The Ethics - Benedictus de Spinoza (ebook reader online free TXT) 📗

for other men,

and so much the more, in proportion as he has a greater knowledge

of God.

Proof.-Men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason,

are most useful to their fellow men (IV. xxxv ; Coroll. i.) ;

therefore (IV. xix.), we shall in obedience to reason necessarily

endeavour to bring about that men should live in obedience to

reason. But the good which every man, in so far as he is guided

by reason, or, in other words, follows after virtue, desires for

himself, is to understand (IV. xxvi.) ; wherefore the good, which

each follower of virtue seeks for himself, he will desire also

for others. Again, desire, in so far as it is referred to the

mind, is the very essence of the mind (Def. of the Emotions, i.)

; now the essence of the mind consists in knowledge (II. xi.),

which involves the knowledge of God (II. xlvii.), and without it

(I. xv.), can neither be, nor be conceived ; therefore, in

proportion as the mind’s essence involves a greater knowledge of

God, so also will be greater the desire of the follower of

virtue, that other men should possess that which he seeks as good

for himself. Q.E.D.

Another Proof.-The good, which a man desires for himself and

loves, he will love more constantly, if he sees that others love

it also (III. xxxi.) ; he will therefore endeavour that others

should love it also ; and as the good in question is common to

all, and therefore all can rejoice therein, he will endeavour,

for the same reason, to bring about that all should rejoice

therein, and this he will do the more (III. xxxvii.), in

proportion as his own enjoyment of the good is greater.

Note I.-He who, guided by emotion only, endeavours to cause

others to love what he loves himself, and to make the rest of the

world live according to his own fancy, acts solely by impulse,

and is, therefore, hateful, especially, to those who take delight

in something different, and accordingly study and, by similar

impulse, endeavour, to make men live in accordance with what

pleases themselves. Again, as the highest good sought by men

under the guidance of emotion is often such, that it can only be

possessed by a single individual, it follows that those who love

it are not consistent in their intentions, but, while they

delight to sing its praises, fear to be believed. But he, who

endeavours to lead men by reason, does not act by impulse but

courteously and kindly, and his intention is always consistent.

Again, whatsoever we desire and do, whereof we are the cause in

so far as we possess the idea of God, or know God, I set down to

Religion. The desire of well-doing, which is engendered by a

life according to reason, I call piety. Further, the desire,

whereby a man living according to reason is bound to associate

others with himself in friendship, I call honour13 ; by

honourable I mean that which is praised by men living according

to reason, and by base I mean that which is repugnant to the

gaining of friendship. I have also shown in addition what are

the foundations of a state ; and the difference between true

virtue and infirmity may be readily gathered from what I have

said ; namely, that true virtue is nothing else but living in

accordance with reason ; while infirmity is nothing else but

man’s allowing himself to be led by things which are external to

himself, and to be by them determined to act in a manner demanded

by the general disposition of things rather than by his own

nature considered solely in itself.

Such are the matters which I engaged to prove in Prop. xviii.

of this Part, whereby it is plain that the law against the

slaughtering of animals is founded rather on vain superstition

and womanish pity than on sound reason. The rational quest of

what is useful to us further teaches us the necessity of

associating ourselves with our fellow men, but not with beasts,

or things, whose nature is different from our own ; we have the

same rights in respect to them as they have in respect to us.

Nay, as everyone’s right is defined by his virtue, or power, men

have far greater rights over beasts than beasts have over men.

Still I do not deny that beasts feel : what I deny is, that we

may not consult our own advantage and use them as we please,

treating them in the way which best suits us ; for their nature

is not like ours, and their emotions are naturally different from

human emotions (III. lvii. note). It remains for me to explain

what I mean by just and unjust, sin and merit. On these points

see the following note.

Note II.-In the Appendix to Part I. I undertook to explain

praise and blame, merit and sin, justice and injustice.

Concerning praise and blame I have spoken in III. xxix. note

: the time has now come to treat of the remaining terms. But I

must first say a few words concerning man in the state of nature

and in society.

Every man exists by sovereign natural right, and,

consequently, by sovereign natural right performs those actions

which follow from the necessity of his own nature ; therefore by

sovereign natural right every man judges what is good and what is

bad, takes care of his own advantage according to his own

disposition (IV. xix. and IV. xx.), avenges the wrongs done to

him (III. xl. Coroll. ii.), and endeavours to preserve that which

he loves and to destroy that which he hates (III. xxviii.). Now,

if men lived under the guidance of reason, everyone would remain

in possession of this his right, without any injury being done to

his neighbour (IV. xxxv. Coroll. i.). But seeing that they are a

prey to their emotions, which far surpass human power or virtue

(IV. vi.), they are often drawn in different directions, and

being at variance one with another (IV. xxxiii. xxxiv.), stand in

need of mutual help (IV. xxxv. note). Wherefore, in order that

men may live together in harmony, and may aid one another, it is

necessary that they should forego their natural right, and, for

the sake of security, refrain from all actions which can injure

their fellow-men. The way in which this end can be obtained, so

that men who are necessarily a prey to their emotions (IV. iv.

Coroll.), inconstant, and diverse, should be able to render each

other mutually secure, and feel mutual trust, is evident from IV.

vii. and III. xxxix. It is there shown, that an emotion can only

be restrained by an emotion stronger than, and contrary to

itself, and that men avoid inflicting injury through fear of

incurring a greater injury themselves.

On this law society can be established, so long as it keeps

in its own hand the right, possessed by everyone, of avenging

injury, and pronouncing on good and evil ; and provided it also

possesses the power to lay down a general rule of conduct, and to

pass laws sanctioned, not by reason, which is powerless in

restraining emotion, but by threats (IV. xvii. note). Such a

society established with laws and the power of preserving itself

is called a State, while those who live under its protection are

called citizens. We may readily understand that there is in the

state of nature nothing, which by universal consent is pronounced

good or bad ; for in the state of nature everyone thinks solely

of his own advantage, and according to his disposition, with

reference only to his individual advantage, decides what is good

or bad, being bound by no law to anyone besides himself.

In the state of nature, therefore, sin is inconceivable ; it

can only exist in a state, where good and evil are pronounced on

by common consent, and where everyone is bound to obey the State

authority. Sin, then, is nothing else but disobedience, which is

therefore punished by the right of the State only. Obedience, on

the other hand, is set down as merit, inasmuch as a man is

thought worthy of merit, if he takes delight in the advantages

which a State provides.

Again, in the state of nature, no one is by common consent

master of anything, nor is there anything in nature, which can be

said to belong to one man rather than another : all things are

common to all. Hence, in the state of nature, we can conceive no

wish to render to every man his own, or to deprive a man of that

which belongs to him ; in other words, there is nothing in the

state of nature answering to justice and injustice. Such ideas

are only possible in a social state, when it is decreed by common

consent what belongs to one man and what to another.

From all these considerations it is evident, that justice and

injustice, sin and merit, are extrinsic ideas, and not attributes

which display the nature of the mind. But I have said enough.

 

PROP. XXXVIII. Whatsoever disposes the human body, so as to

render it capable of being affected in an increased number of

ways, or of affecting external bodies in an increased number of

ways, is useful to man ; and is so, in proportion as the body is

thereby rendered more capable of being affected or affecting

other bodies in an increased number of ways ; contrariwise,

whatsoever renders the body less capable in this respect is

hurtful to man.

Proof.-Whatsoever thus increases the capabilities of the body

increases also the mind’s capability of perception (II. xiv.) ;

therefore, whatsoever thus disposes the body and thus renders it

capable, is necessarily good or useful (IV. xxvi. xxvii.) ; and

is so in proportion to the extent to which it can render the body

capable ; contrariwise (II. xiv., IV. xxvi. xxvii.), it is

hurtful, if it renders the body in this respect less capable.

Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XXXIX. Whatsoever brings about the preservation of the

proportion of motion and rest, which the parts of the human body

mutually possess, is good ; contrariwise, whatsoever causes a

change in such proportion is bad.

Proof.-The human body needs many other bodies for its

preservation (II. Post. iv.). But that which constitutes the

specific reality (forma) of a human body is, that its parts

communicate their several motions one to another in a certain

fixed proportion (Def. before Lemma iv. after II. xiii.).

Therefore, whatsoever brings about the preservation of the

proportion between motion and rest, which the parts of the human

body mutually possess, preserves the specific reality of the

human body, and consequently renders the human body capable of

being affected in many ways and of affecting external bodies in

many ways ; consequently it is good (by the last Prop.). Again,

whatsoever brings about a change in the aforesaid proportion

causes the human body to assume another specific character, in

other words (see Preface to this Part towards the end, though the

point is indeed self-evident), to be destroyed, and consequently

totally incapable of being affected in an increased numbers of

ways ; therefore it is bad. Q.E.D.

Note.-The extent to which such causes can injure or be of

service to the mind will be explained in the Fifth Part. But I

would here remark that I consider that a body undergoes death,

when the proportion of motion and rest which obtained mutually

among its several parts is changed. For I do not venture to deny

that a human body, while keeping the circulation of the blood and

other properties, wherein the life of a body is thought to

consist, may none the less be changed into another nature totally

different from its own. There is no