The Ethics - Benedictus de Spinoza (ebook reader online free TXT) 📗
- Author: Benedictus de Spinoza
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one single mind and one single body, and that all should, with
one consent, as far as they are able, endeavour to preserve their
being, and all with one consent seek what is useful to them all.
Hence, men who are governed by reason-that is, who seek what is
useful to them in accordance with reason, desire for themselves
nothing, which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind,
and, consequently, are just, faithful, and honourable in their
conduct.
Such are the dictates of reason, which I purposed thus
briefly to indicate, before beginning to prove them in greater
detail. I have taken this course, in order, if possible, to gain
the attention of those who believe, that the principle that every
man is bound to seek what is useful for himself is the foundation
of impiety, rather than of piety and virtue.
Therefore, after briefly showing that the contrary is the
case, I go on to prove it by the same method, as that whereby I
have hitherto proceeded.
PROP. XIX. Every man, by the laws of his nature, necessarily
desires or shrinks from that which he deems to be good or bad.
Proof.-The knowledge of good and evil is (IV. viii.) the
emotion of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious
thereof ; therefore, every man necessarily desires what he thinks
good, and shrinks from what he thinks bad. Now this appetite is
nothing else but man’s nature or essence (Cf. the Definition of
Appetite, III. ix. note, and Def. of the Emotions, i.).
Therefore, every man, solely by the laws of his nature, desires
the one, and shrinks from the other, &c. Q.E.D.
PROP. XX. The more every man endeavours, and is able to seek
what is useful to him-in other words, to preserve his own
being-the more is he endowed with virtue ; on the contrary, in
proportion as a man neglects to seek what is useful to him, that
is, to preserve his own being, he is wanting in power.
Proof.-Virtue is human power, which is defined solely by
man’s essence (IV. Def. viii.), that is, which is defined solely
by the endeavour made by man to persist in his own being.
Wherefore, the more a man endeavours, and is able to preserve his
own being, the more is he endowed with virtue, and, consequently
(III.iv. and vi.), in so far as a man neglects to preserve his
own being, he is wanting in power. Q.E.D.
Note.-No one, therefore, neglects seeking his own good, or
preserving his own being, unless he be overcome by causes
external and foreign to his nature. No one, I say, from the
necessity of his own nature, or otherwise than under compulsion
from external causes, shrinks from food, or kills himself : which
latter may be done in a variety of ways. A man, for instance,
kills himself under the compulsion of another man, who twists
round his right hand, wherewith he happened to have taken up a
sword, and forces him to turn the blade against his own heart ;
or, again, he may be compelled, like Seneca, by a tyrant’s
command, to open his own veins-that is, to escape a greater evil
by incurring, a lesser ; or, lastly, latent external causes may
so disorder his imagination, and so affect his body, that it may
assume a nature contrary to its former one, and whereof the idea
cannot exist in the mind (III. x.) But that a man, from the
necessity of his own nature, should endeavour to become
non-existent, is as impossible as that something should be made
out of nothing, as everyone will see for himself, after a little
reflection.
PROP. XXI. No one can desire to be blessed, to act rightly, and
to live rightly, without at the same time wishing to be, act, and
to live-in other words, to actually exist.
Proof.-The proof of this proposition, or rather the
proposition itself, is self-evident, and is also plain from the
definition of desire. For the desire of living, acting, &c.,
blessedly or rightly, is (Def. of the Emotions, i.) the essence
of man-that is (III. vii.), the endeavour made by everyone to
preserve his own being. Therefore, no one can desire, &c.
Q.E.D.
PROP. XXII. No virtue can be conceived as prior to this
endeavour to preserve one’s own being.
Proof.-The effort for self-preservation is the essence of a
thing (III. vii.) ; therefore, if any virtue could be conceived
as prior thereto, the essence of a thing would have to be
conceived as prior to itself, which is obviously absurd.
Therefore no virtue, &c. Q.E.D.
Corollary.-The effort for self-preservation is the first and
only foundation of virtue. For prior to this principle nothing
can be conceived, and without it no virtue can be conceived.
PROP. XXIII. Man, in so far as he is determined to a particular
action because he has inadequate ideas, cannot be absolutely said
to act in obedience to virtue ; he can only be so described, in
so far as he is determined for the action because he understands.
Proof.-In so far as a man is determined to an action through
having inadequate ideas, he is passive (III. i.), that is (III.
Deff. i., and iii.), he does something, which cannot be perceived
solely through his essence, that is (by IV. Def. viii.), which
does not follow from his virtue. But, in so far as he is
determined for an action because he understands, he is active ;
that is, he does something, which is perceived through his
essence alone, or which adequately follows from his virtue.
Q.E.D.
PROP. XXIV. To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is in us
the same thing as to act, to live, or to preserve one’s being
(these three terms are identical in meaning) in accordance with
the dictates of reason on the basis of seeking what is useful to
one’s self.
Proof.-To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is nothing
else but to act according to the laws of one’s own nature. But
we only act, in so far as we understand (III. iii.) : therefore
to act in obedience to virtue is in us nothing else but to act,
to live, or to preserve one’s being in obedience to reason, and
that on the basis of seeking what is useful for us (IV. xxii.
Coroll.). Q.E.D.
PROP. XXV. No one wishes to preserve his being for the sake of
anything else.
Proof.-The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to
persist in its being, is defined solely by the essence of the
thing itself (III. vii.) ; from this alone, and not from the
essence of anything else, it necessarily follows (III. vi.) that
everyone endeavours to preserve his being. Moreover, this
proposition is plain from IV. xxii. Coroll., for if a man should
endeavour to preserve his being for the sake of anything else,
the last-named thing would obviously be the basis of virtue,
which, by the foregoing corollary, is absurd. Therefore no one,
&c. Q.E.D.
PROP. XXVI. Whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is
nothing further than to understand ; neither does the mind, in so
far as it makes use of reason, judge anything to be useful to it,
save such things as are conducive to understanding.
Proof.-The effort for self-preservation is nothing else but
the essence of the thing in question (III. vii.), which, in so
far as it exists such as it is, is conceived to have force for
continuing in existence (III. vi.) and doing such things as
necessarily follow from its given nature (see the Def. of
Appetite, III. ix. note). But the essence of reason is nought
else but our mind, in so far as it clearly and distinctly
understands (see the definition in II. xl. note. ii.) ; therefore
(II. xl.) whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is
nothing else but to understand. Again, since this effort of the
mind wherewith the mind endeavours, in so far as it reasons, to
preserve its own being is nothing else but understanding ; this
effort at understanding is (IV. xxii. Coroll.) the first and
single basis of virtue, nor shall we endeavour to understand
things for the sake of any ulterior object (IV. xxv.) ; on the
other hand, the mind, in so far as it reasons, will not be able
to conceive any good for itself, save such things as are
conducive to understanding.
PROP. XXVII. We know nothing to be certainly good or evil, save
such things as really conduce to understanding, or such as are
able to hinder us from understanding.
Proof.-The mind, in so far as it reasons, desires nothing
beyond understanding, and judges nothing to be useful to itself,
save such things as conduce to understanding (by the foregoing
Prop.). But the mind (II. xli., xliii. and note) cannot possess
certainty concerning anything, except in so far as it has
adequate ideas, or (what by II. xl. note, is the same thing) in
so far as it reasons. Therefore we know nothing to be good or
evil save such things as really conduce, &c. Q.E.D.
PROP. XXVIII. The mind’s highest good is the knowledge of God,
and the mind’s highest virtue is to know God.
Proof.-The mind is not capable of understanding anything
higher than God, that is (I. Def. vi.), than a Being absolutely
infinite, and without which (I. xv.) nothing can either be or be
conceived ; therefore (IV. xxvi. and xxvii.), the mind’s highest
utility or (IV. Def. i.) good is the knowledge of God. Again,
the mind is active, only in so far as it understands, and only to
the same extent can it be said absolutely to act virtuously. The
mind’s absolute virtue is therefore to understand. Now, as we
have already shown, the highest that the mind can understand is
God ; therefore the highest virtue of the mind is to understand
or to know God. Q.E.D.
PROP. XXIX. No individual thing, which is entirely different
from our own nature, can help or check our power of activity, and
absolutely nothing can do us good or harm, unless it has
something in common with our nature.
Proof.-The power of every individual thing, and consequently
the power of man, whereby he exists and operates, can only be
determined by an individual thing (I. xxviii.), whose nature (II.
vi.) must be understood through the same nature as that, through
which human nature is conceived. Therefore our power of
activity, however it be conceived, can be determined and
consequently helped or hindered by the power of any other
individual thing, which has something in common with us, but not
by the power of anything, of which the nature is entirely
different from our own ; and since we call good or evil that
which is the cause of pleasure or pain (IV. viii.), that is (III.
xi. note), which increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, our
power of activity ; therefore, that which is entirely different
from our nature can neither be to us good nor bad. Q.E.D.
PROP. XXX. A thing cannot be bad for us through the quality
which it has in common with our nature, but it is bad for us in
so far as it is contrary to our nature.
Proof.-We call a thing bad when it is the cause of pain (IV.
viii.), that is (by the Def., which see in III. xi. note), when
it diminishes or checks our power of action. Therefore, if
anything were bad for us through that quality which it has in
common with our nature, it would be able itself to diminish or
check that which it has in common with our nature, which (III.
iv.) is absurd. Wherefore nothing can be bad for us through that
quality which it has in common
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