The Ethics - Benedictus de Spinoza (ebook reader online free TXT) 📗

with us, but, on the other hand,

in so far as it is bad for us, that is (as we have just shown),

in so far as it can diminish or check our power of action, it is

contrary to our nature.

Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XXXI. In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature,

it is necessarily good.

Proof.-In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it

cannot be bad for it. It will therefore necessarily be either

good or indifferent. If it be assumed that it be neither good

nor bad, nothing will follow from its nature (IV. Def. i.), which

tends to the preservation of our nature, that is (by the

hypothesis), which tends to the preservation of the thing itself

; but this (III. vi.) is absurd ; therefore, in so far as a thing

is in harmony with our nature, it is necessarily good. Q.E.D.

Corollary.-Hence it follows, that, in proportion as a thing

is in harmony with our nature, so is it more useful or better for

us, and vice vers�, in proportion as a thing is more useful for

us, so is it more in harmony with our nature. For, in so far as

it is not in harmony with our nature, it will necessarily be

different therefrom or contrary thereto. If different, it can

neither be good nor bad (IV. xxix.) ; if contrary, it will be

contrary to that which is in harmony with our nature, that is,

contrary to what is good-in short, bad. Nothing, therefore, can

be good, except in so far as it is in harmony with our nature ;

and hence a thing is useful, in proportion as it is in harmony

with our nature, and vice vers�. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XXXII. In so far as men are a prey to passion, they

cannot, in that respect, be said to be naturally in harmony.

Proof.-Things, which are said to be in harmony naturally, are

understood to agree in power (III. vii.), not in want of power or

negation, and consequently not in passion (III. iii. note) ;

wherefore men, in so far as they are a prey to their passions,

cannot be said to be naturally in harmony. Q.E.D.

Note.-This is also self-evident ; for, if we say that white

and black only agree in the fact that neither is red, we

absolutely affirm that the do not agree in any respect. So, if

we say that a man and a stone only agree in the fact that both

are finite-wanting in power, not existing by the necessity of

their own nature, or, lastly, indefinitely surpassed by the power

of external causes-we should certainly affirm that a man and a

stone are in no respect alike ; therefore, things which agree

only in negation, or in qualities which neither possess, really

agree in no respect.

 

PROP. XXXIII. Men can differ in nature, in so far as they are

assailed by those emotions, which are passions, or passive states

; and to this extent one and the same man is variable and

inconstant.

Proof.-The nature or essence of the emotions cannot be

explained solely through our essence or nature (III. Deff. i.,

ii.), but it must be defined by

the power, that is (III. vii.), by the nature of external causes

in

comparison with our own ; hence it follows, that there are as

many kinds of

each emotion as there are external objects whereby we are

affected

(III. lvi.), and that men may be differently affected by one and

the same

object (III. li.), and to this extent differ in nature ; lastly,

that one and

the same man may be differently affected towards the same object,

and may

therefore be variable and inconstant. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XXXIV. In so far as men are assailed by emotions which are

passions, they can be contrary one to another.

Proof.-A man, for instance Peter, can be the cause of Paul’s

feeling pain, because he (Peter) possesses something similar to

that which Paul hates (III. xvi.), or because Peter has sole

possession of a thing which Paul also loves (III. xxxii. and

note), or for other causes (of which the chief are enumerated in

III. lv. note) ; it may therefore happen that Paul should hate

Peter (Def. of Emotions, vii.), consequently it may easily happen

also, that Peter should hate Paul in return, and that each should

endeavour to do the other an injury, (III. xxxix.), that is (IV.

xxx.), that they should be contrary one to another. But the

emotion of pain is always a passion or passive state (III. lix.)

; hence men, in so far as they are assailed by emotions which are

passions, can be contrary one to another. Q.E.D.

Note.-I said that Paul may hate Peter, because he conceives

that Peter possesses something which he (Paul) also loves ; from

this it seems, at first sight, to follow, that these two men,

through both loving the same thing, and, consequently, through

agreement of their respective natures, stand in one another’s way

; if this were so, Props. xxx. and xxxi. of this part would be

untrue. But if we give the matter our unbiased attention, we

shall see that the discrepancy vanishes. For the two men are not

in one another’s way in virtue of the agreement of their natures,

that is, through both loving the same thing, but in virtue of one

differing from the other. For, in so far as each loves the same

thing, the love of each is fostered thereby (III. xxxi.), that is

(Def. of the Emotions, vi.) the pleasure of each is fostered

thereby. Wherefore it is far from being the case, that they are

at variance through both loving the same thing, and through the

agreement in their natures. The cause for their opposition lies,

as I have said, solely in the fact that they are assumed to

differ. For we assume that Peter has the idea of the loved

object as already in his possession, while Paul has the idea of

the loved object as lost. Hence the one man will be affected

with pleasure, the other will be affected with pain, and thus

they will be at variance one with another. We can easily show in

like manner, that all other causes of hatred depend solely on

differences, and not on the agreement between men’s natures.

 

PROP. XXXV. In so far only as men live in obedience to reason,

do they always necessarily agree in nature.

Proof.-In so far as men are assailed by emotions that are

passions, they can be different in nature (IV. xxxiii.), and at

variance one with another. But men are only said to be active,

in so far as they act in obedience to reason (III. iii.) ;

therefore, what so ever follows from human nature in so far as it

is defined by reason must (III. Def. ii.) be understood solely

through human nature as its proximate cause. But, since every

man by the laws of his nature desires that which he deems good,

and endeavours to remove that which he deems bad (IV. xix.) ; and

further, since that which we, in accordance with reason, deem

good or bad, necessarily is good or bad (II. xli.) ; it follows

that men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason,

necessarily do only such things as are necessarily good for human

nature, and consequently for each individual man (IV. xxxi.

Coroll.) ; in other words, such things as are in harmony with

each man’s nature. Therefore, men in so far as they live in

obedience to reason, necessarily live always in harmony one with

another. Q.E.D.

Corollary I.-There is no individual thing in nature, which is

more useful to man, than a man who lives in obedience to reason.

For that thing is to man most useful, which is most in harmony

with his nature (IV. xxxi. Coroll.) ; that is, obviously, man.

But man acts absolutely according to the laws of his nature, when

he lives in obedience to reason (III. Def. ii.), and to this

extent only is always necessarily in harmony with the nature of

another man (by the last Prop.) ; wherefore among individual

things nothing is more useful to man, than a man who lives in

obedience to reason. Q.E.D.

Corollary II.-As every man seeks most that which is useful to

him, so are men most useful one to another. For the more a man

seeks what is useful to him and endeavours to preserve himself,

the more is he endowed with virtue (IV. xx.), or, what is the

same thing (IV. Def. viii.), the more is he endowed with power to

act according to the laws of his own nature, that is to live in

obedience to reason. But men are most in natural harmony, when

they live in obedience to reason (by the last Prop.) ; therefore

(by the foregoing Coroll.) men will be most useful one to

another, when each seeks most that which is useful to him.

Q.E.D.

Note.-What we have just shown is attested by experience so

conspicuously, that it is in the mouth of nearly everyone : “Man

is to man a God.” Yet it rarely happens that men live in

obedience to reason, for things are so ordered among them, that

they are generally envious and troublesome one to another.

Nevertheless they are scarcely able to lead a solitary life, so

that the definition of man as a social animal has met with

general assent ; in fact, men do derive from social life much

more convenience than injury. Let satirists then laugh their

fill at human affairs, let theologians rail, and let misanthropes

praise to their utmost the life of untutored rusticity, let them

heap contempt on men and praises on beasts ; when all is said,

they will find that men can provide for their wants much more

easily by mutual help, and that only by uniting their forces can

they escape from the dangers that on every side beset them : not

to say how much more excellent and worthy of our knowledge it is,

to study the actions of men than the actions of beasts. But I

will treat of this more at length elsewhere.

 

PROP. XXXVI. The highest good of those who follow virtue is

common to all, and therefore all can equally rejoice therein.

Proof.-To act virtuously is to act in obedience with reason

(IV. xxiv.), and whatsoever we endeavour to do in obedience to

reason is to understand (IV. xxvi.) ; therefore (IV. xxviii.) the

highest good for those who follow after virtue is to know God ;

that is (II. xlvii. and note) a good which is common to all and

can be possessed. by all men equally, in so far as they are of

the same nature. Q.E.D.

Note.-Someone may ask how it would be, if the highest good of

those who follow after virtue were not common to all? Would it

not then follow, as above (IV. xxxiv.), that men living in

obedience to reason, that is (IV. xxxv.), men in so far as they

agree in nature, would be at variance one with another? To such

an inquiry, I make answer, that it follows not accidentally but

from the very nature of reason, that main’s highest good is

common to all, inasmuch as it is deduced from the very essence of

man, in so far as defined by reason ; and that a man could

neither be, nor be conceived without the power of taking pleasure

in this highest good. For it belongs to the essence of the human

mind (II. xlvii.), to have an adequate knowledge of the eternal

and infinite essence of God.

 

PROP. XXXVII. The good which every man, who follows after

virtue, desires for himself he will also desire