The Ethics - Benedictus de Spinoza (ebook reader online free TXT) 📗

quality possessed by a false idea, &c. Q.E.D.

Note.-This proposition is more clearly understood from II.

xvi. Coroll. ii. For imagination is an idea, which indicates

rather the present disposition of the human body than the nature

of the external body ; not indeed distinctly, but confusedly ;

whence it comes to pass, that the mind is said to err. For

instance, when we look at the sun, we conceive that it is distant

from us about two hundred feet ; in this judgment we err, so long

as we are in ignorance of its true distance ; when its true

distance is known, the error is removed, but not the imagination

; or, in other words, the idea of the sun, which only explains

tho nature of that luminary, in so far as the body is affected

thereby : wherefore, though we know the real distance, we shall

still nevertheless imagine the sun to be near us. For, as we

said in II. xxxv. note, we do not imagine the sun to be so near

us, because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because the

mind conceives the magnitude of the sun to the extent that the

body is affected thereby. Thus, when the rays of the sun falling

on the surface of water are reflected into our eyes, we imagine

the sun as if it were in the water, though we are aware of its

real position ; and similarly other imaginations, wherein the

mind is deceived, whether they indicate the natural disposition

of the body, or that its power of activity is increased or

diminished, are not contrary to the truth, and do not vanish at

its presence. It happens indeed that, when we mistakenly fear an

evil, the fear vanishes when we hear the true tidings ; but the

contrary also happens, namely, that we fear an evil which will

certainly come, and our fear vanishes when we hear false tidings

; thus imaginations do not vanish at the presence of the truth,

in virtue of its being true, but because other imaginations,

stronger than the first, supervene and exclude the present

existence of that which we imagined, as I have shown in II. xvii.

 

PROP. II. We are only passive, in so far as we are apart of

Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts.

Proof.-We are said to be passive, when something arises in

us, whereof we are only a partial cause (III. Def. ii.), that is

(III. Def. i.), something which cannot be deduced solely from the

laws of our nature. We are passive therefore, in so far as we

are a part of Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without

other parts. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. III. The force whereby a man persists in existing is

limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external

causes.

Proof.-This is evident from the axiom of this part. For,

when man is given, there is something else-say A-more powerful ;

when A is given, there is something else-say B-more powerful than

A, and so on to infinity ; thus the power of man is limited by

the power of some other thing, and is infinitely surpassed by the

power of external causes. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. IV. It is impossible, that man should not be a part of

Nature, or that he should be capable of undergoing no changes,

save such as can be understood through his nature only as their

adequate cause.

Proof.-The power, whereby each particular thing, and

consequently man, preserves his being, is the power of God or of

Nature (I. xxiv. Coroll.) ; not in so far as it is infinite, but

in so far as it can be explained by the actual human essence

(III. vii.). Thus the power of man, in so far as it is explained

through his own actual essence, is a part of the infinite power

of God or Nature, in other words, of the essence thereof (I.

xxxiv.). This was our first point. Again, if it were possible,

that man should undergo no changes save such as can be understood

solely through the nature of man, it would follow that he would

not be able to die, but would always necessarily exist ; this

would be the necessary consequence of a cause whose power was

either finite or infinite ; namely, either of man’s power only,

inasmuch as he would be capable of removing from himself all

changes which could spring from external causes ; or of the

infinite power of Nature, whereby all individual things would be

so ordered, that man should be incapable of undergoing any

changes save such as tended towards his own preservation. But

the first alternative is absurd (by the last Prop., the proof of

which is universal, and can be applied to all individual things).

Therefore, if it be possible, that man should not be capable of

undergoing any changes, save such as can be explained solely

through his own nature, and consequently that he must always (as

we have shown) necessarily exist ; such a result must follow from

the infinite power of God, and consequently (I. xvi.) from the

necessity of the divine nature, in so far as it is regarded as

affected by the idea of any given man, the whole order of nature

as conceived under the attributes of extension and thought must

be deducible. It would therefore follow (I. xxi.) that man is

infinite, which (by the first part of this proof) is absurd. It

is, therefore, impossible, that man should not undergo any

changes save those whereof he is the adequate cause. Q.E.D.

Corollary.-Hence it follows, that man is necessarily always a

prey to his passions, that he follows and obeys the general order

of nature, and that he accommodates himself thereto, as much as

the nature of things demands.

 

PROP. V. The power and increase of every passion, and its

persistence in existing are not defined by the power, whereby we

ourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but by the power of

an external cause compared with our own.

Proof.-The essence of a passion cannot be explained through

our essence alone (III. Deff. i. and ii.), that is (III. vii.),

the power of a passion cannot be defined by the power, whereby we

ourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but (as is shown in

II. xvi.) must necessarily be defined by the power of an external

cause compared with our own. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. VI. The force of any passion or emotion can overcome the

rest of a man’s activities or power, so that the emotion becomes

obstinately fixed to him.

Proof.-The force and increase of any passion and its

persistence in existing are defined by the power of an external

cause compared with our own (by the foregoing Prop.) ; therefore

(IV. iii.) it can overcome a man’s power, &e. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. VII. An emotion can only be controlled or destroyed by

another emotion contrary thereto, and with more power for

controlling emotion.

Proof.-Emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind, is

an idea, whereby the mind affirms of its body a greater or less

force of existence than before (cf. the general Definition of the

Emotions at the end of Part III.). When, therefore, the mind is

assailed by any emotion, the body is at the same time affected

with a modification whereby its power of activity is increased or

diminished. Now this modification of the body (IV. v.) receives

from its cause the force for persistence in its being ; which

force can only be checked or destroyed by a bodily cause (II.

vi.), in virtue of the body being affected with a modification

contrary to (III. v.) and stronger than itself (IV. Ax.) ;

wherefore (II. xii.) the mind is affected by the idea of a

modification contrary to, and stronger than the former

modification, in other words, (by the general definition of the

emotions) the mind will be affected by an emotion contrary to and

stronger than the former emotion, which will exclude or destroy

the existence of the former emotion ; thus an emotion cannot be

destroyed nor controlled except by a contrary and stronger

emotion. Q.E.D.

Corollary.-An emotion, in so far as it is referred to the

mind, can only be controlled or destroyed through an idea of a

modification of the body contrary to, and stronger than, that

which we are undergoing. For the emotion which we undergo can

only be checked or destroyed by an emotion contrary to, and

stronger than, itself, in other words, (by the general Definition

of the Emotions) only by an idea of a modification of the body

contrary to, and stronger than, the modification which we

undergo.

 

PROP. VIII. The knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but

the emotions of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious

thereof.

Proof.-We call a thing good or evil, when it is of service or

the reverse in preserving our being (IV. Deff. i. and ii.), that

is (III. vii.), when it increases or diminishes, helps or

hinders, our power of activity. Thus, in so far as we perceive

that a thing affects us with pleasure or pain, we call it good or

evil ; wherefore the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else

but the idea of the pleasure or pain, which necessarily follows

from that pleasurable or painful emotion (II. xxii.). But this

idea is united to the emotion in the same way as mind is united

to body (II. xxi.) ; that is, there is no real distinction

between this idea and the emotion or idea of the modification of

the body, save in conception only. Therefore the knowledge of

good and evil is nothing else but the emotion, in so far as we

are conscious thereof. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. IX. An emotion, whereof we conceive the cause to be with

us at the present time, is stronger than if we did not conceive

the cause to be with us.

Proof.-Imagination or conception is the idea, by which the

mind regards a thing as present (II. xvii. note), but which

indicates the disposition of the mind rather than the nature of

the external thing (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.). An emotion is

therefore a conception, in so far as it indicates the disposition

of the body. But a conception (by II. xvii.) is stronger, so

long as we conceive nothing which excludes the present existence

of the external object ; wherefore an emotion is also stronger or

more intense, when we conceive the cause to be with us at the

present time, than when we do not conceive the cause to be with

us. Q.E.D.

Note.-When I said above in III. xviii. that we are affected

by the image of what is past or future with the same emotion as

if the thing conceived were present, I expressly stated, that

this is only true in so far as we look solely to the image of the

thing in question itself ; for the thing’s nature is unchanged,

whether we have conceived it or not ; I did not deny that the

image becomes weaker, when we regard as present to us other

things which exclude the present existence of the future object :

I did not expressly call attention to the fact, because I

purposed to treat of the strength of the emotions in this part of

my work.

Corollary.-The image of something past or future, that is, of

a thing which we regard as in relation to time past or time

future, to the exclusion of time present, is, when other

conditions are equal, weaker than the image of something present

; consequently an emotion felt towards what is past or future is

less intense, other conditions being equal, than an emotion felt

towards something present.

 

PROP. X. Towards something