same motive to add a
definition of contempt.
V. Contempt is the conception of anything which touches the mind
so little, that its presence leads the mind to imagine those
qualities which are not in it rather than such as are in it (cf.
III. lii. note).
The definitions of veneration
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