The Ethics - Benedictus de Spinoza (ebook reader online free TXT) 📗

man who boasts too much (III. xxx. note), who

talks of nothing but his own virtues and other people’s faults,

who wishes to be first ; and lastly who goes through life with a

style and pomp suitable to those far above him in station. On

the other hand, we call humble the man who too often blushes, who

confesses his faults, who sets forth other men’s virtues, and

who, lastly, walks with bent head and is negligent of his attire.

However, these emotions, humility and self-abasement, are

extremely rare. For human nature, considered in itself, strives

against them as much as it can (see III. xiii., liv.) ; hence

those, who are believed to be most self-abased and humble, are

generally in reality the most ambitious and envious.

 

XXX. Honour11 is pleasure accompanied by the idea of some action

of our own, which we believe to be praised by others.

 

XXXI. Shame is pain accompanied by the idea of some action of

our own, which we believe to be blamed by others.

Explanation-On this subject see the note to III. xxx. But we

should here remark the difference which exists between shame and

modesty. Shame is the pain following the deed whereof we are

ashamed. Modesty is the fear or dread of shame, which restrains

a man from committing a base action. Modesty is usually opposed

to shamelessness, but the latter is not an emotion, as I will

duly show ; however, the names of the emotions (as I have

remarked already) have regard rather to their exercise than to

their nature.

I have now fulfilled the task of explaining the emotions

arising from pleasure and pain. I therefore proceed to treat of

those which I refer to desire.

 

XXXII. Regret is the desire or appetite to possess something,

kept alive by the remembrance of the said thing, and at the same

time constrained by the remembrance of other things which exclude

the existence of it.

Explanation-When we remember a thing, we are by that very

fact, as I have already said more than once, disposed to

contemplate it with the same emotion as if it were something

present ; but this disposition or endeavour, while we are awake,

is generally checked by the images of things which exclude the

existence of that which we remember. Thus when we remember

something which affected us with a certain pleasure, we by that

very fact endeavour to regard it with the same emotion of

pleasure as though it were present, but this endeavour is at once

checked by the remembrance of things which exclude the existence

of the thing in question. Wherefore regret is, strictly

speaking, a pain opposed to that of pleasure, which arises from

the absence of something we hate (cf. III. xlvii. note). But, as

the name regret seems to refer to desire, I set this emotion

down, among the emotions springing from desire.

 

XXXIII. Emulation is the desire of something, engendered in us

by our conception that others have the same desire.

Explanation-He who runs away, because he sees others running

away, or he who fears, because he sees others in fear ; or again,

he who, on seeing that another man has burnt his hand, draws

towards him his own hand, and moves his body as though his own

were burnt ; such an one can be said to imitate another’s

emotion, but not to emulate him ; not because the causes of

emulation and imitation are different, but because it has become

customary to speak of emulation only in him, who imitates that

which we deem to be honourable, useful, or pleasant. As to the

cause of emulation, cf. III. xxvii. and note. The reason why

this emotion is generally coupled with envy may be seen from III.

xxxii. and note.

 

XXXIV. Thankfulness or Gratitude is the desire or zeal springing

from love, whereby we endeavour to benefit him, who with similar

feelings of love has conferred a benefit on us. Cf. III. xxxix.

note and xl.

 

XXXV. Benevolence is the desire of benefiting one whom we pity.

Cf. III. xxvii. note.

 

XXXVI. Anger is the desire, whereby through hatred we are

induced to injure one whom we hate, III. xxxix.

 

XXXVII. Revenge is the desire whereby we are induced, through

mutual hatred, to injure one who, with similar feelings, has

injured us. (See III. xl. Coroll. ii and note.)

 

XXXVIII. Cruelty or savageness is the desire, whereby a man is

impelled to injure one whom we love or pity.

Explanation-To cruelty is opposed clemency, which is not a

passive state of the mind, but a power whereby man restrains his

anger and revenge.

 

XXXIX. Timidity is the desire to avoid a greater evil, which we

dread, by undergoing a lesser evil. Cf. III. xxxix. note.

 

XL. Daring is the desire, whereby a man is set on to do

something dangerous which his equals fear to attempt.

 

XLI. Cowardice is attributed to one, whose desire is checked by

the fear of some danger which his equals dare to encounter.

Explanation-Cowardice is, therefore, nothing else but the

fear of some evil, which most men are wont not to fear ; hence I

do not reckon it among the emotions springing from desire.

Nevertheless, I have chosen to explain it here, because, in so

far as we look to the desire, it is truly opposed to the emotion

of daring.

 

XLII. Consternation is attributed to one, whose desire of

avoiding evil is checked by amazement at the evil which he fears.

Explanation-Consternation is, therefore, a species of

cowardice. But, inasmuch as consternation arises from a double

fear, it may be more conveniently defined as a fear which keeps a

man so bewildered and wavering, that he is not able to remove the

evil. I say bewildered, in so far as we understand his desire of

removing the evil to be constrained by his amazement. I say

wavering, in so far as we understand the said desire to be

constrained by the fear of another evil, which equally torments

him : whence it comes to pass that he knows not, which he may

avert of the two. On this subject, see III. xxxix. note, and

III. lii. note. Concerning cowardice and daring, see III. li.

note.

 

XLIII. Courtesy, or deference (Humanitas seu modestia), is the

desire of acting in a way that should please men, and refraining

from that which should displease them.

 

XLIV. Ambition is the immoderate desire of power.

Explanation-Ambition is the desire, whereby all the emotions

(cf. III. xxvii. and xxxi.) are fostered and strengthened ;

therefore this emotion can with difficulty be overcome. For, so

long as a man is bound by any desire, he is at the same time

necessarily bound by this. “The best men,” says Cicero, “are

especially led by honour. Even philosophers, when they write a

book contemning honour, sign their names thereto,” and so on.

 

XLV. Luxury is excessive desire, or even love of living

sumptuously.

 

XLVI. Intemperance is the excessive desire and love of drinking.

 

XLVII. Avarice is the excessive desire and love of riches.

 

XLVIII. Lust is desire and love in the matter of sexual

intercourse.

Explanation-Whether this desire be excessive or not, it is

still called lust. These last five emotions (as I have shown in

III. lvi.) have on contraries. For deference is a species of

ambition. Cf. III. xxix. note.

Again, I have already pointed out, that temperance, sobriety,

and chastity indicate rather a power than a passivity of the

mind. It may, nevertheless, happen, that an avaricious, an

ambitious, or a timid man may abstain from excess in eating,

drinking, or sexual indulgence, yet avarice, ambition, and fear

are not contraries to luxury, drunkenness, and debauchery. For

an avaricious man often is glad to gorge himself with food and

drink at another man’s expense. An ambitious man will restrain

himself in nothing, so long as he thinks his indulgences are

secret ; and if he lives among drunkards and debauchees, he will,

from the mere fact of being ambitious, be more prone to those

vices. Lastly, a timid man does that which he would not. For

though an avaricious man should, for the sake of avoiding death,

cast his riches into the sea, he will none the less remain

avaricious ; so, also, if a lustful man is downcast, because he

cannot follow his bent, he does not, on the ground of abstention,

cease to be lustful. In fact, these emotions are not so much

concerned with the actual feasting, drinking, &c., as with the

appetite and love of such. Nothing, therefore, can be opposed to

these emotions, but highmindedness and valour, whereof I will

speak presently.

The definitions of jealousy and other waverings of the mind I

pass over in silence, first, because they arise from the

compounding of the emotions already described ; secondly, because

many of them have no distinctive names, which shows that it is

sufficient for practical purposes to have merely a general

knowledge of them. However, it is established from the

definitions of the emotions, which we have set forth, that they

all spring from desire, pleasure, or pain, or, rather, that there

is nothing besides these three ; wherefore each is wont to be

called by a variety of names in accordance with its various

relations and extrinsic tokens. If we now direct our attention

to these primitive emotions, and to what has been said concerning

the nature of the mind, we shall be able thus to define the

emotions, in so far as they are referred to the mind only.

GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS

Emotion, which is called a passivity of the soul, is a

confused idea, whereby the mind affirms concerning its body, or

any part thereof, a force for existence (existendi vis) greater

or less than before, and by the presence of which the mind is

determined to think of one thing rather than another.

Explanation-I say, first, that emotion or passion of the soul

is a confused idea. For we have shown that the mind is only

passive, in so far as it has inadequate or confused ideas. (III.

iii.) I say, further, whereby the mind affirms concerning its

body or any part thereof a force for existence greater than

before. For all the ideas of bodies, which we possess, denote

rather the actual disposition of our own body (II. xvi. Coroll.

ii.) than the nature of an external body. But the idea which

constitutes the reality of an emotion must denote or express the

disposition of the body, or of some part thereof, because its

power of action or force for existence is increased or

diminished, helped or hindered. But it must be noted that, when

I say a greater or less force for existence than before, I do not

mean that the mind compares the present with the past disposition

of the body, but that the idea which constitutes the reality of

an emotion affirms something of the body, which, in fact,

involves more or less of reality than before.

And inasmuch as the essence of mind consists in the fact (II.

xi., xiii.), that it affirms the actual existence of its own

body, and inasmuch as we understand by perfection the very

essence of a thing, it follows that the mind passes to greater or

less perfection, when it happens to affirm concerning its own

body, or any part thereof, something involving more or less

reality than before.

When, therefore, I said above that the power of the mind is

increased or diminished, I merely meant that the mind had formed

of its own body, or of some part thereof, an idea involving more

or less of reality, than it had already affirmed concerning its

own body. For the excellence of ideas, and the actual power of

thinking